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IN THE SUPREME COURT THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Petlt iunri : 
v. t 
DONALD L. JAEGER, ' I ' Priority Mo. ^ 4 
Defendant/Respondent« 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF pRQCEEDINGS 
This case is before the Court on a grant of writ of 
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 1 
j u r i s d i e t , In iiii!!! il Illi -"ill I In case under utah Code - :8- 2(3) (a) 
(1992). 
STATEMENI or Tttis xSSUES PRESENTED ON CERTIORARI 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The i * 
] Did the com« ppeals erroneously conclude that 
the State has no right to seek appellate review 
heai j • :: Il: Dr der ::1 il sm :I s si i lg a :!:::i r s t: degree ic ,. .. , u rmation 
based the preliminary hearing magistrate's conclusion that 
there -H not probable cause to bind over defend? 
T h i s in s a q JI o s L11111 "i II il • \ < ; in i ,!e t erencc given *• . ^x - f 
appeals' legal conclusion. State v, James, 
(Utah 1991); AsaS- "-1 > Watkins. 753 ) 
(q U e s L egislative intent and statutory interpretation are 
matters of 
2. Did the preliminary hearing magistrate apply an 
incorrect legal standard for determining probable cause to bind 
defendant over for trial? This is a question of law; the 
magistrate's conclusion is accorded no deference on appeal and is 
reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 
1070 (Utah 1985). 
3. Did the preliminary hearing magistrate erroneously 
conclude that there was insufficient evidence to bind defendant 
over for trial on a charge of criminal homicide? In reviewing a 
dismissal of an information for insufficient evidence, the 
appellate court must view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the information and, when so viewed, determine if 
there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to support the 
charge. If so, the dismissal must be reversed. See Highland 
Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 
1984); Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The full text of all cited provisions is set forth in 
the addenda to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1990) (R. 1-2) (Addendum 1). A preliminary hearing was held in 
circuit court; at its conclusion, the magistrate took the case 
under advisement (R. 17-19). The magistrate subsequently issued 
a memorandum decision in which he concluded that there was no 
2 
probable cause defendant 1< i I i n't I \ nl i/dt HJ I 
di schaxyeil IT xidendum 1!) On February 6 1,991 thu 
court issued an order dismissing the felony information (R. JU) 
(Addendum 
The State appealed directly to the court of appeals (R. 
4 4 r 48-49) month before the scheduled oral argument, this 
Court issued - i i i. S ta te w. Humphrey, hi \ i . .'ii "i i (Utah 
(reversing State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 
1990) Defendant requested that supplemental briefing I . .I&S^RS 
jurisdictiona :&«.;• -aised , - ^ . ^ oncurred in 
the request appeals deniec 
£ and summari lismissed State's 
appeal for lack * ^isdiction State v. Jaeger 910132-CA 
(Utah 
t . i ,, , , *>* ertiorari. On June , 
1992 - petition was granted. 
,^x>TEMENT ui iH£ FACTS 
Shortly aftei midnight: on August 22, 1990, Mary Barndt 
lay dying on her kitchen floe > 
Office: s? i mi paramt a n e a . . --e found the 
nineteen year breathing but moving (T. 20-21f 28- j 
37; unshot wound surrounded 
5 apple or 
two feet from right foot wa* = .22 caliber semi-automatic 
pistol
 v J. . j 9 AX vr 
3 
"just ahead of the gun a little bit . . • kind of in between her 
— her ankles off to the side of the gunM (T. 10). Mary had on a 
skirt but was naked from the waist up; a bra was lying on the 
floor to her left (T. 14-15). Defendant, Mary's live-in 
boyfriend, was kneeling next to her head; he was not touching her 
but speaking to the 911 operator on the telephone (T. 10, 23-24, 
123). 
Officer Sundquist told the paramedics not to disturb 
Mary's hands. He immediately taped two brown bags over her hands 
to preserve any evidence (T. 16-17, 28). The paramedics placed 
Mary on a backboard to bring her to the ambulance (R. 114-15). 
While the officer did not see any motion (T. 28), a paramedic 
"noticed in particular that her feet were moving," she was 
••squirming around," "kicking her legs and moving her arm" (T. 
115). 
At the hospital, Officer Sundquist removed the taped 
bag from Mary's left hand and performed a paraffin (GSR) test for 
gunshot powder residue. Officer Peterson did the same to her 
right hand (T. 17, 19, 31-32, 70). Officer Sundquist had not 
performed a GSR test previously but carefully followed the 
directions which came with the test kit and properly secured the 
testing daubers (T. 18-19). Officer Peterson was experienced in 
performing the test and followed the kit directions completely 
(T. 70-71). The samples were taken while medical personnel were 
attempting to save Mary, but neither officer felt that this 
affected their ability to properly conduct the tests (T. 18, 31, 
4 
70-71, 80). GSR tests were also done on defendant (T. 71-72). 
Ballistic tests established that the recovered gun was 
relatively "clean" but when fired with a bullet, it left gunshot 
residue on the hand of the shooter (T. 11-12, 26-27, 67, 98, 
100). The GSR tests established that Mary's hands did not 
contain any substances indicative of gunpowder residue (T. 89-
90). Both of defendant's hands contained substances 
"characteristic" of gunpowder residue (T. 89-90).l 
Defendant told the police that the gun belonged to his 
boss. Defendant stated that "he'd been having problems with an 
individual that was a previous person living at his residence and 
so he had gone to the business and picked up the gun for his own 
safety" (T. 68). Defendant claimed that he had not touched the 
gun on the day of the shooting (T. 68). But when informed of his 
positive GSR test, defendant stated that it was "possible" that 
he had touched the gun. He stated that every night before he 
went to bed, he would dry fire the gun by pointing it at the 
floor and squeezing the trigger to make sure it was unloaded (T. 
84-85). Expert testimony established that dry firing of the gun 
would not have left powder residue on defendant's hands (T. 100-
1
 A particle is "consistent" with or "characteristic" of 
gunshot powder residue when it contains one or two requisite trace 
elements (T. 91). A particle is "unique" to gunshot residue when 
all three elements, lead, antimony and barium, are found within the 
same spherical particle (T. 91). 
5 
01).2 
Defendant said that on the night Mary died, he came 
home from work around 7:30 p.m. He had expected Mary to be home 
but she was not. He opened the mail and found a telephone bill 
with a number of calls to Clearfield. He was not familiar with 
the number and "decided that he'd make some calls to find out 
where the calls was [sic] going to." Around 12:00 or 12:15 a.m., 
he was awakened by Mary "laying [sic] next to him" (T. 69). He 
told Mary that he wanted her to leave, to move out the next day 
since "he was disappointed in the way that she had been acting, 
that she hadn't returned home that evening, that she had left her 
child alone that evening, that she had called earlier that 
evening at approximately 10:30 and there was music and noises in 
the background that he thought, he didn't know, but he assumed 
that she was possibly at a bar or at a party" (T. 69-70). 
Defendant claimed that he did not yell or get angry but simply 
spoke to her in a stern voice (T. 70). Defendant said he then 
went to sleep but awoke when he heard a shot. He went to the 
kitchen and found Mary lying on the floor (T. 67). 
After performing an autopsy, a state medical examiner 
testified that in his opinion Mary died as a result of a homicide 
(T. 49-50). Examining the entry wound located in her left collar 
2
 Defendant later reiterated to the police that he did not 
touch Mary or the gun (T. 68, 82-84). Asked how he got a blood 
stain on one of his hands, he stated that he had "wiped across 
[Mary's] chest" (T. 78). The State's expert testified that it was 
"possible" that touching a wound with stippling could leave 
gunpowder residue on the hand (T. 107). 
6 
bone area and the trajectory of the bullet disclosed that the 
bullet entered Mary's body "at an angle from down to up and from 
her right to her left." There was no exit wound; the bullet was 
found in the back area of her neck, about 8 1/2 inches from the 
top of her head (T. 37). The bullet never struck her clavicle 
but went underneath it. The medical examiner concluded that when 
the victim was shot, her left arm and elbow were elevated above 
shoulder height; he could not determine how the right arm was 
positioned (T. 38-39). 
The state crime lab and medical examiner's office 
conducted test firings with the recovered gun to compare 
stippling patterns produced at different ranges with those found 
during the autopsy (T. 43-44). From this, it was determined that 
the gun was fired in the intermediate range, with the end of the 
barrel nine to ten inches away from Mary's body (T. 46, 51). 
Mary's arm length was 26 1/2 inches (T. 51). Based on 
the path of the bullet and the length of her arms, the medical 
examiner concluded that Mthe range from which the weapon was 
fired would be of a distance that would be very difficult for an 
individual to achieve to have a self-inflicted wound" (T. 47). 
If self-inflicted, the gun would have been held in the right hand 
(T. 47). Since the gun was fired at the 9-10 inch range and the 
gun barrel length added another 5 inches, Mary would have had to 
fully extend her arm, holding the gun lower than her clavicle 
area, to the right of midline and below her right breast (T. 51, 
55-56). To test her ability to do this, an experiment was set 
7 
up with a gun which had a 4 inch barrel length and a woman who 
had a 28 inch arm length. Despite her slightly longer arm length 
and the slightly shorter barrel, the woman was "unable to reach, 
put her hand around the trigger and reproduce the angle" at which 
Mary was shot (T. 51). In this positionf the woman could not 
pull the trigger with her index finger. If the thumb was used on 
the trigger, the weapon could be placed "farther away" from the 
body (T. 55). Based on the attempted reproduction, the medical 
examiner stated that if the index finger was used, Mary would 
"not have been able to produce that angle and that range of fire. 
If she had used her thumb, it is possible that she could have 
been the one that fired the weapon" (64-65). 
In rejecting the idea that Mary had shot herself, the 
medical examiner additionally considered the location of the 
entrance wound: 
Typically in suicides the gunshot wounds have 
entrances that are located either in the 
head, in the chest, over the heart region, or 
in the abdomen. The location for the 
entrance wound occurring over the clavicle is 
an atypical location for an entrance wound. 
Also in suicides the wounds are typically 
contact wounds or close contact, meaning the 
end of the barrel is close to the surface of 
the body when the weapon is discharged. 
A possibility in this case is that the 
deceased, if she was indeed the one firing 
the weapon, could have flinched and accounted 
for the misplacement of the entrance wound. 
However, typically if individuals flinch, the 
weapon has been placed in a close contact or 
contact position and then rotated and 
produces tangential wounds on the skin 
surface. Usually someone does not flinch 
outwords [sic] before firing a weapon. 
Also the angle of fire, most of the 
suicide entrance wounds are usually straight 
8 
on, maybe a slight angle. But the fact that 
there is an intermediate range with stippling 
makes it very unusual for this to be a self-
inflicted wound. Based on the investigation, 
we had no information that she had any 
previous suicidal thoughts, although that in 
several of our suicide cases that we have at 
our office we may not have information that 
specifically says that this person was 
suicidal• 
The other thing is the elevation of the 
clavicle. If someone is to shoot themselves, 
I would find it very unusual that they would 
elevate their arm as they're doing this 
procedure, unless an individual is lying down 
and possibly placing the hand behind the head 
in a resting position. And also the 
information that I obtained as far as the 
results of the gunshot residue testing that 
we had of the samples that we had obtained on 
the deceased, as well as other gunshot 
residue tests that were done. 
(T. 49-50). Even when considering the fact that the weapon 
recovered had close to a "hair trigger" (T. 99), the medical 
examiner still concluded based on the range and positioning of 
the wound that it was "unlikely that the deceased [was] the one 
who actually pulled the trigger" (T. 63, 65). 
Defendant waived his right to testify at the 
preliminary hearing (T. 123-24). Through cross-examination of 
the State's witnesses, defendant established that he worked for 
Western Battery, overhauling alternators and generators (T. 87). 
Samples taken from his work tools were chemically tested. 
Officer Peterson "believe[d]," but was "not sure," that "one 
particle" from defendant's work area was found to be "consistent 
with gunshot residue" (T. 87).3 No other evidence was 
3
 See n.l, supra at 5. 
9 
introduced concerning the results of these tests. 
Defendant subpoenaed the victim's mother, Judy Clark 
(R. 14; T. 117). She testified that defendant had telephoned her 
twice looking for Mary (T. 118). Defendant told her that he had 
found Mary's daughter in the house alone and that Mary was "heavy 
into drugs" (T. 119, 121). Later that evening, defendant called 
a third time but immediately handed the phone to Mary, who was 
then home and crying (T. 119-20). Mary repeatedly told her 
mother that defendant hated her (T. 121). Mary said that "things 
[were not] working out with" defendant and "mentioned" that she 
had "problems with getting a job and and [sic] she felt upset" 
(T. 121). She said, "I feel like I just need to get away from 
things and work things out" (T. 122). 
Several hours later, Mrs. Clark was told that Mary had 
"passed away" (T. 120). She asked if Mary had taken something to 
kill herself (T. 121). Mrs. Clark testified that she asked this 
only because defendant had previously said that Mary was "heavy 
into drugs," but that nothing in the conversation with her 
daughter indicated that she was contemplating suicide (T. 121-
22). Mary's blood alcohol level at the time of her death was .10 
percent, "slightly above" the legal limit (T. 59). She had also 
ingested diazepam (valium) before her death, revealing a level of 
.33 percent. A person who does not normally take valium and then 
ingests a single 10 milligram tablet would have a blood level 
after one hour of approximately .14 percent; while a person who 
daily ingests valium would have a level of approximately 1.03 
10 
percent (T. 61-62). Mary's level of Valium was "closer to the 
single oral dosage level" than the daily level (T. 62). 
Defendant introduced a tape recording of his telephone 
call to 911 for assistance for Mary (T. 123; R. 51). The 
operator could hear Mary groaning in the background and 
defendant's statements that he loved her. Several times, the 
operator told defendant to help Mary by holding her hand or 
turning her on her side. Each time, defendant responded that he 
did not want to touch her. The operator told defendant to move 
the gun from Mary's reach but defendant responded again that he 
did not want to touch it. When the operator insisted that the 
gun be moved away from Mary, defendant told her that it was about 
four feet away and did not need to be moved. 
In refusing to bind over defendant for trial, the 
preliminary hearing magistrate concluded that "no reasonable jury 
given the facts of this case before the court could find the 
defendant guilty of second degree murder" (R. 36). In the 
opinion of the magistrate, the facts supported only a conclusion 
of suicide (R. 29-35) (Addendum 2). For this reason, the felony 
information was dismissed (R. 39-40) (Addendum 3). 
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SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION TO ARGUMENT 
Jurisdictional Issue 
In State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991)
 f this 
Court determined the appropriate procedural course for a 
defendant who seeks review of a preliminary hearing bindover 
order. The converse question is presented here: What is the 
State's right of review of a preliminary hearing court order 
dismissing a felony information based on a magistrate's 
conclusion that there is not probable cause to bind over the 
defendant for trial? 
In considering a defendant's right of review of a 
magistrate's bindover order, this Court stated: 
Magistrates are not courts or tribunals. 
They exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory, 
functions. Review of their orders cannot 
properly be subjected to appellate review 
under our statutory scheme. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. The court of appeals relied on this 
reasoning in summarily dismissing the State's appeal in this 
case. But the Humphrey statement, while correct if considering 
the traditional magisterial role of holding a defendant for 
trial, is inapplicable to the preliminary hearing court's 
adjudicatory role in dismissing a felony information. 
Beginning in territorial days, only trial courts had 
the authority to dismiss a felony information and the State was 
granted the right to directly appeal such dismissals. A 
magistrate had no authority to dismiss a felony information. 
In 1980 the legislature substantially departed from 
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this precedent. Where previously a magistrate's authority was 
wholly non-adjudicatory, preliminary hearing magistratesf who in 
felony cases must be judges of courts of record, were granted the 
authority to dismiss a criminal information. Contemporaneously, 
the State's right to appeal was extended. Where previously the 
State only had the right to appeal from dismissals issued by the 
trial court, the State's right to appeal from a dismissal was 
broadened to include a final judgment of dismissal irrespective 
of the issuing court. 
Dicta in Humphrey characterized these newly authorized 
preliminary hearing court orders of dismissal as lacking finality 
and, hence, unappealable because refiling of the information is 
not precluded. But, Utah law has consistently recognized the 
appealability of orders of dismissal without regard to the losing 
party's ability to refile the case. 
Additionally, the Humphrey reasoning did not consider 
constitutional limitations on the State's right to refile. Rule 
7(8)(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, permits the State 
"review" of a refusal to bind over by simply refiling the 
dismissed information before a different magistrate. This 
provision has been effectively nullified by State v. Brickev, 714 
P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), which prohibits the refiling of a dismissed 
information unless authorized by the original magistrate on the 
basis that "new evidence" or "good cause" justifies the refiling. 
Other jurisdictions have concluded that a due process limitation 
on the State's ability to refile gives finality to a dismissal 
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and allows for superior court review; for, it would be 
inequitable to impose a Brickev-tvpe standard while denying the 
State any avenue of review of the magistrate's actions. This 
view should be adopted in Utah. 
Alternatively, if the court of appeals' ruling is 
correct and no right of appeal exists, this Court should convert 
this action to an extraordinary writ, as no other just remedy at 
law is available. The district court lacks jurisdiction since no 
bindover order was issued and refiling is precluded by Briekev. 
Without review by this Court, the magistrate's erroneous legal 
conclusions will remain insulated from challenge and the State 
will be denied a fair adjudication of the merits. 
Because the court of appeals summarily dismissed this 
appeal, no determination of its merits was made. This Court 
should now consider the substantive issues; the record contains 
all relevant evidence, which evidence was essentially 
unchallenged below, and the issues are matters of law. The two 
substantive issues raised are: (1) Did the magistrate apply an 
erroneous probable cause standard? and (2) Based on the 
preliminary hearing evidence, is there probable cause to bind 
over as a matter of law? 
Standard of Proof Issue 
Traditionally in Utah, probable cause for a bindover 
was defined as reason to believe that the defendant was "guilty 
of the offense." Under this definition, probable cause required 
proof of a prima facie case. In 1980, the legislature 
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substantially changed the preliminary hearing probable cause 
standard by defining probable cause for a bindover as reason to 
believe that the defendant "had committed the offense." This 
latter language has been interpreted by this Court as not 
requiring proof of a prima facie case. Insteadf probable cause 
for bindover is now identical to the lesser standard of probable 
cause applied in authorizing arrest or search warrants under the 
fourth amendment. 
The preliminary hearing magistrate erred, therefore, as 
a matter of law in evaluating the evidence under a prima facie 
probable cause standard. 
Substantive Issue 
The magistrate incorrectly applied a prima facie 
standard in assessing the State's evidence and erroneously 
concluded that there was not probable cause to bind over 
defendant for trial. But even under a prima facie standard, the 
magistrate's conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the information is erroneous as a matter of law. 
Under either a fourth amendment or prima facie standard 
of probable cause, the magistrate improperly considered the 
credibility of otherwise plausible evidence, failed to consider 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the information, and 
entered factual findings which were unsupported by and contrary 
to the evidence presented. Taking the preliminary hearing 
evidence as a whole, the only issues were factual issues properly 
left to a jury determination. For these reasons, probable cause 
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for a bindover was established as a matter of law. 
This Court should reverse the court of appeals' 
dismissal of the State's appeal and review the substantive merits 
of this case. If probable cause is found, defendant should be 
ordered bound over for trial on the homicide information. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
AN ORDER DISMISSING AN INFORMATION BASED ON 
LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO BIND OVER IS A 
FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER 
A. The Nature Of An Appealable Final Order 
Of Dismissal 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Supp. 1992) allows the 
State to appeal from a final judgment of dismissal. Until State 
v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), it was settled law that 
[w]hile a judgment of dismissal does not 
always determine the rights of the parties 
litigant, and may not preclude the bringing 
of a new action, still it is conclusive as to 
the rights of the parties in that particular 
suit; and where the rights of the parties in 
an action, or a distinct and independent 
branch thereof, are determined by the court, 
and nothing is reserved for future 
determination, except what may be necessary 
to enforce the judgment or decision, the 
judgment is final. 
State v. Booth, 59 P. 553, 554 (Utah 1899) (determining that the 
State must directly appeal a dismissal of an indictment as 
opposed to seeking mandamus). Accord State v. Gomez. 722 P.2d 
747 (Utah 1986) (permitting the State to appeal from the grant of 
the State's motion to dismiss an information at a time when the 
State was statutorily permitted to refile the information); State 
16 
v. Ward, 571 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1977), cert, denied, 435 U.S. 1005 
(1978) (allowing the State to directly appeal from an order 
granting a motion to quash at a time when statutorily the quashal 
did not bar refiling of the information); State v. Archuletta, 
526 P.2d 911, 911 (Utah 1974) (recognizing the State's right to 
appeal the grant of a motion to quash entered "without prejudice 
for a new filing" of an amended information); State ex rel. 
Neilson v. Third Judicial District Court, 102 P. 868, 869 (Utah 
1909) (holding that for purposes of appeal, finality of a 
dismissal is not affected by the losing party's ability to re-
instigate litigation). Cf.. State v. Thompson, 254 P. 147 (Utah 
1927) (an order which quashes an information but orders the 
defendant to remain in custody and the information to be refiled 
is not a final appealable order). 
The Humphrey decision was limited to a determination of 
a defendant's right of review of a bindover order which holds the 
defendant for further trial proceedings. Yet, dicta in Humphrey 
substantially calls into question the above Utah precedent by 
suggesting that a preliminary hearing court order of dismissal of 
a felony information predicated on a refusal to bind over is not 
a final order of dismissal appealable by the State pursuant to § 
77-18a-l(2)(a): 
The fact that a magistrate's dismissal of a 
charge does not preclude subsequent 
prosecution of the same offense, see Utah R. 
Crim. P. 7(8)(c), substantiates the 
determination that magistrates do not 
adjudicate. . . . [A] judicial officer 
functioning as a magistrate is not 
functioning as a circuit court or other court 
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of record. Because magistrates are not 
courts of record when they conduct 
preliminary hearings and issue bindover 
orders, under current jurisdictional statutes 
their orders are not immediately appealable. 
. . . 
Magistrates are not courts or tribunals. 
They exercise magisterial, not adjudicatory, 
functions. Review of their orders cannot 
properly be subjected to appellate review 
under our statutory scheme. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. Before specifics of the Humphrey 
opinion are discussed, the State's traditional right to appeal an 
order of dismissal must be understood. 
Historically, the State always enjoyed the right to 
appeal from a pretrial order which effectively dismissed a felony 
charging document. In territorial days, the State was permitted 
to directly appeal from a "judgment for the defendant on a 
demurrer to the indictment." 1888, Compiled Laws of Utah 
(Territory) § 5137(1) (Addendum 5 ) / Accord State v. Eldredqe, 
5 Utah 161, 13 P. 673 (Terr, of Utah), cert, denied, 145 U.S. 636 
(1887). After statehood, the State's right was expanded to 
include the right to appeal from a demurred information. 1917, 
Compiled Laws of Utah § 9208 (Addendum 6). 
In 1953, with the abolition of demurrers and the 
creation of motions to quash, the State retained the right to 
directly appeal "from a judgment of dismissal in favor of the 
4
 The complete text of all cited constitutional, statutory or 
rule provisions is contained in the addenda. A separate addendum 
is provided for each year cited which contains all the relevant 
provisions for that year, i.e, Addendum 5 contains all relevant 
territorial provisions; Addendum 6, the relevant 1917 provisions; 
Addendum 7, the 1953 provisions; Addendum 8, the 1980 changes; and 
Addendum 9, the current provisions. 
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defendant upon a motion to quash." Utah Code Ann. § 77-39-4(1) 
(1953) (Addendum 7). 
In 1980, the State's right to appeal was expanded to 
include the right to appeal from Ma final judgment of dismissal" 
without restriction of the basis for the dismissal. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(l) (1980) (referred to as Utah R. Crim. P. 26) 
(Addendum 8). This same language remains in the current statute 
and rule. Utah Code Ann. S 77-18a-l(2)(a); Utah R. Crim. P. 
26(3)(a) (Addendum 9). 
The current statute, section 77-18a-l(2)(a), is a 
significant expansion of the State's original right to appeal 
from the granting of a demurrer. State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 
1235 (Utah App. 1990). A demurrer to an indictment or 
information was limited to specified grounds, including lack of 
jurisdiction and failure to substantially conform to the 
statutory charging requirements. 1888, Compiled Laws § 4972; 
1917f Compiled Laws § 8889 (Addenda 5 & 6). With the change to a 
quashal system, the grounds were expanded to include (a) failure 
to provide a defendant with a preliminary hearing, (b) failure to 
comply with the preliminary hearing statutory requirements, and 
(c) failure of the prosecutor to authorize the filing of the 
information. Utah Code Ann. S 77-23-3(2) (1953) (Addendum 7). 
These new grounds had formerly been the basis for an order 
setting aside an information, which was non-appealable. 1917, 
Compiled Laws §§ 8878 and 9208 (Addendum 6). Thus, by expanding 
the grounds for granting a quashal of an information, the 
19 
legislature necessarily also expanded the nature of the State's 
right to appeal from a judgment of dismissal based on a motion to 
quash. 
In 1980 with the adoption of the language of the 
present statute and rule, the legislature chose to deviate from 
its 100-year practice of restricting the State's right to appeal 
dismissals to those predicated on a quashal or demurrer. Now, 
the State is authorized to appeal from any "final judgment of 
dismissal." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (Addendum 9). See 
also Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(1) (1980) (Addendum 8). This 
expansion of the State's right to appeal is consistent with the 
history of the appellate statutes; the appellate rights of both 
the State and defendants have been expanded, not restricted, 
since territorial days. Compare 1888, Compiled Laws §§ 5136 and 
5137 (Addendum 5), with Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(b) and (c) 
(1980) (Addendum 8), with Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(l) and (2) 
(Addendum 9). See State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1983) 
("the Legislature has the power to confer appellate jurisdiction 
in connection with the decisions of any inferior court where such 
jurisdiction is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution"). 
B. The Nature Of An Order Of Dismissal 
Predicated On A Refusal To Bind Over A 
Defendant 
Is the State's right to appeal from an order dismissing 
an information limited to dismissals issued by the trial court as 
opposed to the preliminary hearing court? The court of appeals 
assumed that this question had been answered in Humphrey, 823 
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P.2d at 467-68, when this Court characterized preliminary hearing 
magistrates as non-adjudicatory and not of record. But while the 
Humphrey holding is sound, its dicta did not properly appreciate 
the adjudicatory nature of a dismissal of a felony information, 
did not discern the restrictions placed on which magistrates may 
conduct felony preliminary hearings, and failed to consider the 
impact of State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), on the 
right to refile granted in rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. 
(1) The Adjudicatory Nature Of A 
Preliminary Hearing Court's Order 
Dismissing A Felony Information 
Prior to 1980, if a preliminary hearing magistrate 
determined that probable cause did not exist to hold a defendant 
for trial, the magistrate's role was limited to "discharging" the 
defendant. 1888, Compiled Laws § 4885 (Addendum 5); 1917, 
Compiled Laws § 8753 (Addendum 6); Utah Code Ann. S 77-15-17 
(1953) (Addendum 7); Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1326-27 
(Utah 1977) (the power of a committing magistrate is limited to 
discharging the defendant or binding him over for trial). 
However, this traditional non-adjudicatory role was 
expanded in 1980 to confer on preliminary hearing courts the 
adjudicatory power to "dismiss the information." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-35-7(d)(l) (1980) (Addendum 8). Accord Van Dam, 571 P.2d at 
1327 (under pre-1980 statutes, the power to dismiss a felony 
information was not conferred on magistrates but restricted to 
"courts"). Under the current procedural rule, the preliminary 
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hearing court has retained this adjudicatory authority. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 7(8)(c) (Addendum 9). 
The failure of the Humphrey decision to recognize the 
adjudicatory nature of a preliminary hearing court order of 
dismissal arises from the decision's uncritical reliance on the 
language of Van Dam. Van Dam's holding that magistrates have no 
adjudicatory function was dictated by the pre-1980 statutes 
restricting preliminary hearing magistrates to discharging a 
defendant and allowing only trial courts to terminate prosecution 
by dismissing the information. Read in light of the 1980 
statutory change and the current rule, Van Dam supports the 
proposition that when a preliminary hearing magistrate dismisses 
a felony information, the magistrate adjudicates as a "court." 
Cf. State v. Easthope, 668 P.2d 528, 531-32 (Utah 1983) ("In the 
absence of language expressly limiting 'the court' to a 
particular court, it is reasonable to construe discovery powers 
as having been conferred upon . . • the circuit courts" inherent 
in their magisterial power to conduct preliminary hearings). 
(2) The Statutory Requirement That 
Preliminary Hearing Magistrates In 
Felony Cases Must Be Courts Of 
Record 
Humphrey also concluded that preliminary hearing 
magistrates are not "circuit courts. Furthermore, because the 
statutory definition of magistrate includes judges of courts not 
of record, . . . the respective functions of courts of record and 
magistrates are not extensive." Id., 823 P.2d at 467. Again, 
while technically correct, this statement fails to consider the 
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restrictions placed on which magistrates and courts may conduct 
felony preliminary hearings. 
At the time of this preliminary hearing in January 
1991, magistrates were defined to include judges of the appellate 
courts, the district courts, the juvenile courts, the circuit 
courts and the justice courts. Utah Code Ann. S 77-1-3(4) (1990) 
(Addendum 9). Except for the justice courts, the remainder were 
designated as courts of record. JId. But statutorily, not all 
magistrates were permitted to conduct preliminary hearings. 
Judges of courts not of record have never had authority to 
conduct a felony preliminary hearing or dismiss a felony 
information. Instead, only a court of record, i.e., circuit 
court or above, could conduct this first degree felony 
preliminary hearing. Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-104(3)(c) (Supp. 
1989) (Addendum 8). Even for second and third degree felonies, 
the justice court could only conduct a preliminary hearing if (1) 
no circuit court existed in the jurisdiction, and (2) the justice 
court proceedings were "made a matter of record." Id. 
In January 1992, additional restrictions were placed on 
which magistrates could conduct felony preliminary hearings. 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-5-104 (1992) (Addendum 9) prohibits the 
justice courts from conducting any felony preliminary hearings 
unless authorized by the Judicial Council Rules. Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-7-17.5(2) (1992) limits felony preliminary hearings to 
courts of record (Addendum 9). Rule 4-610, Code of Judicial 
Administration, permits the appointment of a justice court judge 
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to preside at a preliminary hearing only if no court of record 
judge is reasonably available and then only if trained to conduct 
the preliminary hearing and the parties stipulate (Addendum 9). 
Further, the hearing must be "conducted on the record." Id. 
(3) The Impact Of State v. Brickev On 
The Finality Of A Preliminary 
Hearing Court Order Of Dismissal 
When the legislature by statute and this Court by rule 
granted the preliminary hearing court adjudicatory power and 
restricted felony preliminary hearings to courts of record, 
significant expansion of the State's right to appeal also 
occurred. Where prior to 1980 the State could only appeal a 
dismissal issued by the trial court in quashing an information, 
the State may now appeal from any final grant of a dismissal 
irrespective of the issuing court (see discussion, supra at 19-
20). 
Despite this, dicta in Humphrey would negate the 
appealability of a preliminary hearing court order of dismissal 
on the grounds that such an order is not "final" since the State 
may refile the information. Id., 823 P.2d at 467. But as 
discussed, supra at 16-17, the finality of a judgment has never 
been limited by the fact that a party may re-instigate 
litigation. Indeed, it is clear that the State would have the 
right to appeal a trial court's dismissal of the information on 
insufficiency grounds under § 77-18a-l(2)(a), even though the 
procedural rules contemplate that the State may refile the 
information. See Rule 25(d), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
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(only dismissals based on speedy trial or statute of limitations 
violations bar subsequent prosecution) (Addendum 9). 
Significantly, in weighing the impact of refiling on 
"finality," the Humphrey decision failed to consider the effect 
of State v, Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986), which prohibits 
the refiling of a dismissed information unless authorized by the 
original magistrate on the basis that "new evidence" or "good 
cause" justifies the refiling. The adoption of this due process 
limitation effectively nullifies the State's right to refile an 
information dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage pursuant 
to rule 7(8)(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (Addendum 9). 
Now, despite the procedural rule permitting unfettered refiling, 
the State's right to refile is controlled by due process 
determinations of the magistrate. Further, if the court of 
appeals' application of Humphrey were followed, the State would 
have no right of appeal from the original order of dismissal and 
no right of review of any subsequent action by the magistrate in 
barring refiling. As noted by at least one commentator, to 
refuse to provide appellate review because of lack of "finality" 
of a judgment, which judgment fully precludes the State from 
proceeding, amounts to the "awkward and unjustified setoff of two 
irrational rules." Graham and Letwin, "The Preliminary Hearing 
in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy 
Observations," 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 635, 731 (1971). No other 
judicial officer or court is so isolated from challenge. 
Every jurisdiction addressing the prosecution's right 
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to seek review of a refusal to bind over and dismissal of an 
information has considered the presence or absence of a Brickey-
type restriction. State v. Frv. 385 N.W.2d 196, 198-99 (Wis. 
App. 1985), cert, denied, 388 N.W.2d 185 (Wis. 1986) (where 
refiling is subject to a Brickev-tvpe standard, the State retains 
the right to appeal erroneous legal conclusion); State v. Antes, 
246 N.W.2d 671, 674 (Wis. 1976) (when prosecution is restricted 
from refiling under Briekev-type standard, any dismissal of the 
charges is a final order and appealable); Commonwealth v. Finn, 
496 A.2d 1254, 1255 (Pa. Sup. 1985) (while a dismissal of an 
information for lack of probable cause is not ordinarily 
considered a final order since the prosecution may freely refile, 
it will be considered as final and appealable where refiling is 
precluded due to a statute of limitations); Commonwealth v. 
Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10 (Penn. 1978) (a dismissal of an information 
for lack of probable cause will be considered final where lower 
court refused to allow refiling); Walker v. Schneider, 477 N.W.2d 
167, 171-75 (N.D. 1991) (under its writ and rulemaking powers, 
the court adopts a Brickev standard and then construes the 
dismissal of information as a final order which may be appealed); 
State Ex Rel. Fallis v. Caldwell, 498 P.2d 426, 428 (Okl. App. 
1972) (using its writ powers, the court adopts a prospective rule 
that the prosecution is entitled to a right of review of a 
dismissed information co-equal with that of defendant's right to 
review of bindover order); State v. Zimmerman, 660 P.2d 960, 963-
64 (Kan. 1983) (where refiling is restricted, dismissal of a 
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criminal complaint is equivalent to a final order; statute 
permits appeals from such orders and is not affected by the 
possibility that the State may refile); Morgan v. State, 675 P.2d 
473 (Okl. App. 1984) (State's right to refile or appeal from 
dismissal are alternative modes of procedure); People v. Nevitt, 
256 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. App. 1977) (where charges are dismissed, 
better practice is to allow appeal rather than permit de novo 
refiling); State v. Ruiz, 678 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Idaho 1984) (where 
no Brickev-type restriction on refiling, the State's remedy for a 
dismissed information is to refile de novo before a different 
magistrate); State v. Fahev, 275 N.W.2d 870, 871 (S.D. 1979) 
(magistrate's order of dismissal is not final order where State 
has unrestricted right to refile de novo before different 
magistrate); State v. Maki, 192 N.W.2d 811 (Minn. 1971) (State's 
right to review of dismissed charges is limited to its 
unrestricted right to refile the charges de novo before a 
different magistrate). See also People v. Mimms, 251 Cal.Rptr. 
672 (Cal. App. 1988) (recognizing appellate court's attempts to 
provide prosecution with review of a magistrate's order and 
subsequent legislative reform allowing the prosecution to first 
seek reconsideration from the magistrate who dismisses an 
information and then permitting direct appellate review of the 
magistrate's refusal to reconsider). 
C. The State's Right To Review Of The 
Merits 
As discussed, the State asserts that it is entitled to 
direct appellate review of the order of dismissal issued by the 
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preliminary hearing court• This is based on the present 
statutory and rule provisions and is consistent with the State's 
right to appeal similar orders of dismissal since territorial 
days. 
Alternatively, if the court of appeals is correct that 
no right of appeal exists, this Court should convert this action 
to an extraordinary writ, as no other just remedy at law is 
available. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). The district court lacks 
jurisdiction since no bindover order was issued and refiling is 
precluded by Brickev. Without review by this Court, the 
magistrate's erroneous legal conclusions will remain insulated 
from challenge and the State will be denied a fair adjudication 
of the merits. 
POINT II 
THE PRIMA FACIE STANDARD FOR PROBABLE CAUSE 
TO BIND OVER FOR TRIAL IS NO LONGER 
APPLICABLE IN UTAH; INSTEAD, THE STANDARD HAS 
BEEN REDUCED TO A LEVEL OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
EQUIVALENT TO THAT REQUIRED UNDER THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
Under the Utah Constitution, a defendant charged by an 
information has the right to a preliminary examination before a 
magistrate to determine if he should be held for trial. Utah 
Const, art. I, S 13 (Addendum 9). The probable cause standard of 
proof applicable to such a hearing is not constitutionally 
defined but arises from legislative enactment and, today, by 
procedural rule. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(b). 
Here, the magistrate relied on the prima facie probable 
cause standard enunciated in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778 
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(Utah 1980), which had been accepted in Utah since State v. 
Eldredoe, 13 P. 673 (R. 27-29). The prima facie standard derived 
from the difference in statutory definition of probable cause for 
purposes of a preliminary hearing as opposed to a warrant of 
arrest. 
From territorial days until 1980, Utah law established 
that a magistrate had probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest 
when the magistrate was satisfied that an offense had been 
committed and there was a reasonable basis to believe that "the 
defendant had committed it." 1888, Compiled Laws § 4839 
(Addendum 5); 1917, Compiled Laws S 8688 (Addendum 6); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-12-1 (1953) (Addendum 7).5 During the same period, a 
magistrate had probable cause to bind over a defendant for trial 
when the magistrate was satisfied that an offense had been 
committed and a reasonable basis to believe that "the defendant 
was guilty of it." 1888, Compiled Laws § 4885 (Addendum 5); 
1917, Compiled Laws § 8753 (Addendum 6); Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-
17 (1953) (Addendum 7). Comparing these two distinct standards, 
this Court stated: 
The probable cause showing necessary in 
the preliminary examination differs from that 
required for an arrest warrant. In the 
latter, the facts presented must be 
sufficient to establish that an offense has 
been committed and a reasonable belief the 
defendant committed it. The facts presented, 
however, do not have to establish a prima 
5
 The term "probable cause" was not used statutorily until 
1980 but "reasonable cause" and "sufficient cause" were interpreted 
to mean "probable cause." Eldredge, 13 P. at 675-76; Anderson. 612 
P.2d at 783. 
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facie case against defendant. 
Conversely the probable cause showing at 
the preliminary examination must establish a 
prima facie case against the defendant from 
which the trier of fact could conclude the 
defendant was guilty of the offense as 
charged. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783 (citing Eldredore, 13 P. at 675-76) 
(footnotes omitted). 
In 1980, the Utah legislature abandoned these 
distinctions and lowered the standard of probable cause for a 
preliminary hearing. Whereas before the statutory definitions 
differed for probable cause to arrest and probable cause to bind 
over, the legislature now chose to equate the two. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-7(d)(1) (1980) (Addendum 8) was enacted to read: 
If from the evidence a magistrate finds 
probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate 
shall forthwith order . . . that the 
defendant be bound over to answer in the 
district court. 
(Emphasis Added). The new language is identical to that 
traditionally used to define probable cause for purposes of 
arrest. See Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-6(a) (1980) (Addendum 8). 
The legislature must be presumed to have understood the 
consequences of so substantial a change. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 
P.2d 245, 252 n.ll (Utah 1988) (any statutory amendment not 
expressly designated as a clarification must be presumed to be a 
change in existing legal rights and liabilities). 
Ten years after the 1980 legislative change, this Court 
reaffirmed the adoption of the fourth amendment standard for 
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probable cause to bindover by utilizing the "committed" language 
in current rule 7(8)(b), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(Addendum 9). 
Consistent with the majority of other jurisdictions, 
the new Utah test for probable cause to bind over is one of 
probability. LaFave and Isreal, Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2, § 
14.3 at 256. It is more than "mere suspicion" but less than 
"condemnation or conviction;" it exists when the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the crime are sufficient to "warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in the belief" that the defendant 
committed the crime. Brineaar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 
175-76 (1949). 
Despite the clear legislative and rule change, 
subsequent cases have cited the Anderson prima facie standard as 
applicable to preliminary hearings. In State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 
at 646 and State v. Easthooe, 668 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1983), this 
Court correctly noted that the State must establish probable 
cause that a defendant "committed" an offense to hold him for 
trial but then, without analysis, stated that Anderson had 
interpreted this language to impose a prima facie standard. This 
is directly contrary to Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783, which 
recognized that use of "committed" language does not create a 
prima facie requirement. 
But whether a fourth amendment or prima facie standard 
is applied to probable cause, the magistrate's refusal to bind 
over defendant is still erroneous as a matter of law. 
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No Utah case has enunciated how a magistrate should 
evaluate evidence to determine if probable cause has been 
established, that is: When should the magistrate evaluate the 
credibility of the witnesses and in whose favor should 
conflicting evidence and inferences be resolved? Two Utah cases 
have generally commented on the right of a preliminary hearing 
magistrate to consider the credibility of witnesses. State v. 
Anderson. 612 P.2d at 786 ("the credibility of the witnesses is 
an important element in the determination of probable cause"); 
State v. Giles, 576 P.2d 876# 879 (Utah 1978) (a magistrate has 
the "prerogative to believe whom he chose and to decide which 
witness was telling the truth and which one was falsifying"). 
But since neither case was decided on this ground, the decisions 
are not controlling. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 
1991) (appellate court is not bound by earlier dicta). Accord 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468. 
More determinative are decisions addressing the 
propriety of dismissals based on insufficient evidence and 
directed verdicts.6 In the civil context, the law is clear: 
In directing a verdict the trial court may 
not weigh the evidence. Rather, the court 
must consider the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party against whom the 
motion is directed and resolve controverted 
facts in his favor. If the evidence and its 
6
 A prima facie standard is considered synonymous, in this 
context, with a directed verdict standard. See LaFave and Israel, 
Crimina1 Procedure, § 14.3(a). For purposes of evaluating 
evidence, a fourth amendment standard entails the same type of 
inquiries as a prima facie standard but with a lesser degree of 
proof. 
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inferences would cause reasonable men to 
arrive at different conclusions as to whether 
the essential facts were or were not proved, 
then the question is one of fact for the 
jury. Unless the evidence is wholly lacking 
and incapable of reasonable inference to 
prove some issue which supports the 
plaintiff's claim, a court should not direct 
a verdict for the defendant. 
Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted). On appeal, the same standard is imposed; the appellate 
court must view the evidence is the light most favorable to the 
losing party and if there is any reasonable basis to support "a 
judgment in favor of the losing party, the directed verdict 
cannot be sustained." Management Committee v. Graystone Pines. 
652 P.2d 896, 897-898 (Utah 1982); Highland Const, Co. v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984). 
Applying this standard to a determination of probable 
cause, a magistrate must not resolve the ultimate issue of guilt. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 683 (even under a prima facie standard, the 
State need not establish guilt, only enough evidence to warrant 
the submission of the case to the trier of fact). Rather, the 
magistrate should view the evidence, and all potential 
inferences, in the light most favorable to the prosecution. 
Under a fourth amendment standard, the magistrate must then 
determine if the facts provide "some rational ground for assuming 
the possibility" that the crime was committed and the defendant 
committed it. CjE. People v. Superior Court (Bolden), 257 
Cal.Rptr. 678, 680 (Calif. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1989). Accord 
People v. Garner. 781 P.2d 87, 90 (Colo. 1989) (evidence is 
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sufficient for a bind over when it would "induce a person of 
ordinary prudence to entertain a reasonable belief that the 
defendant committed the crime charged . . . evidence sufficient 
to support a conviction is not necessary"). 
Under a prima facie standard, the magistrate must 
determine if some evidence exists in support of all requisite 
elements of the crime. If credible evidence exists both 
supporting and negating an element, this presents a question of 
fact to be resolved by the jury and a bind over is required. See 
People v. Superior Court fKneip), 268 Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 6 Dist. 1990) ("the evidence need not be unambiguous for 
purposes of a bindover; raising a reasonable possibility of guilt 
suffices"). See also People v. District Court, 803 P.2d 193, 196 
(Colo. 1990) ("it is not for the trial judge at a preliminary 
hearing to accept the defendant's version of the facts over the 
legitimate inferences which can be drawn from the People's 
evidence. . . . weighing the merits of the case is for the trier 
of fact at trial"); People v. Pedrie, 727 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 
1986) ("when testimony conflicts, a question of fact exists for 
the jury, and the judge must draw the inference favorable to the 
prosecution"); State v. Patterson, 570 A.2d 174, 179 (Conn. 1990) 
("when reviewing a motion to dismiss an information, the 
proffered proof is to be viewed most favorably to the state"); 
People v. Moore, 446 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989), 
appeal denied Mich. (1990) ("if the preliminary examination 
evidence conflicts or raises a reasonable doubt regarding a 
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defendant's guilt# this question is properly left for judge or 
jury at trial, and the binding over of the defendant is still 
required"); Matter of Buckner. 284 N.W.2d 507# 509 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1979) (if credible evidence exists to support and negate an 
element, a question of fact exists which should be left to the 
jury); State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Wis. 
1982) ("the purpose of the preliminary [hearing] is not to make a 
final judgment on the credibility of a witness; the court's role 
is simply to ascertain the plausibility of her story and whether, 
if believed, it would support a bind over"). 
This does not mean that the magistrate is totally 
precluded from considering credibility. 
The judicial role in pretrial screening 
involves weighing and judgment rather than a 
wooden comparison of the testimony with the 
elements of the crime. Although credibility 
ordinarily is a matter for the jury, and it 
is not expected that judges will normally 
resolve testimonial conflicts at the 
preliminary hearing, cases do occasionally 
arise in which a witness's testimony is so 
weak or contradicted by sufficiently clear 
facts that the judge should have the power to 
dismiss the case. 
Mvers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 826 n.12 (Mass. 1973) 
(quoting Model Penal Code, § 330.5(3) and cited with approval in 
Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783). 
Read with the requirement that a preliminary hearing 
court is not to decide the ultimate issue of culpability, a 
committing magistrate is restricted in his "inquiry of 
credibility to the 'plausibility of the story and not general 
trustworthiness.'" Hunter v. District Court, 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 
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(Colo. 1975). 
[A] judge in a preliminary hearing has 
jurisdiction to consider the credibility of 
witnesses only when, as a matter of law, the 
testimony is implausible or incredible. When 
there is a mere conflict in the testimony, a 
question of fact exists for the jury, and the 
judge must draw the inference favorable to 
the prosecution. 
Id. Accord People in Interest of M.V., 742 P.2d 326, 329 (Colo. 
1987) ("the trial court may not disregard the testimony of a 
witness favorable to the prosecution unless the testimony is 
implausible or incredible as a matter of law"); Matter of 
Buckner, 284 N.W.2d at 509; State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 
N.W.2d at 461. 
The magistrate's failure to apply the correct legal 
standard in evaluating the preliminary hearing evidence 
constitutes error as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
BASED ON THE EVIDENCE, THERE IS PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO BIND OVER; ACCORDINGLY, DEFENDANT 
SHOULD BE ORDERED HELD FOR TRIAL ON THE 
CHARGE OF SECOND DEGREE MURDER 
If this Court determines that the merits of the State's 
claim should be reviewed, it is unnecessary to remand for further 
proceedings in any other court. The record contains a complete 
statement of the evidence, which was essentially unchallenged in 
the preliminary hearing court. The issue raised then and now was 
one of law: Does the preliminary hearing evidence establish 
probable cause to bind defendant over for trial on a charge of 
second degree murder? 
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When considering the propriety of a dismissal based on 
insufficient evidence, the evidence must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the losing party, and if there is any 
reasonable basis in the evidence to support a judgment in favor 
of the losing party, the order of dismissal must be reversed. 
Management Committee v. Gravstone Pines, 652 P.2d at 897; 
Highland Const. Co. v. Union Pacific R. Co., 683 P.2d at 1045. 
Here, the magistrate erroneously found facts 
unsupported by the evidence, failed to draw reasonable inferences 
in support of the information, and invaded the province of the 
jury by resolving factual and credibility issues involving 
conflicting evidence. As discussed in Point II, supra, this was 
incorrect under either a fourth amendment or prima facie standard 
of probable cause. Since under either standard a proper 
evaluation of the evidence supports a conclusion of probable 
cause as a matter of law, the errors will be discussed under only 
the higher standard. If erroneous under the prima facie 
standard, the magistrate's conclusion is necessarily erroneous 
under the lesser fourth amendment standard. 
A. Factual Findings Without Evidentiary 
Support 
Throughout his memorandum decision, the magistrate made 
factual findings that lacked support or were contrary to the 
evidence. The specific errors will be discussed below, including 
the magistrate's compounding of these errors by further 
impermissible and speculative extrapolations. 
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(1) The Finding That The Victim Made 
Unauthorized Telephone Calls 
The magistrate initially found that when defendant came 
home, he opened the telephone bill and discovered that Mary had 
been making "unauthorized phone calls" (R. 21, 35). (See Addendum 
2 for complete memorandum decision). But, the only evidence 
presented concerning the bill or calls was defendant's statement 
to the police that he 
went to the mailbox, got the mail, opened up 
a telephone bill that he had received and saw 
a lot of calls, long distance phone calls, 
some going to Clearfield. And so he decided 
that he'd make some calls to find out where 
the calls was [sic] going to, he wasn't 
familiar with the numbers. 
(T. 69). There was no evidence that defendant thought Mary made 
the calls or that the calls contributed to the disagreement 
between Mary and defendant (T. 69-70). 
Yet, from the erroneous finding that Mary made 
unauthorized calls (R. 35), the magistrate extrapolated that one 
reason for Mary to have been so "distraught" as to commit suicide 
was that 
[s]he had been confronted with making long 
distance phone calls to places and to people 
unknown and not approved by Donald Jaeger. 
(R. 34). This finding is wholly fictional. 
(2) The Findings That The Victim Was 
Suicidal 
The magistrate found that when Mary talked to her 
mother shortly before she was shot, she was "crying and 
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despondent" (R. 22). From this the magistrate concluded: 
There is ample motive for Mary to have 
taken her own life. She was distraught. She 
was crying and upset. She had just been 
informed that she would have to leave the 
residence of Donald Jaeger the next day and 
not continue to reside with him. Where would 
she live? Under what circumstances would she 
live and with whom? She was under the 
influence of alcohol and Valium. Earlier in 
the evening she had temporarily abandoned her 
daughter at the home unsupervised. She had 
been confronted with making long distance 
phone calls to places and to people unknown 
and not approved by Donald Jaeger. She spoke 
to her mother on the telephone about her many 
problems and her troubled life and expressed 
a desire to get away from things. The 
combination of these emotions and chemicals 
could very well have prompted Mary to take 
her own life. Of significance, is the first 
comment made by Mary's mother, Judy Clark, 
when informed that Mary had died. She asked 
if Mary had taken her own life. 
(R. 34-35). 
There is no basis in the record to support the 
magistrate's finding that Mary Barndt was suicidal. The only 
testimony concerning Mary's state of mind came from her mother. 
Mrs. Clark stated that when Mary called she was crying and kept 
repeating that defendant hated her (T. 120). Mary said that 
"things" were not working out between them. Mary "mentioned that 
she'd just had problems with getting a job and she felt upset. . 
. . She said I feel like I just need to get away from things and 
work things out" (T. 121-22). Neither defendant nor Mrs. Clark 
portrayed Mary as "despondent" or suicidal. Neither represented 
that Mary had "many problems" or a "troubled life." 
Despite defendant's claim that he had ordered Mary out 
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of the home (T. 69-70), neither defendant nor Mary told that to 
Mrs. Clark. Instead, Mary represented to her mother that it was 
her wish to "get away" and "work things out" (T. 122). Assuming 
that Mary had been out partying, it would be reasonable to 
conclude that Mary was involved with other persons besides 
defendant. If so, it was Mary who was separating herself from 
defendant and not the other way around. Even accepting 
defendant's description of the events leading up to the shooting, 
it was defendant who was sitting at home, babysitting his 
girlfriend's child, and repeatedly attempting to locate her. 
Apparently from a bar where music was playing, she called 
defendant at 10:30 p.m., yet did not come home until 12:00 or 
12:15 a.m. (T. 69-70). Mary was sufficiently upset once home 
that she was crying. But when faced with what she perceived to 
be defendant's "hate," her solution was not to apologize or ask 
for forgiveness. Mary's solution was to leave defendant so she 
could "work things" out for herself (T. 122). 
The significance the magistrate attributed to Mrs. 
Clark's question regarding suicide is unwarranted. (See R. 35, 
Addendum 2.) Mrs. Clark testified that the only reason she asked 
if her daughter had "taken something" to kill herself was because 
defendant had earlier said that Mary was "heavy into drugs." She 
did not believe that her daughter was suicidal and had no 
indications from their conversation that she was contemplating 
suicide (T. 121-22). 
The magistrate also found that when defendant heard the 
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shot, "he immediately rushed into the kitchen whereupon he saw 
Mary lying on her back. The firearm was on the floor between her 
legs near her ankles" (R. 22). This is incorrect. Defendant 
told the police that he "was asleep in the bedroom and heard a 
shot, went into the kitchen and found Mary . . . on the floor" 
(T. 67). When asked by the 911 operator where the gun was, 
defendant responded that it was to Mary's side about four feet 
away. Officer Sundquist, the first person on the scene, 
testified that he observed the gun about "one to two feet from 
the victim's right foot" (T. 9). It was not the gun but a spent 
shell casing that the officer found "kind of in between her 
ankles" (T. 10). 
The significance of the magistrate's error concerning 
the location of the gun can be seen in the magistrates's further 
speculation that a suicide occurred because the gun was "exactly 
where one would expect it to be found if the gunshot was self-
inflicted" (R. 34). Aside from the fact that the gun was not 
between the victim's legs, no testimony was presented that this 
would have been indicative of a self-inflicted wound. 
(3) The Findings That The GSR Tests 
Were Unreliable And Failed To 
"Link" Defendant With The Crime 
The magistrate determined that the critical proof of 
defendant's "linkage" with the victim's death was the gunshot 
residue tests of his and the victim's hands. Since the 
magistrate found the tests unreliable, he refused to find any 
"linkage" of defendant with any crime (R. 29). This ignores the 
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fact that if the probability of a homicide was established, 
defendant was the only possible perpetrator. The critical issue 
was not whether the gunshot residue tests connected defendant 
with the crime but whether there was medical or other physical 
evidence that a homicide had occurred. 
The magistrate found the GSR tests to be unreliable on 
the following grounds: 
1. At defendant's work place, one "unique" 
particle had been found as well as many 
particles "characteristic" of gunshot 
residue; 
2. It was "very conceivable" that 
defendant's hands tested characteristic 
several hours after work because his work 
place contained similar particles and "no 
evidence was presented to indicate that the 
work place particles would not be found on 
the defendant's hands a few hours after 
work;" and, 
3. On both of defendant's hands were found 
particles characteristic of gunpowder 
residue. 
(R. 29-30). The magistrate found that if defendant had fired the 
gun, it was more reasonable to assume that gunpowder residue 
would have been on only one of defendant's hands and that the 
particles should have tested as "unique" to gunpowder and not 
just "characteristic" (R. 29-30). These findings are simply 
speculative and do not support the magistrate's finding that the 
tests were unreliable. 
The magistrate's finding concerning the result of the 
tests at defendant's work place is erroneous. GSR samples from 
defendant's work place were taken but the results were not 
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admitted into evidence. On cross-examination, Officer Peterson 
stated that he thought, but was not sure, that one particle found 
at defendant's work place was "consistent" with gunpowder residue 
(T. 87). The magistrate confused this testimony with the 
testimony of James Gaskill that firings of the recovered gun 
produced residue on the shooter's hand consisting of one unique 
particle and several characteristic particles (T. 93, 100-01). 
In considering the possible effect of the chemicals at 
defendant's work place, the magistrate originally noted that 
there was no evidence presented to establish that the particles 
obtained from defendant's work would have stayed on his hands 
over five hours later (T. 140). Evidence was presented that such 
things as washing the hands would remove or lessen the presence 
of residue (T. 95). 
What the testimony did establish was that the GSR tests 
of defendant's hands were properly done and correctly analyzed 
(T. 71-72, 89-90). The tests established that particles 
characteristic of gunpowder were on defendant's hands (T. 90). 
The issue was not the admissibility or reliability of the tests 
but what weight should be accorded them. The GSR tests provided 
some evidence that defendant shot Mary; therefore, the ultimate 
resolution of the issue should have been left for the jury. 
Accord Matter of Buckner, 284 N.W.2d at 509. 
Additionally, the magistrate found that despite the 
negative GSR tests on Mary's hands, it was "possible" that Mary 
had fired the gun (R. 30). This was derived from the testimony 
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of the state criminologist that it was normal protocol in GSR 
tests to scan the first four rows of the discs and not every 
particle (R. 93-94)• The expert testified that the lack of a 
positive GSR test was never conclusive that a person had not 
fired a weapon. Negative results could occur based on the type 
of weapon used, the passage of time between firing and testing, 
and whether the shooter washed his or her hands (T. 95). 
In Mary's case, none of these factors were present. 
The gun recovered did leave detectable powder residue, there was 
only a short period between the firing of the gun and the 
testing, and her hands were not washed after she was shot. 
Despite this, the magistrate found that it was "very conceivable 
that any gunshot residue from a relatively 'clean gun' found on 
her hands would rub off or be obliterated" (R. 31). The 
magistrate found that residue could have been rubbed off when 
[t]he defendant was told by the 911 
dispatcher to hold her hand and to turn her 
over. Mary's upper clothing was removed — 
presumably rubbing against her hands and 
removing residue. . . . Mary's hands were 
moving about as she was taken on the 
stretcher from the home while her hands were 
still in the bags. 
(R. 31). Again, this is contrary to the evidence. 
A paramedic testified that Mary had kicked her leg and 
moved one arm when moved to the ambulance (T. 115-16). 
Initially, the magistrate recognized that no evidence was 
presented that this type of motion would have had any affect on 
dispersal of the residue (T. 137). Subsequently, the magistrate 
speculated that it did (R. 31). This latter finding is without 
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evidentiary support and in contradiction of the requirement to 
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the information. 
For, while the magistrate found that the alleged residue on the 
victim's bagged hands would have totally disappeared from 
"squirming around" for a few minutes, the magistrate readily 
inferred that any chemical residue defendant picked up from work 
would easily stay on his hands through many hours of normal 
activities. This acceptance of defendant's theory of the case 
over the legitimate inferences drawn from the state's evidence is 
impermissible at the preliminary hearing stage. People v. 
District Court, 803 P.2d at 196. 
Contrary to the magistrate's finding (R. 31), there was 
no evidence that after Mary had been shot, defendant either held 
Mary's hands or removed her clothing. Defendant only claimed to 
have touched Mary when he "wip[ed]" her chest (T. 78). When the 
911 operator told him to touch Mary, he said he did not want to 
and repeated this several times. Despite the fact that the 911 
operator told defendant to turn Mary on her side so she would not 
choke, Mary was still on her back when the officers arrived (T. 
14). No one saw defendant holding Mary's hand and he never 
asserted that he did (T. 23-24, 78). 
When the officers arrived, Mary was naked from the 
waist up. Her bra was next to her; her blouse was not in the 
room (T. 14-15). No evidence was presented that Mary's upper 
clothing was removed after she was shot. No facts support the 
finding that Mary's blouse "presumably rubb[ed] against her hands 
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and remove[d] residue" (R. 31). 
While the magistrate referred to the GSR tests as 
unreliable and "discredited," there was no basis for this 
finding. The tests were conducted and analyzed properly; the 
magistrate did not find otherwise. The GSR tests were simply 
corroborative evidence. Even if defendant had tested negatively 
for residue, the medical evidence established probable cause to 
believe that a homicide had occurred. Under the facts, defendant 
was the only possible perpetrator. 
(4) The Findings That The Medical 
Evidence Was Unreliable And Failed 
To Establish That A Homicide Had 
Occurred 
Clearly, the main evidence against defendant was the 
autopsy and medical examiner's opinion. Based on this physical 
and scientific evidence, the medical examiner concluded the it 
was highly unlikely that the victim's wound was self-inflicted. 
Instead, the medical examiner testified that the physical 
findings indicated that the gun had been fired by another 
individual at intermediate range and, thus, that a homicide had 
occurred. (See Statement of Facts, supra at 6-9, for complete 
discussion of the examiner's findings.) 
The magistrate discounted and ultimately rejected the 
medical examiner's opinion for two reasons: (1) the examiner's 
opinion was "grounded on the discredited gunshot residue tests"; 
and (2) the examiner failed to "consider any factors of a 
possible suicide" (R. 35). Neither contention is supported by 
the record. The medical examiner's opinion was based primarily 
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on the physical difficulties the victim would have encountered in 
shooting herself, particularly in light of the path and range of 
fire (T. 47, 49-51, 63, 65). Only secondarily did he consider 
the GSR tests (T. 50). The finding that the examiner failed to 
consider the possibility of suicide is directly contrary to the 
examiner's extensive testimony that he thoroughly considered and 
rejected that hypothesis (T. 49-51). 
A magistrate is not permitted to disregard Mthe 
testimony of a witness favorable to the prosecution unless the 
testimony is implausible or incredible as a matter of law." 
People In Interest of M.V., 742 P.2d at 329. Here, the medical 
examiner, as a qualified expert, testified to matters within his 
expertise. His scientific conclusions were not challenged. But 
even if conflicting expert evidence had been presented, it would 
simply have raised a factual issue which should have been left 
for the jury to resolve. People v. General Dynamics Lands 
Systems, 438 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Mich. App. 1989). 
(5) The Finding that Defendant Lacked A 
Motive 
Finally, the magistrate's consideration of motive is 
unwarranted and improper. Motive is not an element of murder. 
Yet, the magistrate's ruling is clearly predicated on the fact 
that he found a motive for the victim to commit suicide but no 
motive for defendant to have killed her. Aside from the factual 
incorrectness of the finding that the victim was suicidal, 
discussed supra at 38-41, the magistrate failed to draw the 
requisite inferences from Mary's actions. If Mary was out 
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partying as defendant believed, it was she and not defendant who 
was actively terminating the relationship. This inference is 
supported by Mary's statement to her mother that it was her wish 
to leave. Her desire to leave defendant gave him a motive. 
B. The Magistrate's Erroneous Conclusion 
That There Was Not Probable Cause To 
Bind Over 
When the evidence is evaluated under the proper 
standard, it is clear that there is probable cause to bind over 
defendant. The medical evidence established that it would have 
been essentially impossible for the victim to self-inflict the 
wound she suffered. Gunshot residue tests corroborated that it 
was unlikely that the victim had fired the gun and supported the 
probability that defendant had. Even if the GSR tests were 
totally disregarded, the medical examiner's testimony alone 
established probable cause that a homicide had occurred. Since 
it is uncontroverted that at the time of the homicide only 
defendant and the victim were present, sufficient proof that a 
homicide occurred necessarily creates probable cause to believe 
defendant committed the crime. People v. Porterfield, 420 N.W.2d 
853, 855 (Mich. App. 1988). Accord People v. District Court, 779 
P.2d 385 (Colo. 1989); People in the Interest of M.V., 742 P.2d 
326. 
The refusal to bind over and subsequent order of 
dismissal are erroneous as a matter of law. People v. Lewis, 791 
P.2d 1152, 1154 (Colo. Ct. App 1989), cert, denied Colo. 
(1990) (failure to draw all permissible inferences and view the 
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evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution 
constitutes error as a matter of law). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court of 
appeals dismissing the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
should be reversed. This Court should review the substantive 
issues and conclude, as a matter of law, that the State has 
established probable cause to bind over defendant. Accordingly, 
defendant should be ordered bound over for trial on the charge of 
second degree murder, a first degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /& day of October, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing brief of petitioner was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Joan C. Watt, Lisa J. Rental and Richard Mauro, attorneys for 
respondent, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 424 East 500 
South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, thisc^b day of 
October, 1992. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DONALD 6* JAEGER 11/20/58, 
Defendant(s). 
The undersigned Sgt. Vern Peterson - West Jordan P.D. under 
oath states on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed 
the crimes of: 
COUNT I 
CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a First Degree 
Felony, at 6495 South Scranton Drive, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about August 22, 1990, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
DONALD L. JAEGER, a party to the offense, intentionally 
or knowingly caused the death of Mary L. Barndt, or 
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life that 
caused the death of Mary L. Barndt, or acting under 
circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human 
life, engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of 
death to another, and thereby caused the death of Mary 
L. Barndt; 
Screened by: E. Jones 
Assigned to: E. Jones 
BAIL $50,000.00 
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STATE V. DONALD L. JAEGER 
County Attorney #90 1 81804 
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officers: B. Sundquistf K. Kallas, V. Person, C. Loving and C. 
Hodgkinson. 
Others: Kevin Lee Smith, R.L. Wright, Rudy Riet, Dr. Edward A. 
Leis, Bradley Wardle, Chris Evans, Claude Stoker, Jed 
Harris, Paul Miller, Jim Gaskill, Judy Clark and Mary 
Crawford. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant based this Information on police report, Case 
No. 90-5745 and his personal investigation which disclosed the 
following: 
Officers were called to 6495 South Scranton Drive to 
investigate a shooting. The victim of the shooting was 19 year old 
Mary Barndt. The victim had been shot in the chest with a single 
shot from a .22 caliber pistol. The Defendant was alone in the house 
with the victim at the time of the shooting. The Defendant said the 
victim shot herself. A GSR test on the victim for evidence of powder 
was negative. A GSR on the Defendant at the scene, however was 
positive for powder residue. The Defendant and victim had been in an 
argument the evening of the shooting. 
y/ ^L-^ feb> 
Affiant 
Subscribed ., aricL
 ; sworn . to before 
this / -dayofxliovemfier. 1990. 
Authorized for presentment and 
filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM./County Attorney 
' 6 'U\'*~ \//)l>Q- , Deputy 
November 1, isfeo 
lls/4588 ' 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
VS. 
DONALD L. JAEGER, 
Plaintiff, ] 
Defendant. ] 
| MEMORANDUM DECISION 
} Case No. 901012471 FS 
| JUDGE MICHAEL L. HUTCHINGS 
On January 9, 1991 at the hour of 2:00 p.m. the court, Judge 
Michael L. Hutchings presiding, heard evidence presented by the 
State and also by the defense in the above entitled case. The 
defendant, Donald L. Jaeger, is charged with criminal homicide, 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony which allegedly 
occurred at 6495 South Scranton Drive in Salt Lake County. On the 
date of August 22, 1990. The State was represented by Ernie Jones 
and Kim Hornack. The defense was represented by Lisa Remal and 
Richard Mauro. The court commends counsel for the defense and 
the prosecution for the manner in which the evidence at the 
preliminary hearing was presented. 
The court has taken the case under advisement and now issues 
its Memorandum Decision. 
The court will state the question presented, a summary of the 
facts presented at the preliminary hearing, cite the legal 
standard to be applied at a preliminary hearing, analyze the facts 
with the law and announce it's decision in this Memorandum Decision 
QUESTION 
Did the defendant, Donald Jaeger, inflict the fatal gunshot 
wound that caused the death of Mary Barndt? 
FACTS 
Mary Barndt was a 19 year old female, living with the 
defendant, Donald Jaeger, at 6495 South Scranton Drive in West 
Jordan, Utah. On August 22, 1990, the defendant, Donald Jaeger, 
arrived from work at the residence at 7:30 p.m. Mary was not 
home. The defendant opened some mail that had been delivered in 
the mail box and discovered a telephone bill with some long 
distance phone calls. He suspected that Mary had made some 
unauthorized phone calls. The defendant called the phone numbers 
to find out the purpose of the phone calls and to verify who had 
made them. 
The defendant also found Mary's young daughter, Alicia, home 
unsupervised. The defendant attempted to determine where Mary 
might be located. He called, at least twice, Mary's mother, Judy 
Clark. During one of the conversations, Judy Clark was informed 
that Mary "was heavy into drugs." Judy Clark did not know Maryfs 
whereabouts• 
Later in the evening, Mary contacted the defendant by 
telephone. The defendant did not know where Mary was when she 
called but he could hear some music in the background. He assumed 
that she had called from a bar or a party. 
At approximately 12:00 midnight, Mary came home. The 
defendant was awakened when Mary came to bed. At that time, the 
defendant told her that his relationship with her was terminated 
and that she should move out of the home the next day* 
The defendant made another telephone call to Judy Clark. The 
defendant first spoke with Judy Clark and indicated that Mary 
would like to speak with her. Ms. Clark thereupon spoke with 
Mary. Mary was crying and despondent. Mary stated that Don had 
asked her to leave the home and that the relationship was over. 
She stated "Don hates me*, .yes he does, he hates me.91 She made 
these statements approximately six times. She also said, her 
employment situation was not good. Finally she said, "I feel that 
I need to get away from things and work things out.11 
The defendant indicated in conversations with the police 
officers that he went back to sleep and was awakened by the 
discharge of a firearm. He immediately rushed into the kitchen 
whereupon he saw Mary lying on her back. The firearm was on the 
floor between her legs near her ankles. Mary had sustained a 
gunshot wound in her lower left neck near the collarbone. 
The defendant called 911 emergency and spoke with the 911 
operator for the city of West Jordan. Near the beginning of his 
911 conversation he stated, "Oh,...1...I.. .my girlfriend just shot 
herself.11 He also stated during this conversation, "Oh, God I 
canft believe she done this.11 (sic.) "What can I do to help her?", 
,fI can*t calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself.", "I love 
you, I love you Mary...breath...breath...Baby, come on." and also 
in speaking directly to her, "How could you do this?" During the 
911 conversation, the operator told him, among other things, to 
hold the hand of Mary Barndt and also told him to turn Mary Barndt 
on her side. 
Officer B. Sundguist, from the West Jordan Police Department, 
was first to arrive on the scene. When he entered the residence, 
he noticed Mary on her back on the kitchen floor with the gun at 
her feet. The barrel was pointed towards Mary Barndt. One bullet 
had been shot from the .22 caliber automatic pistol. One expended 
cartridge was lying on the ground between Mary Barndtfs legs near 
her ankles. Officer Sundguist noticed some of Mary's upper 
clothing near her side on the floor. Officer Sundguist noticed 
no evidence of disruption in the house. He immediately put two 
small brown paper bags over Mary's two hands and taped them. His 
purpose in doing so was to preserve any gun shot residue which may 
possibly of been on her hands. Paramedics arrived and took Mary 
out of the residence to be transported to the hospital. Her arms 
were moving about as she was taken down the stairs of the split 
level home. 
Officer Sundguist performed a gun shot residue test at the 
hospital at approximately 1:45 p.m. The scene was hectic. Many 
medical personnel were working to preserve Mary's life. Maryfs 
left breast was cut, chest tubes were placed within her, I.V.'s 
were administered and she was given many medical treatments. The 
bags which were placed over Mary's hands were removed by the law 
enforcement officers and were never preserved. Therefore no tests 
were performed on the inside of the bags to ascertain the presence 
of gun shot residue. 
Officer Sundguist performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's 
left hand. He had never performed a gunshot residue test before. 
Officer Peterson performed a gunshot residue test on Mary's right 
hand. Officer Vernon Peterson had performed three or four prior 
gunshot residue tests on various occasions before this particular 
test. 
Officer Vernon Peterson also conducted gunshot residue tests 
on both hands of the defendant. He performed the gunshot residue 
test between 1:22 a.m. to 1:27 a.m. He noticed blood on the hands 
of Donald Jaeger. Donald Jaeger also indicated that he had 
touched Mary's gunshot wound. 
Later, Judy Clark was informed that her daughter had died. 
Her first comment was to ask if Mary had taken her own life. 
Dr. Edward A. Leis, the Assistant State Medical Examiner, 
testified that when the shot entered Mary's body, her left arm was 
raised at least to shoulder height. He formed this opinion 
because of the passage way created by the bullet as it went 
through the muscle and bone of Mary's left lower neck. He 
indicated the gunshot wound was clearly within the reach of Mary's 
arms. He determined that the barrel of the gun was approximately 
nine inches away from Mary when the fatal shot was fired. The 
firearm was also positioned near Mary's right breast and was fired 
into her upper left collarbone area of her lower left neck. A 
mannequin was introduced into evidence to demonstrate the location 
of the fatal wound, the distance of the gun from the wound (a nine 
inch yellow tape was attached to the mannequin), the trajectory of 
the fatal shot and Mary's left arm raised at the time the fatal 
shot was fired. 
Dr. Leis also indicated that blood was found on Mary's hands 
when she was brought into the State Medical Examiner's office. 
Blood alcohol and drug screen tests were also conducted at 
the State Medical Examinerfs office. At the time of death, Mary 
had between .10 and .12 percent alcohol in her system. A drug 
screen test also indicated the presence of Valium (diazapam) and 
the metabolite of Valium. Dr. Leis indicated this drug and its 
combination with alcohol would cause someone to be tired and slow 
and that Valium would heighten the effect of the alcohol. 
Dr. Leis also indicated that the arm length of the victim was 
26 1/2 inches and that it would be extremely unlikely that she 
would have been able to shoot herself by holding the handgun by 
the right hand with her right index finger on the trigger. He 
also indicated, however, that it would have been possible for Mary 
to self inflict a gunshot by holding the gun facing her left 
upper chest with her right hand and pulling the trigger with her 
right thumb. 
Dr. Leis expressed the opinion that Mary did not self-inflict 
the gunshot. He based the opinion on the facts of her left arm 
being raised, gunshot residue test results on her hands, the 
atypical entrance wound, the distance of the firearm from Maryfs 
body and angle of fire. 
Kevin Smith, a criminologist working for the State Crime Lab, 
testified. He stated he tested the gunshot residue tests 
performed on both Mary Barndtfs hands and found no gunshot residue 
on either test. He stated that it was possible that Mary had 
gunshot residue on her hands because he did not analyze all of the 
particles submitted to him on the test discs. He also stated that 
a lack of gunshot residue should not be conclusive that Mary did 
not fire the gun. 
He also tes_*fied that he analyzed gunshot residue test 
samples taken from both hands of Donald Jaeger. He indicated that 
he found particles "characteristic91 of gunshot residue on both 
samples. He testified that there are three particles he is 
looking for when performing a gunshot residue test. These three 
particles are: lead, barium, and antimony. He indicated that he 
would look for spherical particles containing lead, plus the 
substance of barium or the substance of antimony. In the tests 
conducted on the samples taken from Donald Jaeger's hands, he 
found only two elements. His conclusion was that he found 
elements "characteristic* of gunshot residue but not "unique." A 
finding of "unique" would require the discovery of all three 
substances taken in the gunshot residue test. 
The test samples were also taken from the defendant's 
workplace. The defendant works for a company called "Western 
Battery" where he overhauls generators and alternators. 
"Characteristic" samples of particles were taken from four 
locations at Western Battery, including Mr. Jaegerfs wrenches, the 
"vice," the defendant's toolbox and also the "book area." 
Kevin Smith performed tests upon the samples taken at 
"Western Battery" and found one spherical particle to be "unique" 
(i.e. wherein all three elements were found) and a limited number 
of spherical particles to be "characteristic" (i.e. where two of 
three elements were found) of gunshot residue. The defendant, 
therefore, at the time of the shooting was working in an 
environment where particles characteristic and unique of gunshot 
residue were prevalent. 
James Gaskill, an Assistant Professor at Weber State College 
Crime Lab, testified. He stated that it would take only two 
pounds of pressure to pull the trigger on the firearm. The 
firearm was characterized as having a "hair trigger.11 Professor 
Gaskill also tested the level of gunshot residue coming onto the 
hands of the shooter of the firearm. Gunshot residue tests were 
performed on the hands of persons firing the «22 caliber pistol 
with the same ammunition used in the fatal shot. The tests were 
performed with holding the gun in the right hand pulling the 
trigger with the right index finger. Particles "unique" to 
gunshot residue were found on the hand of each person shooting the 
pistol• 
Professor Gaskill also indicated that the gun is a relatively 
"clean gun" meaning that it did not exude very much gunshot 
residue when compared with other handguns. He indicated that 
semi-automatic firearms have fewer openings than revolvers and 
given the fact that the firearm in this case is a .22 caliber 
firearm, that not much gunshot residue would exude from the 
firearm when it was fired. 
No evidence of fingerprint testing of the gun was presented 
at the preliminary hearing to assist the court in determining who 
fired the fatal shot. 
LEGAL STANDARD TO APPLY AT A PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Rule 7 (8) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure governs 
preliminary hearings. That rule requires that a magistrate must 
find "probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been 
committed and that the defendant has committed it.,f The Utah 
Supreme Court has defined "probable cause91 for purposes of 
preliminary hearings in the case of State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 
778 (Utah 1980). In Anderson, the court stated ,f...the probable 
cause showing at the preliminary examination must establish a 
prima facie case against the defendant from which the trier of 
fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense as 
charged." The court cited with approval a Massachusetts case, 
Mvers v. Commonwealth. 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E. 2d 819 (1973) 
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a 
"directed verdict" rule in defining the minimum quantum of 
evidence necessary to fulfill the probable cause requirement at 
the preliminary examination. The Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts stated "the magistrate should dismiss the complaint 
when, on the evidence presented, the trial court would be bound to 
acquit as a matter of law." 
The Anderson case also contains the following language "the 
prosecution is not required to introduce enough evidence to 
establish the defendants guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but must 
present a quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of 
the case to the trier of fact." Footnote 13 of that opinion 
states that probable cause at a preliminary hearing is a higher 
standard of "probable cause" than the "probable cause" for 
arrest. The Supreme Court reasoned, "thus, the minimum quantum of 
evidence is more than required to establish probable cause for 
arrest but less than would prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at 783. The Anderson case has also been 
cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in subsequent 
opinions dealing with preliminary hearings, see State v. EasthopeP 
668 P.2d 528 (Utah 1983) and State v. Brickev. 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 
1986). 
ANALYSIS 
At final argument of this case, the prosecution and defense 
argued that the prosecution's case really hinged on the results of 
the gunshot residue tests. Without the gunshot residue test 
results, the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to link 
the defendant to the second degree murder charge. 
The court is of the opinion that the gunshot residue tests in 
this case are not reliable to provide that critical linkage. Of 
great significance, is the fact that the prosecution has tested 
the defendant's workplace and found one particle "unique" as well 
as many particle "characteristic" of gunshot residue. The 
defendant was regularly employed in an environment in which 
particles "unique" and "characteristic" of gunshot residue are 
prevalent. It is very conceivable that the defendant's hands had 
particles "characteristic" of gunshot residue when tested by law 
enforcement officers a few hours after work. He works day after 
day in an environment where these particles are prevalent. No 
evidence was presented to indicate that the workplace particles 
would not be found on the defendant's hands a few hours after work. 
Another fact of significance is that both of the defendant's 
hands were tested and had particles "characteristic" of gunshot 
residue upon them* Did the defendant shoot the gun by holding it 
with both hands? It seems highly unlikely that the particles 
could be found on both the defendant's hands and could have come 
from the .22 caliber pistol. The gun is not particularly large or 
heavy and one which a person of the size and stature of the 
defendant clearly would have no trouble holding, aiming and 
shooting. The .22 caliber gun was also a relatively "clean gun" 
exuding comparatively little gunshot residue. No one testified 
about the possibility of the defendant shooting the gun with one 
hand and particles "characteristic" of residue landing on the 
other hand. Furthermore, if the defendant really shot the gun, 
why were only particles "characteristic" and not "unique" found on 
his hands? When Professor Gaskill tested the firing of the same 
gun with the same ammunition, he found particles "unique" to 
gunshot residue. Finally, the most prevalent particles found at 
the defendant's place of employment were also "characteristic" 
particles. 
For the above reasons, the court finds that a reasonable jury 
could not link the defendant to the charge with the gunshot 
residue test results. They do not establish the probable cause 
necessary to link the defendant to the commission of the offense. 
The prosecution points out that Mary had no gunshot residue 
on her hands when tested. The argument is that if she 
self-inflicted the gunshot, she would have had residue on her 
hands. In this case, she had none. However, Kevin Smith 
testified that he did not analyze all of the particles taken from 
Mary's hands and therefore it was possible that Mary had gunshot 
residue on her hands. He also stated that a lack of gunshot 
residue should not be conclusive that Mary did not fire the gun. 
The defense also persuasively argues that Mary's hand did not 
have gunshot residue when tested because it may have been rubbed 
off in the hustle of the care that she received after she was 
discovered with a gunshot wound. The defendant was told by the 
911 dispatcher to hold her hand and to turn her over. Mary's 
upper clothing was removed—presumably rubbing against her hands 
and removing residue. A bag was placed and taped over each hand 
and later removed at the hospital (unfortunately the bags were 
not preserved by law enforcement to test for gunshot residue that 
may have been displaced from the hands and still found within the 
bags). Mary's hands were moving about as she was taken on the 
stretcher from the home while her hands were still in the bags. 
Numerous persons were working upon and around Mary at the 
hospital. The scene was hectic as medical personnel attempted to 
preserve her life. Mary's left chest was cut, tubes placed into 
her chest and I.V.'s administered. Blood also was on her hands. 
Given these facts, it is very conceivable that any gunshot residue 
from a relatively "clean gunw found on her hands would rub off or 
be obliterated. 
Nor is the court persuaded that the gun, if fired by Mary, 
would exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue on her hands to 
be detectable. The gun is a relatively "clean gun" exuding 
comparatively little gunshot residue. It is true that test 
firings were performed under the direction of Professor Gaskill, 
showing a discharge of gunshot residue. But these tests were 
presumably conducted with a person holding the .22 caliber gun 
with the right hand holding the pistol in a normal manner—with 
the heel of the gun held with the right hand and pulling the 
trigger with the right index finger. The shell would expend to 
the right through the exit chamber and presumably most of the 
gunshot residue would also be expelled through the exit chamber to 
the right of the gun. There was no testimony of gunshot residue 
tests performed consistent with the defense theory that the gun 
was held in Mary's right hand and pointed backwards and fired 
using her right thumb. In essence, the gun was held by her right 
hand but on the left side of the gun—away from the exit chamber 
which expels the cartridge to the right and presumably also 
expels most of the gunshot residue. The reason this test was not 
performed is obvious to the court. However, appropriate testing 
perhaps could have been performed in a safe manner. Regardless, 
the evidence is not before the court and yet for the above 
reasoning, the court doubts that the gun, if fired by Mary, would 
exude a sufficient amount of gunshot residue to be easily 
detectable on her hands, especially after receiving all of the 
care and treatment which she received as described in the 
preceding paragraph. 
One of the defendant's first comments made to the 911 
operator is consistent with the prosecution's case. The defendant 
stated MOh...I...I...my girlfriend just shot herself." It could 
be considered, although not argued as such by the prosecution, 
that this statement was the beginning of an admission changed in 
mid-course by the defendant. The statement, however, obviously 
cannot provide the linkage of the defendant to the murder charge. 
It was made in the confusion and excitement at the very beginning 
of the 911 call. It is not an admission and is consistent with 
many other emotional, excited utterances made by the defendant 
while on the telephone line with the 911 operator. These 
emotional, excited utterances are consistent with the defense 
theory that Mary self-inflicted the gunshot wound. The defendant 
stated, "Oh God, I can't believe she done this.11 (sic) and ,fI 
can't calm down but my girlfriend just shot herself." and, in 
speaking directly to Mary, "How could you do this?" 
The prosecution also points to the fact that when Mary was 
shot, her left arm was raised at least to shoulder level in a 
natural reaction to protect herself from the gunshot. However, 
the court has viewed the evidence demonstrated by the mannequin 
and determines that there would be no reason for Mary to raise her 
left arm to protect herself from the gunshot. The gun would have 
been held by the defendant in a position too low and too close to 
Mary's chest for Mary to raise her left arm above shoulder height 
in any meaningful self defense. 
However, the left arm being raised by Mary is more consistent 
with a person who is self-inflicting a gunshot and chooses to 
cover her eyes with her left hand rather than literally look down 
the barrel of the gun as it was pointed at her chest, neck or 
facial area. 
Furthermore, the closeness of the gun when it was shot is an 
important factor. Nine inches away from Mary is clearly within 
Mary's 26 1/2 inch arms reach. It would seem that if Mary were to 
be shot by the defendant that she would be shot at a distance out 
of her arms reach. 
Another factor to consider is the trajectory of the shot 
itself. The trajectory is very consistent with Mary holding the 
gun up at herself with her right hand and pulling the trigger with 
her right thumb. The trajectory compared with the closeness of 
the shot and Mary's elevated left arm is not consistent with the 
prosecution's theory that the defendant held the gun and fired the 
fatal shot. 
Another factor is the location of the gun itself when the 
police arrived at the home. It was found on the floor between 
Mary's legs—exactly where one would expect it to be found if the 
gunshot were self-inflicted. Furthermore, the officers observed 
no evidence of any struggle when they were inside the home. 
There is ample motive for Mary to have taken her own life. 
She was distraught. She was crying and upset. She had just been 
informed that she would have to leave the residence of Donald 
Jaeger the next day and not continue to reside with him. Where 
would she live? Under what circumstances would she live and with 
whom? She was under the influence of alcohol and Valium. Earlier 
in the evening she had temporarily abandoned her daughter at the 
home unsupervised. She had been confronted with making long 
distance phone calls to places and to people unknown and not 
approved by Donald Jaeger. She spoke to her mother on the 
telephone about her many problems and her troubled life and 
expressed a desire to get away from things. The combination of 
these emotions and chemicals could very well have prompted Mary to 
take her own life. Of significance, is the first comment made by 
Mary's mother, Judy Clark, when informed that Mary had died. She 
asked if Mary had taken her own life. 
On the other hand, is there a motive for the defendant to 
kill Mary? It is true that this case is in a domestic environment 
where strong and sometimes unpredictable emotions may exist. It 
is true that Mary made unauthorized phone calls, abandoned her 
daughter at the defendants home unsupervised and had been at a bar 
or a party that evening. She came home late with alcohol and 
Valium in her system. The relationship was over. When 
relationships end, people are often excited and do not restrain 
their anger and frustration. But was the defendant this type of 
person? Was he excited and did he fail to restrain his anger and 
frustration? It is significant to the court that, in spite of all 
that had happened and after the defendant had informed Mary that 
the relationship was over, Donald Jaeger telephoned Mary's mother, 
Judy Clark. He said that Mary needed to talk to her and then gave 
Mary the phone. This does not appear to be the conduct of a 
person who would within minutes take Mary's life. 
It is true that the opinion of the Assistant State Medical 
Examiner was that Mary's death was a homicide. However, his 
opinion was grounded on the discredited gunshot residue tests and 
he did not consider any factors of a possible suicide. For these 
important reasons and other, the court is not persuaded by the 
opinion of the Assistant State Medical Examiner. 
CONCLUSION 
The court has taken this case under advisement for over a 
three week period of time. The court has reviewed the tapes of 
the trial on many occasions as well as the 911 tape. The court 
has examined the physical evidence that was admitted at trial 
including the mannequin, the firearm, the photographs, and the 
gunshot residue test packets. This case is certainly one of the 
most difficult cases that the court has been assigned to decide 
during an eight year tenure on the bench. The court has given 
this case an extensive amount of careful thought and consideration. 
The case is a circumstantial evidence case with major 
weaknesses. The facts just do not add up to the second degree 
murder charge against the defendant. The legal standard 
articulated by our Supreme Court is a higher standard of probable 
cause than the probable cause associated with arrest. There is 
not a sufficient quantum of evidence presented to submit this 
case to a judge or jury. It is the finding of this court that if 
a trial court were presented with this case that it would be bound 
to acquit the defendant as a matter of law. Could a reasonable 
jury find the defendant guilty of the homicide charge? This 
court's honest evaluation of that question is negative—no 
reasonable jury given the facts of this case before the court 
could find the defendant guilty of second degree murder. The 
court concludes that the requisite probable cause necessary for a 
bindover at a preliminary hearing is lacking. The case is 
dismissed against the defendant and he is discharged. 
Dated this 1st day of February, 1991. 
Michael L. Hutchings^ 
Third Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that I hand delivered a copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum Decision in the above entitled case to the Salt Lake 
County Attorney's Office, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Office, 430 East 500 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on this 1st day of February, 
1991. 
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSN. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
DONALD L. JAEGER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Case No. 901012471FS 
HONORABLE MICHAEL HUTCHINGS 
Having heard and considered the evidence presented at the 
preliminary hearing in the above-entitled case, and the arguments of 
counsel for the State and counsel for the Defendant, and good cause 
appearing as was stated by this Court in its Memorandum decision, 
dated February 1, 1991, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
above-entitled case be and the same hereby is dismissed for 
insufficiency of evidence. 
DATED this _fc2. day of February, 1991. 
ft THE COURT: 
HONORABLE Ml€HAEiy L'. HUTCH]?NGS 
Third Circuit Court 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the 
Salt Lake County Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111, this vP -day of February, 1991. 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Donald L. Jaeger, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
AMENDED* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No, 910132-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 7, 1992) 
Third Circuit, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Joan C. Watt, Lisa J. Remal, and Richard P. Mauro, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and 
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral 
argument* 
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a 
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the 
information on the ground that the State failed to establish 
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for 
trial. The State appeals. 
In State v. Humphrey, No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover 
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued, 
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines 
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for 
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the 
*This replaces the memorandum decision issued on January 3, 1992. 
district court permitting that court to take original 
jurisdiction of the matter. The district court then "has the 
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its 
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." Id. Further, 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the 
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or 
information. 
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's 
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been 
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with 
Humphrey, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and 
remand to the circuit court. Because we dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion 
for supplemental briefing is deemed moot. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Russel^-W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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tion, mast be oommenced within two years after the commis-
sion of the offence. 
§ 4835. e 55. An action on a complaint is commenced, g^fXJgJ 
when a verified complaint is filed by the magistrate. She?cS^ * 
plaint ie filed. 
CHAPTER HI. 
T B S IKFOEMATJOX. 
SECTION. 
4836 Who are magistrates. 
§ 4836. s 56. The following persons are magistrates: J^JT*1**" 
1. The district judge. 
2. Justices of the peace. 
3. Police magistrates in incorporated cities, such as 
mayors and aldermen. 
CHAPTER IV. 
THE WARRAKT OP ARREST. 
SECTION. SECTION. 
4887 Examination of the prosecutor 4845 Proceedings on taking bail from 
and his witnesses upon the in- the defendant. 
formation. 4846 When bail is not given. When 
4838 The deposition, what to contain. magistrate who issued the war-
4839 When warrant may issne. rant cannot act. 
4840 Form of warrant. 4847 No delay in taking defendant be-
4841 Name or description of the de- fore magistrate. 
feiidant in the warrant, and 4848 Proceedings when defendant is 
statement of time of issuing it. taken before another magis-
4842 Warrant, to whom directed and trate. 
by whom executed. 4849 Proceedings for offences triable 
4838 Defendant arrested for felony to in other county. 
be taken before magistrate i s - 4850 Duty of officer. 
suing the warrant, etc. 4851 Admission to bail. Proceedings 
4844 Defendant arrested for misde- when magistrate has jnrlsdic-
mean or in another county to be tion of the offence. 
admitted to ball. 
• 
§ 4837. s 57. When an information is laid before a 
magistrate of the commission of a public offence, triable 
within the county, he must examine on oath the informant or 
668 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
J«mta«tton prosecutor, and any witnesses he may produce, and take their 
^iufetse^p ^P08***01*8 in writing, and cause them to be subscribed by 
•SOD.6iDform t* ie Parties making them. 
The dermal- § 4838. s 58. The deposition must set forth the facts 
contain. stated by the prosecutor and his witnesses, tending to estab-
lish the commission of the offence and the guilt of the de-
fendant. 
wStml"" § 4 8 3 9 « s 5&- I f & e magistrate is satisfied therefrom 
iBine. t^f.
 t j j e 0ff e n c e complained of has been committed, and that 
there is reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has 
committed it, he must issue a warrant of arrest. 
Form of w»r- § 4840. s 60. A warrant of arrest is an order in writ-
xant. . 
ing in the name of the people, signed by a magistrate, com-
manding the arrest of the defendant, and may be substantially 
in the following form: 
County of 
The people of the Territory of Utah to any sheriff, con-
stable, marshal, or polieceman of naid Territory, or of the 
county of : Information on oath having been this day 
laid before me, by A. B. , that the crime of (designat-
ing i t ) , has been committed, and accusing C D . thereof, you 
are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above 
named C. D . and bring him before me at (naming the place), 
or in case of my absence or inability to act, before the nearest 
or most accessible magistrate in this county. Dated at 
this day of , eighteen . 
Justice of the Peace. 
When necessary, the magistrate may insert therein a 
• clause to the effect that if the accused has fled from justice, 
that the peace officer pursue him into any other county of this 
Territory and there arrest him. 
•cnptionoV 5 4841. s 61. The warrant must specify the name of 
methdeew«.&ntt^e defendant, or, if it is unknown to the magistrate, the de-
•SSSemiBBt of fendant may be designated therein by any name. It must 
5£ingu!o£i8" also state the time of issuing it, and the county, city or pre-
cinct where it is issued, and be signed by the magistrate, with 
his name of office, 
warrant to § 4842. s (*2. The warrant must be directed to and ex-
lecwhonkdexe.eou'ed by a peace officer; and in an incorporated city may be 
«nt€d. served by any peace officer, either in the county where issued 
or in any other county of the Territory. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
EXAMINATION OF THE CASE AND DISCHARGE OF THE DEFENDANT, OB 
HOLDING HIM TO ANSWER. 
SECTION. SECTION. 
4872 Magistrate to inform defendant 4884 Depositions, by whom and how 
of the charge and of his right kept. 
to have counsel. 4885 Defendant, when and how di6-
4873 Time to send and sending for charged. 
counsel. 4886 When and how to be committed. 
4874 Examination, when to proceed. 4887 When offence is not bailable, 
4875 When to be completed. PoBt- order for commitment. 
ponement. 4888 When offence is bailable, cer-
4876 On postponement defendant to tificate of bail being taken. 
be committed or discharged on 4889 Order for bail on commitment, 
bail. 4890 Commitment, how made and to 
4877 The commitment, form of. whom delivered. 
4878 Depositions to be read on ex- 4891 Commitment, form of. 
ainination and subpoenas issued. 4892 Undertaking may be required of 
4879 Examination of witnesses to be witness to appear. 
in presence of defendant, etc. 4893 For the appearance of witnesses, 
4880 Examination of defendant's wit- when and how required. 
nesses. 4894 Witness refusing to give se-
4881 Exclusion and separation of curity for his appearance to be 
witnesses. committed. 
4882 Who are entitled to be present 4895 Witness unable to give security 
at the examination. may be conditionally examined. 
4883 Testimony, how taken and an- 4896 Magistrate to return depositions, 
thenticated. etc., without delay, to the 
court. 
§ 4872. 8 92. When the defendant is brought before Magistrate to 
the magistrate upon an arrest, either with or without warrant, fendantof the 
on a charge of having committed a public offence, the magis-iu» right to 
trate must immediately inform him of the charge against him, 
and" of his right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the 
proceedings. 
§ 4873. 8 93. He must also allow the defendant a reas- Time to Bend 
onable time to send for counsel, and postpone the examination for counsel, 
for that purpose, and must, upon the request of the defend-
ant, require a peace officer to take a message to any counsel 
in the precinct or the city the defendant may name. The 
officer must, without delay and without fee, perform that duty. 
§ 4874. s 94. If the defendant requires the aid of Examination 
counsel, the magistrate must, immediately after the appear-ce/dD pro' 
ance of counsel, or if, after waiting a reasonable time there-
for, none appears, proceed to examine the case. 
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competed6 $ 4875. 8 95. The examination must be completed at 
Postpone one session, unless the magistrate, for good cause shown bj 
affidavit, postpone it. The postponement cannot be for more 
than four days at each time, nor more than twelve days in 
all, unless by consent or on motion of the defendant. 
meDt°Bde?eDned- $ 4876. 8 96. If a postponement is had, the magistrate 
a
1^^ {1b«r<gI™_ must commit the defendant for examination, admit him to 
charged on ^ail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money 
as provided in this act, as security for his appearance at 
the time to which the examination is postponed, 
menftcfmof $ 4 8 7 7 # 8 9 7 ' ^ e commitment for examination is 
be reason ex made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate on the 
SobpSffff*warrant of arrest, to the following effect: "The within 
* named A. B. having been brought before me under this war-
rant, is committed for examination to the sheriff of ." 
If the sheriff is not present, the defendant may be committed 
to the custody of any peace officer. 
Examination § 4878. B 98. At the examination the magistrate must 
tobeinprea- first read to the defendant the depositions of the witnesses 
ence of de F 
fendant, etc examined on taking the information. He must also issue 
subpoenas, subscribed by him, for witnesses within the Terri-
tory, required either by the prosecution or the defense. 
Examination § 4879. 8 99. The witnesses must be examined in the 
witaeMMHkBt>a presence of the defendant, and may be cross-examined in his 
behalf. 
§ 4880. s 100. When the~examination of witnesses on 
the part of the people is closed, any witness the defendant 
may produce may be sworn and examined. 
Excision and § 4881. 8 101. While a witness is under examination, 
witnesses? ° the magistrate may exclude all witnesses who have not been 
' examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be kept sep-
arate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other 
until they are all examined, 
who are en- § 4882. 8 102. The magistrate must also, upon the re-
present at the nuest of the defendant, exclude from the examination every 
examination. * 
person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the 
attorney-general, the prosecuting attorney of the county, or 
the district attorney of the United States, the defendant and 
his counsel, and the officer having the defendant in custody. 
Testimony, § 4883. 8 103. The testimony of each witness in cases 
andanthen-
 0 f homicide must be reduced to writing, as a deposition, by 
the magistrate, or under his direction; and in other cases 
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upon the demand of the prosecuting officer. The magistrate 
before whom the examination is had, may, in his discretion, 
order the testimony and proceedings to be taken down in 
short hand, in all examinations herein mentioned, and for 
that purpose he may appoint a short hand reporter. The 
deposition or testimony of the witness must be authenticated 
in the following form: 
1. It must state the name of the witness, his place of March is, ISM. 
residence, and his business or profession. 
2. It must contain the questions put to the witness, and 
his answers thereto, each answer being distinctly read to him 
as it is taken down, and being corrected or added to until it 
conforms to what he declares is the truth; except in cases 
where the testimony is taken down in short hand, the answer 
or answers of the witness need not be read to him. 
3. If a question put be objected to on either side and 
overruled, or the witness declines answering it, that fact with 
the ground on which the question was overruled or the an-
swer declined, must be stated. 
4. The deposition must be signed by the witness, or if 
he refuse to sign it, his reason for refusing must be stated 
in writing as he gives it, except in cases where the deposi-
tion is taken down in short hand, it need not be signed by the 
witness. 
5. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate 
when reduced to writing by him, or under his direction, and 
when taken down in short hand, the transcript of the reporter 
appointed as aforesaid, when written out in long hand writ-
ing, and certified as being a correct statement of such testi-
mony and proceedings in the case shall be prima facie a cor-
rect statement of such testimony and proceedings. The re-
porter shall, within ten days after the close of such examina-
tion, (if the defendant be held to answer the charge), tran-
scribe into long hand writing his said short hand notes, and 
certify and file the same with the clerk of the district court 
of the district embracing the county in which the defendant 
was examined, and shall in all cases file his original notes with 
said clerk. The reporter's fees shall be paid out of the treas-
ury of the county. 
§ 4884. s 104. The magistrate or his clerk must keen PW>«KK»§. 
.* , . , , , . -r oy whom *nd 
the depositions taken on the information or on the examina-bowkept 
tion, until they are returned to the proper ^court; and must 
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not permit them to be examined or copied by any ^enon ex-
cept a judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offence, or 
authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus, the attorney gen-
eral, district attorney, or other prosecuting attorney, and the 
defendant and his counsel. 
Shenn«d\ow § 4885. e 105. If, after hearing the proofs, it appears 
discharged. ^at either no public offence has been committed, or that 
there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of 
a public offence, the magistrate must order the defendant to 
be discharged, by an indorsement on the depositions and 
statement, signed by him, to the following effect: "There 
being no sufficient cause to believe the within named A. B 
guilty of the offence within mentioned, I order him to be 
discharged.'' 
when »nd § 4886. s 106. If, however, it appears from the ex-
committed, animation that a public offence has been committed, and 
there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty there-
of, the magistrate must indorse on the depositions an order, 
signed by him to the following effect: "It appearing to me 
that the offence in the within depositions mentioned (or any 
offence, according to the fact, stating generally the nature 
thereof), has been committed, and that there is sufficient 
cause to believe
 Nthe within named A. B. guilty thereof, I 
order that he be held to answer to the same." 
when offence § 4887. s 107. If the offence k not bailable, the fol-
{fafiabie,or lowing words must be added to the indorsement: "And he 
mitment. m is hereby committed to the sheriff of the county of ." 
when offence § 4888. s 108. If the offence is bailable, and bail is 
is bailable, *
 # . • « . i * JJ J 
certificate of taken by the magistrate, the following words must be added 
t**en. to the indorsement; "And I have admitted him to bail on 
the undertaking hereto annexed." 
order for § 4889. s 109. If the offence is bailable and the de-
mitment. fendant is admitted to bail, but bail has not been taken, the 
following words must be added to the order indorsed on the 
deposition: "And that he is admitted to bail in the sum 
of dollars, and is committed to the sheriff of the count) 
of , until he gives such bail, or is legally discharged. 
commitment § 4890. s 110. If the magistrate ordered the defendant 
SSd tTwho^to be committed, he must make out a commitment, signed by 
delivered. ^ . ^
 w l t h h i g n a m e 0f o f f i c6 f a n d deliver it, with the defend-
ant, to the officer to whom he is committed, or, if that officer 
is not present, to a peace officer, who must deliver the de 
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fendant into the proper custody, together with the commit-
ment. 
§ 4891. s 111. The commitment must be to the f o l l o w - ^ S f " * 
ing effect: 
County of : (as the case may be.) 
The people of the Territory of Utah to the sheriff of the 
county of : An order having been this day made by 
me that A. B. be held to answer upon a charge of (stating 
brfefly the nature of the offence, and giving as near as may 
be the time when, and the place where, the same was com-
mitted), you are commanded to receive him into your custody 
and detain him until he is legally discharged. Dated this 
day of eighteen . 
§ 4892. s 112. On holding the defendant to answer, the
 UnderUking 
magistrate may take from each of the material witnesses ex- JjS^ofW 
amined before him on the part of the people a written under- ]J|]5e8t0*p 
taking, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the 
court to which the depositions and statements are to be sent, 
or that he will forfeit the sum of two hundred dollars. 
§ 4893. s 113. When the magistrate or a judge of the security for 
court in which the action is pending is satisfied, by proof onlnce*o?wit-
oath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness2nTbowre*n 
will not appear and testify unless security is required, he may ^ r e ' 
order the witness to enter into a written undertaking, with 
sureties, in such sum as be may deem proper, for his appear-
ance as specified in the preceding section. 
§ 4894. 8 114. If a witness, required to enter into an witness ret as-
undertaking to appear and testify, either with or without cnnt£?o75?§ 
sureties, refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, be committed, 
the magistrate must commit him to prison until he complies 
or is legally discharged. 
§ 4895. s 115. When, however, it satisfactorily ap-witnes§nn 
pears, by examination on oath of the witness, or any other *ecnrity may 
i , , * . » De condition 
person, that the witness is unable to procure sureties, he may *{g[ *§• 
be forthwith conditionally examined on behalf of the people; 
such examination must be by question and answer, and con-
ducted in the same manner as the examination before a com-
mitting magistrate is required by this act to be conducted, 
and the witness thereupon be discharged; but this section 
does not apply to the prosecutor or to an accomplice in the 
commission of the offence charged. 
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Feb.«2,1878. § 4896. s 116. When a magistrate has discharged a 
return depon defendant, or has held him to answer, he must return, with-
tions, etc, 
without delay out delay, to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is 
to tue court. . 
required to appear, the warrant, if any, the depositions, and 
all undertakings of bail, or for the appearance of witnesses 
taken by him. 
T I T L E I I I . 
OF PROCEEDINGS AFTER COMMITMENT AND BEFORE INDICTMENT. 
CHAPTER I. Preliminary provisions. 
CHAPTER II. Powers and duties of a grand jury. 
CHAPTER I. 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS. 
SECTION. SRCTIOX. 
4897 Public offences triable in the 4904 Effect of allowing a challenge to 
district courts to be prosecuted an individual juror. 
by indictment. 4905 Objection to jury can only be 
4898 Who may challenge the panel taken by challenge. 
or an individual juror. 4906 Appointment of a foreman. 
4899 Cause of challenge to a panel. 4907 Oath of foreman. 
4900 Cause of challenge to an indi- 4908 Oath of other grand jurors. 
vidual grand juror. 4909 Grand jury to be charged by the 
4901 Manner of taking and trying court. 
challenges. 4910 Retirement of the grand jury. 
4902 Decision upon challenges. Discbarge of. 
4908 Effect of allowing a challenge to 
a panel. 
March is, 1884. § 4897. 8 117. All public offences triable in the district 
^eDcei courts, except cases appealed from justices' courts, must be 
SuSnaoomta prosecuted by indictment. 
cnted^in- A grand jury must consist of fifteen eligible male citizens 
dictmeDt
 0 j t j i e United States, selected, summoned and impaneled, as 
provided by law, twelve of whom may constitute a quorum to 
do business. 
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ment is not made, the defendant is precluded from after- ^ IJJ^obW 
wards taking the objections mentioned in the last section. m°akesthe88he 
§ 4967. s 187. The motion must be heard at the time Sofion,when 
it is made, unless for cause the court postpones the hearingheard-
to another time. If the motion is denied, the defendant must 
immediately answer the indictment, either by demurring or 
pleading thereto. If the motion is granted, the court mustit denied or 
* i i i » t • * • * * <». i «iA» granted, what 
order that the defendant, if in custody, be discharged there- proceeding* to 
from; or, if admitted to bail, that his bail be exonerated; 
or, if he has deposited money instead of bail, that the same 
be refunded to him, unless it directs that the case be re-sub-
mitted to the same or another grand jury. 
§ 4968. s 188. If the court directs the case to be re-Effect of order 
* , for re anemia 
submitted, the defendant, if already m custody, must so re-*ion-
main unless he is admitted to bail, or, if already admitted to 
bail, or money has been deposited instead thereof, the bail or 
money is answerable for the appearance of the defendant to 
answer a new indictment; and unless a new indictment is 
found before the next grand jury of the district is discharged, 
the court must, on the discharge of such grand jury, make 
the order prescribed by the preceding se'etion. 
§ 4969. s 189. An order to set aside an indictment, as order to aet 
provided in this Chapter., is no bar to a future prosecution ment notot© 
» ** ~ another proae 
for tne same offence, cation. 
CHAPTER HI. 
DEMUBRER. 
SECTION. SECTION. 
4970 Pleading on part of defendant. 4977 If re-gubmlssion not ordered, 
4971 Demurrer or plea, when put in. defendant to be discharged, etc. 
4972 Grounds of demurrer. 407$ Proceedings, if submission or-
4978 Demurrer, how put in and its dered. 
form. 4979 Proceedings if demurrer is dis-
4974 When heard. allowed. 
4975 Judgment on demurrer. 4980 When objections forming 
4976 If allowed, bar to another prose- ground of demurrer must or 
cution, when. * may be taken. 
§ 4970. s 190. The only pleading on the part of the #££*«» 
defendant is either a demurrer or a plea. part of defend. 
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-jemarreron § 4971. s 191. Both the demurrer and plea must be 
plea, when pot / r u c 
«>• put m, m open court, either at the time of the arraignment 
or at such other time as may be allowed to the defendant for 
that purpose. 
SSSSSSr?1 § 4 9 7 2 - 8 1 9 2 ' T h e d ^ n d a n t may demur to the indict-
ment when it appears upon the face thereof either: 
1. That the grand jury by which it was found had no 
legal authority to inquire into the offence charged, by reason 
of its not being within the legal jurisdiction of the court. 
March is, i88i 2. That it does not substantially conform to the require-
ments of sections 150 and 151. 
3 . That more than one offence is charged in the indict-
ment, except as provided m section 153. 
4. That the facts stated do not constitute a public 
offence. 
5. That the indictment contains any matter which, if 
true, would constitute a legal justification or excuse of the 
offence charged, or other legal bar to the prosecution. 
i^ wp^unand § 4973. s 193. The demurrer must be in writing, signed 
k§ form. either by the defendant or his counsel, and filed. It must 
distinctly specify the grounds of objection to the indictment, 
or it must be disregarded, 
when heard § 4974. s 194. Upon the demurrer being filed, the argu-
ment upon the objections presented thereby must be heard, 
either immediately or at such time as the court may appoint, 
judgment on § 4975. s 195. Upon considering the demurrer, the 
rlblafim court must give judgment, either allowing or disallowing it, 
and an order to that effect must be entered upon the minutes, 
if allowed,bar § 4976. s 196. If the demurrer is allowed, the judg-
to another * . . ' . * ° 
prosecution, ment is final, upon the indictment demurred to, and is a bar 
March is, 1884 to another prosecution for the same offence, unless the pourt, 
being of the opinion that the objection on which the demurrer 
is allowed may be avoided in a new indictment, directs the 
case to be re-submitted to the same or to another grand jury, 
if re tobmis § 4977. s 197. If the court does not direct the case to be 
VS^tiwuS re-submitted, the defendant, if in custody, must be discharged, 
discharged,
 or .^  a ( j m j t t e ( j to ^ail, his bail is exonerated, or if he has de-
posited money instead of bail, the money must be refunded 
to him. 
Proceedings if § 4978. s 198. If the court directs that the case be re-
ordered submitted, the same proceedings must be had thereon as are 
prescribed in sections 187 and 188. 
FLEA. 697 
6 4979. a 199. If the demurrer is disallowed, the court Proceeding 
must permit the defendant, at his election, to plead, which he disallowed, 
must do forthwith, or at such time as the court may direct. 
If he does not plead, judgment may be pronounced against 
him. 
§ 4980. s 200. When the objections mentioned in seo>B> SSffVomiSW 
tion 192 appear upon the face of the indictment, they cang£j£j«**«• 
only be taken by demurrer, except that the objection to thegjgjf* 
jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the indictment, 
or that the facts stated do not constitute a public offence, 
may be taken at the trial, under the plea of not guilty, or 
after the trial, in arrest of judgment. 
CHAPTER IV. 
PLEA. 
SECTION. SECTION. 
4981 The different kinds of pleas. 4986 What is not a former acquittal. 
4982 Plea, bow put in and its form. 4987 What is a former acquittal. 
4983 Plea of £niltj, how put in and 4988 Conviction or acquittal of an 
when it may he withdrawn. indictment for a higher offence, 
4984 Plea of not frailty, what It puts effect of. 
in issue. 4989 Defendant refusing to answer, 
4985 What may be put in evidence plea of not guilty to be entered. 
under a plea of not guilty. 
§ 4981. s 201. * Tbere are three [four] kinds of pleas to Feb. «, inn. 
an indictment. A plea of: 2£*^SaaL 
1. Guilty. 
2. Not guilty. 
3. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the March is, *sst 
offence charged, which may be pleaded either with or with-
out the plea of not guilty. 
4. Once in jeopardy. 
§ 4982. s 202. Every plea must be oral and entered piea, bow ^t 
upon the minutes of the court substantially in the following &£!*iu 
form: 
1. If the defendant plead guilty, "The defendant 
pleads that he is guilty of the offence charged in this indict-
ment." 
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attorney, and he shall, at the request of the defendant, per-
mit such ministers of the gospel, not exceeding two, as the 
defendant may name, and any persons, relatives or friends, 
not to exceed five, to be present at the execution, together 
with such peace officers as he may think expedient, to witness 
the execution. But no other person than those mentioned in 
this section can be present at the execution, nor can any per-
son under age be permitted to witness the same. 
5S^«x?ant $ 5 1 3 ^ 8 3 5 7 * After the execution, the proper officer 
must make a return upon the death warrant, showing the 
time, mode and manner in which it was executed. 
T I T L E VIII . 
OF APPEALS TO THE SUPREME COUBT. 
CHAFTEB I. Appeals, when allowed and how takeD, and the effect 
thereof. 
CHAPTER II. Dismissing an appeal for irregularity. 
CHAPTER III. Argument on the appeal. 
CHAPTER IV. Judgment on appeal. 
CHAPTER I. 
APPEALS, HOW ALLOWED AND HOW TAKEN AND THE EFFECT THEREOF. 
SECTION SECTION. 
518* Either party may appeal, on 5)89 Appeal, how taken. 
question of law. 5140 When notice may be 6er?ed by 
5185 Parties, how designated on ap- publication. 
peal 5141 Appeal by the people, effect of. 
5186 Appeal by defendant; in what 5142 Appeal by defendant, effect of. 
cases may be taken. 5148 Same. Duty of officer. 
5187 Appeal by the people, in what 5144 Same. 
cases may be taken. 5145 Duty of clerks upon appeal. 
5188 Appeal, within what time to be 
taken. 
Either party § 5134. s 3 5 8 . Either party in a criminal action, may 
rquStPon o?n appeal to the supreme court on questions of law alone, as 
prescribed in this Chapter. 
APPEALS, HOW ALLOWED AND HOW TAKEN. 729 
§ 5135. s 359. The party appealing is known as the Parties, how 
„ i , , i i t designated on 
appellant, and the adverse party as the respondent, but appeal, 
the title of the action is not changed in consequence of 
the appeal. 
§ 5136. s 360. An appeal may be taken by the defend-Appeal by de 
' r r j j fendant,in 
ant: w h a t cases 
may be taken 
1. From a final judgment of conviction. 
2. From an order denying a motion for a new trial. 
3. From an order made after judgment, affecting the 
substantial rights of the party. 
§ 5137. 8 361. An appeal may be taken by the people: Aw^J *£ the 
1. From a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer mif^hiken. 
to the indictment. 
2. From an order granting a new trial. 
3. From an order arresting judgment. 
4. From an order made after judgment affecting the 
substantial rights of the people. 
§ 5138. s 362. An appeal from a judgment must be Appeau t^h-
taken within one year after its rendition, and from an order10 bc taken-
within sixty days after it is made. 
§ 5139. s 363. An appeal is taken by filing with the Appeal, how 
clerk of the court in which the judgment or order appealed 
from is entered or filed, a notice stating the appeal from the 
same, and serving a copy thereof upon the attorney of the 
adverse party. 
§ 5140. s 364. If personal service of the notice cannot when notice 
be made the judge of the court in which the action was tried, by'pobiicaSxSL 
upon proof thereof, may make an order for the publication 
of the notice in some newspaper for a period not exceeding 
thirty days; such publication is equivalent to personal 
service. 
§ 5141. s 365. An appeal taken by the people in no Appeal by the 
case stays or effects the operation of a judgment in favor of o?.op e ' e cc 
the defendant, until judgment is reversed. 
§ 5142. s 366. An appeal to the supreme court from a Appeal by de. 
judgment of conviction stays the execution of the judgment, of. 
upon filing with the clerk of the court in which the convic-
tion was had, a certificate of the judge of such court, or of a 
justice of the supreme court, that in his opinion there 
is probably cause for the appeal, but not otherwise. 
§ 5143. 8 367. If the certificate provided for in the same, 
preceding section is filed, the sheriff must, if the defendant 
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patyofofflccr.be in his custody, upon being served with a copy thereof, 
keep the defendant in his custody without executing the judg-
ment and detain him to abide the judgment on appeal. 
***«• § 5144. s 368. If, before the granting of the eertifi-
- cate, the judgment has commenced, the further execution 
thereof is suspended, and upon service of a copy of such cer-
tificate the defendant must be restored, by the officer in 
whose custody he is, to his original custody. 
^ w a T * § 51*5. s 369. Upon the appeal being taken the clerk 
with whom the notice of appeal is filed must, within ten days 
thereafter, without charge transmit to the clerk of the 
appellate court a copy of the notice of appeal, and of the 
record, and of all bills of exception, instructions and indorse-
ments thereon; and upon the receipt thereof, the clerk of the 
appellate court must file the same and perform the same ser-
vice as in civil cases, without charge. 
CHAPTER II . 
DI6MI8SING AN APPEAL FOR IRREGULARITY. 
SECTION. SECTION. 
5146 For what irregularity and bow 5147 Dismissed for want of proper 
dismissed. return. 
For what ir. $ 5146. s 370. If the appeal is irregular in any sub-
anffhowiii. e t antial particular, but not otherwise, the appellate court 
missed. may, on any day in the term, on motion of the respondent, 
upon five days notice, accompanied with copies of the papers 
upon which the motion is founded, order it to be dismissed. 
wanTo/pwpS § 5 1 4 7 - 8 3 7 1 \ T h e o o u r t m a y a l s o » u P o n l i k e motion, 
"etTfi ^^ dismiss the appeal, if the return is not made as provided in 
section 369, unless for good cause they enlarge the time for 
that purpose. 
Tab 6 
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may be commenced at any time after^the death of the person killed, and for 
the embezzlement of public moneys .or the falsification of public records, at 
.any time after the discovery of the crime. 
Cal. Fen. C, f 799; Cal. Sup. (1893) p. 1064. Limitations not affected by general repeal I 
Limitations, civil procedure, II 6445-6492. 5835. 
8666. (4598.) Felony other than murder, etc Four years. For any 
felony other than murder, the embezzlement of public moneys, or the falsifi-
cation of public records, an indictment must be found or an information filed 
within four years after its commission. 
Gal .Pen. C, | 800; Cal. Sup. <1893) p. 1064. 
8667. (4599.) Indictable misdemeanor. Three years. An indictment 
for any misdemeanor must be foun4 or an information filed within three years 
after its commission. 
<3aL Pen. C 1 S01*, State •. Jeneen, 14 U. 166; 96 P. 1085. 
8668. (4600.) Tune of defendant's absence no part of limitation. If, 
when the offense is committed, the defendant is out of the state, the indict-
ment may be found or an information filed within the term herein limited 
after his coming within the state, and no time during which the defendant 
shall not be an inhabitant of, or usually resident within, the state, shall be 
part of the limitation. 
Cal. Pen. C. | 802. 
8669. (4601.) When indictment deemed found. An indictment is found, 
within the meaning of this chapter, when it is presented by the grand jury in 
open court, and there received and filed. 
Cal. Pen. C, I 808. 
8670. (4602.) Misdemeanor within justice's jurisdiction. Two years. 
A complaint for a misdemeanor, of which justices of the peace have jurisdic-
tion, must be filed within two years after the commission of the offense. 
8671. (4603.) Action begun when complaint filed. An action on a com-
plaint is commenced when a verified complaint is filed with the magistrate. 
Complaint defined, | 8674; form, If 8680, 8480. 
CHAPTER 11. 
DEFINITIONS. 
8674. (4604.) Complaint defined. A complaint is a statement in writ-
ing, made to a court or magistrate, that a person has been guilty of some 
designated offense. 
Cal. Pen. C, f 806; Mont. Pen. C, { 1870. What complaint must state, f{ 8680,-9480. 
Action begun when complaint filed, | 8S71. 
8675. (4605.) Indictment defined. An indictment is an accusation in 
writing, presented by a grand jury to a competent court, charging a person 
with a public offeftse. 
Cat Pen. €., 8 817. 
^ 8676. (4606.) Information defined. An information is an accusation in 
writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, charg-
ing a person with a public offense, presented and signed by the district at-
torney, or by the attorney pro tern, for the state, and filed in the office of At 
clerk of the district court, - Am'd "01, p. 26. 
Mont Pen. C. f 1872V Proeecution by information or indictment 
niing- of information, Ifi 8779-8782, except, Con. art 1, tee. 18; | 8549. 
8677. (4607.) Magistrate defined. A magistrate is an officer having 
power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public of-
fense. 
Cal. Pen. C, I 807; Moat Pen. C, I 1878. 
8678. (4608.) Magistrates enumerated. The following persons are 
magistrates: 
L The justices of the supreme court/ 
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2. The judges of the district courts; 
3. Justices of the peace. 
Cal Pen. C , I 808*. 
8679. (4609.) Peace officers enumerated. A peace officer is a sheriff of 
a county or his deputy, or a constable, or a marshal or policeman of any in-
corporated city or town. 
Mont. Pen. C I 1375*. 
CHAPTER 12. 
COMPLAINT. 
8680. (4610.) What m complaint most state The complaint must 
state: 
1. The name of the person accused, if known, or if not known and it is 
so stated, he may be designated by any other name; 
2. The county in which the offense was committed; 
3. The general name of the crime or public offense; 
4. • The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the crime or pub-
lic offense named; 
5. The person against whom or against whose property the offense was 
committed, if known; 
6. If the offense is against the property of any person, a general descrip-
tion of such property. 
. The complaint must be subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. 
N. Dak. (1895) i 7886; Mont Pen. C , | 1590*. It need not state the offense In technical 
Complaint defined, ( 8674. language or in such specific term* as is re-
Complaint for offense within justice's juris- quired in the information. 
diction, | 9420. ~ State v. Pay, 45 tJ. 411; 146 P. 100. 
J £ £ p l f ! ? ™ * f t o m m i S 8 i o n ot c r i m e to "o ther Accused, failing to object to the complaint 
nS?ni! iS «« «,»«™ •« ~ . « ^ i - ^ M ^ ^ *~ w n e n arraigned before the committing magis-
k . X ^ K ? ^ L £ ?f ft°57t°anS0mpel • e c u r i t y t 0 trate, waived all objections that might hive 
keep the peace, 55 8567, 8569. been urged against i t 
e t c ^ l f ^ . t m 1 1 8 1 c o r p o r a t i o n ' c o m P l a i n t » State v. Anderson. 85 U. 496; 101 P, 885. 
Information or complaint must show that a . A verified complaint is essential to a prelim-
crime fcas been committed. ta%7*ex « n a H o n i ^ „ *«* ^ * •» «A« 
In re Catherine Wiseman, 1 U. 89. s t a t e v- Sheffield, 45 U. 426; 146 P . 806. 
Criminal complaint may be sworn to upon Where It develops that a crime committed 
Information and belief. was different from that charged in the com-
U. S. v. Eldredge, 5 TJ. 161; 18 P. €73. plaint, a magistrate may direct the county at-
A complaint which states the name of the torney to prepare a new complaint, and direct 
crime charged, the time and place of its com- the rearrest of the accused, and give him an 
mission, the name of the accused, and which opportunity to either waive or insist on exam-
sets out in general terms the acts constituting ination on the new charge, 
the crime, is sufficient State v. Pay, 45 XJ. 411; 146 P . 100. 
State v. Anderson, 85 U. 496; 101 P . 885. 
8681. (4611.) Any person having knowledge must make complaint. 
Every person who has reason to believe that a crime or public offense has 
been committed must make complaint against such person before some mag-
istrate having authority to make inquiry of the same-
N. Dak. (1895) I 7887; Mont Pen. C., I 1591* 
When person concealing crime an accessory, I 7980. 
8682. (4612.) Magistrate must examine complainant Witnesses. 
When a complaint is made before a magistrate, charging a person with the 
commission of a crime or public offense, such magistrate must examine the 
complainant, under oath, as to his knowledge of the commission of the of-
fense charged, and he may also examine any other persons, and may take their 
depositions. 
K. Dak. (1895) I 7888; Mont Pen. C , J 1592*. A writ of prohibition will not issue to re-
complainant must name witnesses, f 8684. strain criminal proceedings on the ground that 
Witnesses may be required to give bonds for I 8682, providing that when a complaint is 
appearance at preliminary, fi 8766. made before a magistrate, charging a crime, 
Depositions of witnesses unable to give the magistrate must examine the complainant 
bonds, 55 8765, 8767. under oath and may also examine other persons 
Preliminary examination, f 5 8787-8768. and take their depositions, and 5 8688, providing 
Under chap. 23, laws of 1896, a magistrate that where a complaint is made by a person 
hit authority to examine and commit a pris- r+her than the county attorney, the complaint 
oner charged with commission on an offense and other evidence taken by the magistrate 
to answer the eharge in proper court must be submitted to the county attorney be-
State v. Pierpont, 16 TJ. 476; 52 P . .892. fore a warrant issues—were not complied with; 
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the decision of the question being within the remedy for an erroneous ruling being by *o-Jurisdiction of the trial court, and the accused's peal. 
State, ex rel Brown •. Third District Court 
27 U. 836; 76 P. 739. 
8683. (4613.) When arrest made without warrant, complaint to be filed. 
When any officer or other person shall bring any person he has arrested with-
out a warrant before a magistrate, it is the duty of such officer or person f 
specify the charge upon which he has made the arrest. It is then the duty ol 
the magistrate or the county attorney to make a complaint of the offense 
charged, and cause the officer or person, or some other person, to subscribe 
and make oath to such complaint, and file it. 
N. Dak. (1S95) I 7*89; Mont Pen. C, I 1593V 
8684. (4614.) Complainant must name witnesses. Subpoena. Every 
person making complaint charging the commission of a crime or public of-
fense must inform the magistrate of all persons whom he believes to have any 
knowledge of its commission, and the magistrate, at the time of issuing the 
warrant, may issue subpoenas for such persons, requiring them to attend at» 
specified time and place as witnesses. 
tt. Dak. (1895) 5 7890; Mont Pen. C., | 1594. 
CHAPTER 13.. 
WARRANT OF ARREST. 
8688. (4615.) Issuance of warrant Consent of county attorney. 
When a complaint, verified by oath or affirmation, is made before a magis-
trate, charging the commission of a crime or public offense, he must, if satis-
fied therefrom that the offense complained of has been committed, and that 
. there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed it, issue a 
warrant for his arrest; but when the magistrate before whom the complaint 
is made is a justice of the peace, before issuing the warrant, the complaint, if 
made by any person other than the county attorney of the county, and other 
evidence taken by such magistrate relating to the offense charged, must be 
submitted to such county attorney, and he must examine into the charge and 
enter either his approval or disapproval of the issuance of a warrant upon such 
complaint. If the county attorney disapproves, no warrant shall be issued, 
but if he approves the issuance of a warrant, such magistrate shall proceed 
accordingly; provided, that in cases when it appears from statements of the 
complaint or other written evidence submitted to the magistrate that the 
accused is likely to escape from the county before the approval of the county 
attorney can be had, as hereinbefore prescribed, a wcrrant may issue without 
the apprqval of the county attorney. No justice of the peace shall receive 
any fees or allowances whatever for any act done or services rendered in a 
criminal action or proceeding commenced or prosecuted in disregard of the 
provisions of this section, 
N. Dak. (1895) ( 7891*. criminal proceedings upon the ground that the 
Form of complaint, I 8680. provisions of this section and | 8682 were not 
Magistrate defined, I 8677; magistrates enu- complied with, the accused's remedy being by 
merated, | 8678. appeal. 
Cited In : State v. Pay, 45 U. 411; 146 P. State, ex rel. Brown v. Third District Court 
100. 27 U. 886; 75 P. 789. 
A writ of prohibition will not Issue to restrain 
8689. (4616.) Warrant defined. Form. A warrant of arrest is an or-
der in writing in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate, commanding 
the arrest of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form: 
State of Utah, county of . 
The state of Utah to any sheriflF, constable, marshal, or policeman of said 
state, or of the county of 
Complaint on oath having been this day made before me, by A B, that the 
crime of (designating it) has been committed, and accusing C D thereof, you 
are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above n a m ^ C n *nA v»rinir 
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*7XL (4(54.) id. Arrest and det«tioo of prboner. The order may be 
directed generally to any of such officers, and executed by the officer receiving 
it. The officer executing any such order shall take into his custody the person 
designated therein, and detain him upon such order for such length of time as 
shall be necessary for the officer directing the arrest to reach the place of de-
tention by the ordinary means and course of travel, or until sooner demanded 
by an officer having a warrant for the arrest* of such person, but in no case 
shall the officer arresting such person upon such order detain him longer than 
the time hereinbefore mentioned. 
K. Dak. <H95) f TWO. Disposition of person arrested, tf 8695-8707. 
CHAPTER tS. 
RETAKING AFTER ESCAPE OR RESCUE. 
8732. <4655.) Pursuit and rearrest If a person arrested escapes or is 
rescued, the person from whose custody he shall have escaped or shall have 
been rescued may immediately pursue and retake him at any time and in any 
place within the state. 
•Cal. Pen. C, 1 S54. Rescues, | | 7964, 7965. 
Escapes, | | 7967-7971. Justifiable homicide In retaking felon, f 1031. 
£733. (4656.) Id. May break door or window. To retake the person 
escaping or rescued, the person pursuing may break open an outer or inner 
door or window of a dwelling-house or other building, if, after notice of his 
intention, he is refused admittance. 
Cal. Fen. C I 656. 
Door or window may be tooken In making arrest, when, | S72J. 
CHAPTER 16. 
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION. 
4737. <4657.) Magistrate to inform prisoner of his rights. When the 
defendant shall be brought before the magistrate upon an arrest, either with 
or Without a warrant, on a charge of having committed a public offense, the 
magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his 
right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings. 
Cal. Pen. C, 1 S58. Where the Information charged an offense 
Rights of accused person, Con. art 1, sees, different from that stated in the complaint on 
7-12, and notes; I 6553, and note. which accused had a preliminary examination, 
District attorney may attend, | 6762. the accused may, before pleading to the merits, 
Preliminary examination may fee waived* move to quash the information on that ground-Con, art 1, sec. IS; | 6549, and note. Id. 
What complaint must state, I 8680. A verified complaint Is essential to a prelim-
Preliminary examination of corporation, J Inary examination, and the preliminary exam-
9867. ination, unless waived. Is a prerequisite to 
Information to he filed, f ST7S, and note. prosecution by Information. 
The right of the accused to a preliminary State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 486; 146 P. 806. 
examination on the charge stated In the com-
plaint Is a substantial one. 
State v. Pay, 46 0 . 411; 146 P. SO0. 
$738. (4658.) Time to procure coantd allowed Message to counsel 
The magistrate must also allow the defendant a reasonable time to send for 
counsel, and postpone the examination for that purpose, and must, upon the 
request of the defendant, require a peace officer to take a message to any 
counsel in the precinct or the city the defendant may name. The officer must, 
without delay and without fee, perform that duty* 
CaL Pen. C., 1 859. Right to counsel, Con. art X, sec 18. 
8739. (4659.) Examination to be proceeded with. At the time set for 
the hearing, the magistrate before whom the accused is brought must, unless 
a change of place of trial is had under the provisions of the next succeeding 
section, immediately after the ann»QM«^ ** ,»A««~«~i ~- it ~~-~~* •(• 
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ter waiting a reasonable time therefor, if the accused requires the aid of coun-
sel, proceed to examine the case. 
N Dak. (1895) | 7952. 
Waiver of preliminary examination with Densest of state, Con. art 1, sec. 12; f 8549. 
8740. (4660.) Change of place of trial Affidavit Transfer. When 
ever a person accused of a public offense is brought before a justice of the 
peace for examination and, at any time before such examination is com-
menced, he files with such justice his affidavit stating that by reason of tbt 
bias or prejudice of said justice he believes he cannot have a fair and impartial 
examination before him, such justice must transfer said action, and all die pa-
pers therein, including a certified copy of his docket entries, to another justice 
of the same county; provided, that unless the parties agree upon the justice tc 
whom said action shall be transferred, it shall be sent to the nearest justice oi 
the county, but no more than one change of the place of examination tmdei 
this section shall be had in an action. 
N Dak. (1895) I 7963. 
Chancre of place of trial In Justices' courts, f| 9427-9429. 
8741. (4661.) Limitation on postponement, unless by consent The ex-
amination must be completed at one session, unless the magistrate, for good 
cause shown, postpone it. The postponement shall be for not more than four 
days at each time, nor more than twelve days in all, unless by consent or on 
motion of the defendant. 
Cal Pen C, I S81*. 
8742. (4662.) Id Defendant to give bail or be committed. If a post-
ponement is had, the magistrate must commit the defendant for examination, 
admit him to bail, or discharge him from custody upon the deposit of money, 
as provided in this code, as security for his appearance at the time to which 
the examination is postponed. 
Cal Pen C, I 862. % Bail, It 8704, 8705, 9248-9270. 
8743. (4663.) Form of commitment for examination. The commitment 
for examination shall be made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate 
on the warrant of arrest, to the following effect: 'The within named A B, 
having been brought before me under this warrant, is committed for exam-
ination to the sheriff of " If the sheriff be not present, the defendant 
may be committed to the custody of any peace officer. 
Cal Pen C, I 863. 
County attorney to report to district attorney, I 8788. 
8744. (4664.) Magistrate must issue subpoenas. The magistrate must 
issue subpoenas, subscribed by him, for witnesses within the state, required 
either by the prosecution or the defense. 
Cal Pen. C, 8 864V 
Accused entitled to compulsory process for -witnesses, Con. art 1, s e c 18. 
8745. (4665.) Procedure on preliminary examination. At the exam-
ination, the magistrate must first read to the defendant the complaint and the 
depositions of the witnesses examined or making the complaint, if depositions 
were taken. * ' -«R| 
Cal Pen C, I 864*. crime charged in the complaint, or one included 
A criminal prosecution must be begun by a therein, 
complaint, and accused can only be held for State T. Pay. 48 U. 411; 148 P. 800. 
trial after preliminary examination for the JT — 
8746. (4666.) Id. Examination of witnesses in presence of defendant. 
The witnesses must be examined in the presence of the defendant, and may be 
cross-examined in his behalf. 
Cal Pen C , f 865. 
Accused entitled to be confronted by witnesses, Con. ar t 1, sec. 18; I 8558. 
8747. (4667.) Id. Examination of. defendant's witnesses. When the 
examination of witnesses on the part of the state shall have closed, any wit-
nesses the defendant may produce may be sworn and examined. 
Cal Pen. C . 8 888. 
8748. (4668.) Id. Exclusion of witnesses. Keeping separate. While 
a witness shall be tinder examination, the magistrate may exclude all wit-
nesses who have not been examined. He may also cause the witnesses to be 
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kept separate, and to be prevented from conversing with each other until 
they shall have all been examined. 
CaL Pen. C, I 867. Exclusion of witnesses and others, | 1801. 
8749. (4669.) Id Exclusion of spectator*, etc, on request The mag-
istrate must also, upon the request of the defendant, exclude from the exam-
ination every person except his clerk, the prosecutor and his counsel, the at-
torney-general, the county attorney, the defendant and his counsel, and the 
officer having the defendant in custody. . 
Cal. Pen. C., f 868. 
Exclusion of spectators, etc., In certain cases, 8 1101. 
8750. (4670.) When testimony reduced to writing. Form of deposition. 
The testimony of each witness in cases of homicide must be reduced to writ-
ing as a deposition, by the magistrate, or under his direction; and in other 
cases upon the demand of the prosecuting attorney. The magistrate before 
whom the examination shall be had may, with the consent of the county attor-
ney, order the testimony and proceedings to be taken down in shorthand, in 
all examinations herein mentioned, and for that purpose he may appoint a 
stenographer. The deposition or testimony of the witness must be authenti-
cated in the following form: 
1. It must state the name of the witness, his place of residence, and his 
business or profession; 
2. It must contain the questions put to the witness, and his answers 
thereto, each answer being distinctly read to him as it is taken down, and 
being corrected or added to until it conforms to what he declares is the truth; 
except that in cases where the testimony shall be taken down in shorthand, 
the answer or answers of the witness need not be read to him; 
3. If a question put is objected to on either side and overruled, or the 
witness declines answering it, that* fact, with the ground on which the ques-
tion shall have been overruled or the answer declined, must be stated; 
4. The deposition must be signed by the witness, or if he refuses to sign 
it, his reason for refusing must be stated in writing as he gives it, except that 
in cases where the deposition shall be taken down in shorthand, it need not be 
signed by the witness; 
5. It must be signed and certified by the magistrate when reduced to 
writing by him, or under his direction, and when taken down in shorthand, the 
transcript of the stenographer appointed as aforesaid, when written out in 
longhand, and certified as being a correct statement of such testimony and 
proceedings in the case, shall be prima facie a correct statement of such testi-
mony and proceedings. The stenographer shall, if the defendant is held to 
answer the charge, within ten days after the close of such examination, tran-
scribe his said shorthand notes into longhand, and certify and file the same 
with the clerk of the district court of the county in which the defendant shall 
have been examined, and shall in all cases file his original notes with said 
clerk. The stenographer's fees shall be paid out of the treasury of the county. 
CaL Pen. C, | 869*. time of the trial, and the transcript of the 
Testimony upon preliminary examination testimony of an absent witness admitted. 
may be used on trial, when, | 8558. Id* 
Testimony of witness taken In writing, 8 Where a magistrate, who holds a person to 
1767. answer a complaint charging him with a fel-
Fsllure of reporter to file transcript does not ?£*'district* J^£C?»X °**!? ^ £ & < £ 
wjss»^ hi «s B^SS^SS&S^S 
S£la»^ » a S » 
taSfVu? S^ BIO1 U - UU " P ' M 7 ; *~ ****. o E & l 41 U. 88; 128 P. 897. 
!•••* *~>t/i.i*n. #* *M. ••**!*.• «fA »*+ m»ir* Where accused, with consent of the stats, 
*hT%JS.?£&H? L M J £ T £ ? ! ? «r £*irr?h! waived the preliminary examination, he mutt 
JHII 5!S5«JP,mn« iVlCLSW,KUS'fffiSf* **e b« *•** to have waived the necessity of ths 
* » . • ? ¥ xr,S£ln JW TT^IS? M P MS** magistrate's hearing any testimony. _ 
State ••Morgan, 27 U. 108, 74 P. 526. g f ^
 v# Mewnjnnfy# 4§ u # l l 6 . 184 p. 432. i.A'fKSW. S^d l£r£F5J&lSF^ A transcript is admissible where the certtfl-
^\££L*££i t w i n ? ^ A S S S ^ V L ? J ^ <**• ^ to the effect that it was transcribed £ e S2XS& £ «S*&«i d e f e c t l v e» b u t "^y to long hand while, In fact it was transcribed 
beflA1!iald^-«L t M TT^#. HA T> A*A I n typewriting, and the testimony of a wit** 
State v. Vance, 88 U. 1; 110 P. 484. who, at the time of the trial, was out of thj 
The provision -fixing time of filing the notes state, is admissible, as opportunity was gfr*& 
Is directory, in the absence of a claim of preju- for cross-examination at the hearing.
 mmm dice, and original notes may be filed at the state v. HMstrom, 46 U. 841; 150 P. 885. 
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8751. (4671.) Custody and disposition of depositions, eta The magis-
trate or his clerk must keep the depositions taken, and exhibits admitted as 
evidence on the examination, until they shall be returned to the proper court; 
and must not permit them to be examined or copied by any person except a 
judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offense, or authorized to issue writs 
of habeas corpus, the attorney-general, county attorney, or other prosecuting 
attorney, and the defendant and his counsel. 
Cal. Pen. C, f 870. 
8752. (4672.) Id Violation of preceding section a crime. Every vio-
lation of the next preceding section is punishable as a misdemeanor. 
N. Dak. (1895) 8 7963. 
8753. (4673.) Defendant discharged for want of probable cause. If, 
after hearing the proofs, it appears that either no public offense has been com-
mitted, or that there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of 
a public offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, * 
by an indorsement on the warrant or the complaint, signed by him, to the 
following effect: "There being no sufficient cause to believe the within 
named A B guilty of the offense within mentioned, I order him discharged/' 
Cal. Pen. C, ! 871. 
8754. (4674.) Id. When costs taxed against complainant. If the de-
fendant on^a preliminary examination for a public offense is discharged as 
provided in the next preceding section, and if the magistrate finds that the 
prosecution was malicious or without probable cause, he shall enter such judg-
ment on his docket and tax the costs against the complaining witness, which 
shall be enforced as judgments for costs in criminal cases, and execution may 
issue therefor. 
N. Dak. (1895) 8 7965. 
8755. (4675.) When defendant held to answer. Order. If, however, it 
appear from the examination that a public offense has been committed, and 
that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the mag-
istrate must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the follow-
ing effect: "It appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint men-
tioned (or any offense, according to the fact, stating generally the nature 
thereof) has been committed, and that there is sufficient cause to believe the 
within named A B guilty thereof, I order that he be held to answer to the 
same." 
Cal. Pen. C , | 872*. accused is held is entered upon the magis-
Form of commitment, ( 8760. trate's docket and certified to the court 
Magistrate to return papers to district court, State v. Crook, 16 IT. 212; 51 P. 1091. 
I 8768. An Information will not be set aside because 
Magistrate to furnish list of witnesses, etc., of mistakes of magistrate In describing the of-
I 8768. . fense, or even in characterizing it, when It ap-
Names of witnesses to be indorsed on infor- pears that the conduct, acts, and motives de-
ntation, § 8782; and on indictment, | 8820. scribed in the information as the offense were 
Sec. 4886, C. L. 1888, requiring the Justice to investigated by the magistrate and commit-
In do r*«e on the deposition an order, etc., Is dl- merit made thereon, 
rectory, and it is sufficiently complied with State v. McKee, 17 U. 870; 58 P. 788. 
when the order specifying the offense for which 
8756. (4676.) Id Order when offense not bailable. If the offense is 
not bailable, the following words, or words to the same effect, must be added 
to the indorsement: "And that he is hereby committed to the sheriff of the 
county of " 
Cal. Pen. C./ f 878. 
8757. (4677.) Id Order when bail has been taken. If the offense is 
bailable, and bail is taken by the magistrate, the following words must be 
added to the aforementioned indorsement: "And I have admitted him to 
bail to answer by the undertaking hereto annexed." 
8758. (4678.) Id Order when offense bailable. If the offense is bail-
able, and the defendant is admitted to bail, but bail shall not have been given, 
the following words must be added to the order indorsed on th*e complaint: 
"And that he is admitted to bail in the sum of dollars, and is committed 
to the sheriff of the county of until he gives such bail, or is legally dis-
charged," 
Cal. Pen. C , I 876*. Bail generally, ffi 9248-9270. 
Ball on arrest, f$ 8704, $706. 
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8759. (4679.) Comfutacnt to be delivered with defendant. If the mag-
istrate orders the defendant to be committed, he must make out a commit-
ment, signed by himself, with his name of office, and deliver it, with the de-
fendant, to the officer to whom he is committed, or, if that officer is not pres-
ent, to the peace officer, who must immediately deliver the defendant into the 
proper custody, together with the commitment. 
Cal. Pen! C, I S76. 
Indorsement to be made on the complaint toy the magistrate, I S755. 
8760. (4680.) Id. Form of. The commitment must be to the follow-
ing effect: 
State of Utah, county of 
The state of Utah to the sheriff of the county of • 
An order having been this day made by me that A B be held to answer 
upon a charge of (stating briefly the nature of the offense, and giving as near 
as may be the time when and the place where the same was committed), you 
are commanded to receive him into your custody and detain him until he is 
legally discharged. 
Dated at , this day of , 19 
Cal. Pen. C | 877. 
8761. (4681.) Witnesses may be required to give bonds. On holding 
the defendant to answer, the magistrate may take from each of the material 
witnesses examined before him on the part of the state a written undertaking, 
without surety, to the effect that he will appear and testify at the court to 
which the complaint and depositions are to be sent, or that he will forfeit the 
sum of $200. 
Cal. Pen. C., I 878* 
Witness may be required to five bond to appear at preliminary examination, | 8766. 
8762. (4682.) 1<L Sureties may be required When the magistrate or a 
judge of the court in which the action is pending shall be satisfied, by proof on 
oath, that there is reason to believe that any such witness will not appear and 
testify unless security is required, he may order the witness to enter into a 
written undertaking, with sureties, in such sum as he may deem proper, for 
his appearance as specified in the next preceding section. 
Cal. Pen. C., I 879. - " ~ " -^.i^ 
8763. (4683.) Id. When witness is a minor. When a minor is a ma-
terial witness, any other person may be allowed to give an undertaknig for 
the appearance of such witness; or the magistrate may, in his discretion* take 
the undertaking of such minor in a sum not exceeding $50, which shall be valid 
and binding in law, notwithstanding the disability of minority. 
Mont Pen. C, I 1090*. 
8764. (4684.) Id. Commitment for failure to give. If a witness, re-
quired to enter into an undertaking to appear and testify, either with or with-
out sureties, refuses compliance with the order for that purpose, the magis-
trate must commit him to prison until he complies or is legally discharged. 
Cal Pen. C, I 881. 
8765. (4685.) Id. Examination of witness unable to give bond. When, 
however, it shall satisfactorily appear, by examination on oath of the witness, 
or any other person, that the witness is unable to procure sureties, he maybe 
forthwith conditionally examined on behalf of the state. Such examination 
must be by question and answer, in the presence of the defendant, or after 
notice to him, if on bail, and conducted in the same manner as the examination 
before a committing magistrate is required by this code to be conducted, and 
the witness must thereupon be discharged; but this section shall not apply to 
an accomplice in the commission of the offense charged. 
Cal. Pen. C.,.f 882. Magistrate may take depositions of witness* 
Use of such testimony, f 8558. In the first instance, f 8682. _ ^ 
Testimony of witness may be taken in writ- > When testimony reduced to writing on pry-
ing in any case; use as evidence, | 8787. liminary examination, f 8750. 
8766. (4685x.) May require witness to give bond to appear at prelimi-
nary examination* Whenever a crime has been committed, a magistrate hav-
ing jurisdiction of the same may, on proof that there is reason to believe that 
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any of the material witnesses will not appear at the preliminary examination 
unless security is required, or on the recommendation of the county attorney 
or other attorney for the state, order said witness to enter into a written un-
dertaking with sureties, in any sum he may deem proper, for their appearance 
at said preliminary examination. *07, p. 196. 
8767. (4685x1.) Id* Testimony of witnesses taken in writing; use as 
evidence. Upon application from the county attorney or other attorney for 
the state, and upon notice to the defendant, the testimony of witnesses may 
te taken in writing before the magistrate having jurisdiction of said crime, 
and said testimony, when signed by the witness and certified by the magis-
trate, or a transcript of said testimony, if taken in shorthand, certified by the 
stenographer who took the testimony, shall be prima facie a correct state-
ment of such testimony, and shall be used at the preliminary examination of 
said defendant or at the trial of said defendant, or both, with the same force 
and effect as though said witnesses were present in court and testifying; 
provided, however, that it be satisfactorily shown to the court that the wit-
ness is dead or insane, or cannot with due diligence be found within the state. 
'07, p. 196. 
Magistrate may examine witnesses and take admissible, even though the defendant does 
depositions at time complaint Is made, f 8682. not have an opportunity to cross-examine the 
Testimony of witnesses at preliminary hear* witness in the presence of the Jury, 
tog | 8553, and note State vs HiHstrom, 46 U. 841; 150 P. 885. 
Where a deputy sheriff calls at a home of a Where it is shown that the witness is out 
witness several times, but does not find him, of the state, it is not necessary to show any 
and the witness is out of the state at the time special effort to find him in the state 
of the trial, the transcript of his evidence is State v. De Prctto, 48 U. 849. 155 P. 886. 
8768. (4686.) After preliminary examination, magistrate must make 
full return of proceedings to the district court. Penalty for failure. When 
the magistrate shall have discharged the defendant or shall have held him 
to answer, he must, within fifteen days from the date of his decision, re-
turn to the clerk of the court at which the defendant is required to appear, 
the warrant, if any; the complaint, the depositions, if any; a list of the names 
and the postoffice addresses of all witnesses for the state, if he can ascertain 
them; and all undertakings of bail and for the appearance of witnesses taken 
by him, together with a certified copy of the record of the proceedings, as 
it" appears on his docket. Failure of the magistrate to make such return as 
herein provided; and within the time herein stated, shall be deemed a con-
tempt of the court before which the defendant is required to appear, for 
which the magistrate shall be fined by said court not less than $10 and not 
more than $100. Am'd '15, p. 200. 
Cal Pen C. 8 883* 
8769. (4687.) When defendant a convict* Examination in prison. 
When the defendant is a convict in the state prison, or a prisoner in a county 
jail, the examination may be held in the office of the prison or jail. In such 
cases the commitment shall be directed to the warden of the prison or to the 
keeper of the jail. 
CHAPTER 17. 
PROSECUTION BY INFORMATION, INDICTMENT, OR ACCUSATION. 
8773. (4688.) Prosecution In dBstrict court to be by information, etc. 
All public offenses triable in the district courts, except cases appealed from 
justices' courts, must be prosecuted by information or indictment, except as 
provided in the next succeeding section. 
* i « ~ . - - cordance with the statutes, Con. art 1, sec. 18, Cal Pen C, | 888*. and art 8, aec 21, does not abridge the privi-
Prosecutlon by information «r indictment, leges or immunities of such person as a citizen 
von art l, sec. 18, | 8549. of the U. S under the fourteenth amendment 
Indictment defined, | 8675. - In re Maxwell, 18 U. 495, 57 P. 412; affirmed 
Information defined, | 8676. 176 U. 8. 181 
The prosecuUon and conviction of a person State v. Imlay, 22 U. 156; 61 P. 557. 
Dy information filed by county attorney in ac- A person charged with having committed an 
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informed by the court that it is his right to have counsel before being ar-
raigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of counsel. If he desires and 
is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign counsel to defend him. 
Cal. Pen. C, I 987. of showing to contrary it will be presumed thti 
Rights of accused persons, Con. art 1, sees, the examining magistrate informed accusedaf 
T-18; | 8553. his right to-an attorney. (The transcript of the proceedings before an State v. Mewhinney, 43 TJ. 185; 134 P. ttt 
examining magistrate, affirmatively showing An attorney appointed under this section 
that the defendant "waived the service of an la not entitled to compensation from the coon-
attorney," shows that defendant was apprised ty. 
of his right to such services, and in absence Pardee v. 8. L*. County, 39 U. 482; 118 P. ltt. 
8872. (4768.) Id. Information or indictment to be read. Plea. The 
arraignment must be made by the court, or by the clerk or county attorney 
under its direction, and shall, consist in reading the information or indictment 
to the defendant and delivering to him a copy thereof, including the list of 
witnesses, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty to the in-
formation or indictment. 
Gal. Pen. C, f 988*. 
8871 (4769.) Defendant to declare hit true name. When the defendant 
is arraigned, he must be informed that, if the name by which he is prosecuted 
is not his true name, he must then declare his true name, or be proceeded 
against by the nam^ in the information or indictment. If he gives no other 
name, the court may proceed accordingly; but if he alleges that another name 
is his true name, the court must direct an entry thereof in the minutes of the 
arraignment, and the subsequent proceedings on the information or indict-
ment may be had against him by that name, referring also to the name by 
which he is informed against or indicted. 
*Cal. Pen. C, f 989*. 
Defendant charged in wrong name, correction, I S888. 
8874. (4770.) Time allowed for answer. Motion to set aside. De-
murrer. Plea. Proviso. If, on the arraignment, the defendant requires it, 
he must be allowed a reasonable time, not less than one day, to answer the 
information or indictment. He may, in answer to the arraignment, move 
to set aside, demur, or plead to the information or indictment; provided, 
'that the defendant must be required to answer within ten days from the 
date of arraignment if court be then in session in such county, otherwise 
on the first day of next succeeding session of court. Am'd '15, p. 200. 
CaL Pen. C f 900. 
CHAPTER 24. 
SETTING ASIDE INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT. 
8878. (4771.) When information must be set aside. The information 
must be set aside by the court in which defendant is arraigned, upon his mo-
tion, in any of the following cases: 
1. When it fails to recite that the defendant had theretofore been duly 
committed by a magistrate; 
- 2. When the names of the witnesses testifying on the part of the state 
in such examination are not indorsed thereon; 
3. When it is not signed by the district attorney or by the attorney pro 
tern, for the state, Am'd *01, p. 27. 
Cal. Pen. C I 995*.
 mm Indictment and Information tested by ssms Information, rules Of pleading, form, ate, II rules of pleading. 
•779-8782, 8828-8855. State v. Crook, 16 U. 212; 51 P. 1091. 
Granting or refusing of motion deemed ex- A variation of the date of an adulterouf 
cepted to, i 9183.
 A act is not ground for motion to quash. Waiver of preliminary examination* | 8549, State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 426; 146 P. 806. 
and note. . . . . . . ** objection that accused has not had a 
Time of filing and necessity of preliminary preliminary examination may be raised by a 
hearing, I 8779. motion to quash the information, and sues 
Names of witnesses, etc., to be placed on in- motion cannot be considered as a demurrer in-
formation, | 8782. der | 8898. 
When indictment or information sufficient f State v. Springer, 40 TJ. 471; 121 P. 976. 
M<1. - -
8879. (4772.) When the indictment must be set aside. The indictment 
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must be set aside by the court in which the defendant is arraigned, upon his 
motion, in any of the following cases: 
1. Where it is not found, indorsed, and presented as prescribed in this 
code; * * 
2. When the names of the witnesses examined before the grand jury, or 
whose depositions may have been read before them, are not inserted at Hit 
foot of the indictment, or indorsed thereon; 
3. When a person has been permitted to be present during the session 
of the grand jury while the charge embraced in the indictment has been under 
consideration, except as provided in § 8814; 
4. When the defendant had not been held to answer before the finding 
of the indictment, on any ground which would have been good for challenge 
cither to the panel or to any individual grand juror. 4 * 
Cal Fen C, I 995*. testimony of Incompetent witness Is BO ground 
Indictment, rules of pleading, form, e tc , If for setting aside <>r 
1820*8855 U. S v Cutler, 5 TJ. 608, 19 P. 145 
Granting or refusing of mouon deemed ex- Indictment returned by grand Jury not sum* 
#*n£d to 8 9189 * «*«"«« «c**«*u ** moned and Impaneled as required by law, or 
cepiea u>, 5 »A« consisting of an illegal number, should Jfc>e set 
Names of witnesses to be placed on indict- aside 
ment. J 8829. „ U. S v. Reynolds, 1 U. 226. 
Fact that indictment was found solely on Brannigan v. People, 8 U. 488, 24 P. 767.' ' 
8880. (4773.) Motion to set aside. Form. When to be made. Motion 
to set aside the information or indictment, must be in writing, subscribed by 
the defendant or his attorney, and it must specify clearly the ground of ob-
jection to the information or indictment, and such motion must be made and 
filed contemporaneously with the filing of a demurrer and plea, or the de* 
fendant will be deemed to have waived any objection which could be raisefl 
by such motion. Am'd '15, p. 201. 
Mont Pen. C, 8 1911; K. Dak. (1895) | 8083. 
8881. (4774.) Id. Hearing. Procedure. Postponement The motion 
must be heard at the time it is made, unless for cause the court postpones the 
hearing to another time. If the motion is denied, the defendant must im; 
mediately answer the information or indictment, either by demurring ox 
pleading thereto. If the motion is granted, the court must order that t,he 
defendant, if in custody, be discharged therefrom; or, if admitted to bail, that 
his bail be exonerated; or, if he has deposited money instead of bail, that the 
same be refunded to him, unless it directs that an information be filed or that 
the case be submitted to the same or to another grand jury. But the court 
shall not postpone the hearing for any longer time than may be imperative. 
Am'd '15, p. 201. 
Cal Pen C . | 997*. 
8882. (4775.) Id. When new information or resubmission ordered. 
If the court directs that an information be filed, or that the case be resub-
mitted, the defendant, if already in custody, must so remain unless he shall 
be admitted to bail; or, if already admitted to bail, or money has been de-
posited instead thereof, the bail or money shall be answerable for the appear-
ance of the defendant to answer a new information or indictment; and, un-
less a new information is filed or a new indictment is found at the same or 
the next term of court, the court must make the order prescribed by the next 
preceding section. 
Cal Pen C, f 9984. Dismissal for failure to brine action to trial, 
Amendment of information, | 8781. IS 9845-9847. 
Proceedings on sustaining demurrer to Infor- Resubmission to grand jury, I 8881. 
nation or indictment, §§ 8898-8*95. Mistake in charging tbe offense, discharge or 
Nolle Prosequi, fiS 8780, 9848. new prosecution, | 8998. 
8883. (4776.) Order setting aside not a bar. An order to set aside an 
information or indictment, as provided in this chapter, shall be no bar to a fu-
ture prosecution for the same offense. 
Cal Pen. C, | 999. Whether such an order bars a future proee-
Bar on judgment of acquittal, | 8908. cution is a question of law for the court 
Decisions on once in jeopardy, etc., note to State T. Springer, 40 U. 471; 121 P. 976. 
I 8905. 
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CHAPTER 25. 
DEMURRER. 
8887. (4777.) Defendant's pleading, a dcimmci or a plea. The only 
pleading on the part of the defendant shall be either a demurrer or a plea. 
OaL Pen. Cx 1 1002. 
8888. (4778.) Demurrer, when made. Plea. Both theydemurrer and 
plea must be put in open court at the time of the arraignment/ 
Am'd '15, p. 201. 
CaL Pen. a . | 1003. 
8889. (4779.) Grounds of demurrer. The defendant may demur to the 
information or indictment when it appears upon the face thereof: 
1. That the grand jury by which it was found had no legal authority 
to inquire into the offense charged, by reason of its not being within the legal 
jurisdiction of the county, if an indictment, or, if an information, that the 
court has no jurisdiction of the offense charged therein; or, 
2. That it does not substantially conform to the requirements of §§ 8830-
8832; 
3. That more than one offense is charged, except as provided in I 
8834; or, 
4. That the facts stated do not constitute a public offense; or, 
5. That it contains matter which, if true, would constitute a legal justi-
fication or excuse of the offense charged, or other legal bar to the prosecu-
tion. 
Cal. Ben. C, I 1004*. 150, 151, of the code of procedure in criminal 
Order sustaining or overruling demurrer cases as to the offense charged and the par* 
<d*emed excepted to, f 9189. tlcular circumstances" sufficiently specifies tot 
Demurrer that the indictment "does not sub- grounds -of objection hereunder. 
•tantially conform to the requirements of | | People v. Hill, S U. 834; 8 P. 75. 
8890. (4780.) Demurrer to be in writing and to specify grounds. The 
demurrer must be in writing, signed either by the defendant or his counsel, 
and filed. It must distinctly specify the grounds of objection to the informa-
tion or indictment, or it must be disregarded. 
Cat Pen. C. f 1005. 
8891. (4781.) Id. l ime of bearing argument Postponement The 
argurhent upon the objections presented by the demurrer must be heard at 
the time it is filed, unless for cause the court postpone the hearing to another 
time, but the court shall not postpone the hearing for any longer time than 
may be imperative. If the defendant files a motion to set aside the informa-
tion or indictment, the argument upon such motion and the argument upon 
the demurrer must be heard at the same time. Am'd '15, p. 201. 
CaL Pen. C., | 1006. 
8892. (4782.) 'Judgment on demurrer. Entry. Upon considering the 
demurrer, the court must give judgment, either allowing or disallowing it, 
and an order accordingly must be entered upon the minutes. 
Cal. Pen, C I 1007. 
8893. (4783.) Effect of sustaining demurrer. Further prosecution. 
If the demurrer is allowed, the judgment shall be final upon the information 
or indictment demurred to, and shall be a bar to another prosecution for the 
same offense, unless the court, being of the opinion that the objection cm 
which the demurrer is allowed may be avoided in a new information or in-
dictment, directs that a new information be filed, or that the case be resub-
mitted to the same or to another grand jury. 
Cal. Pen. C., | 1008*.
 ftoRtemlMal toT **Hure to prosecute. II Mtt-
When Jurisdiction found to be in another 0350. " 9 
county or state, procedure, |fi 8994-8997. Amendment «f <T>frtW>o*i^  t em 
New information^ or resubmission of charge £m«nament of information, § 8781. 
when facts charged do not constitute an of- ^15* w<01Td,- ? e x t •ucceedlna flrsnd Jurjr 
fense. §8 8994, 89*8. I? ,,to t h e flr!t ***** J"1? t n a t m e e t i **** 
New information or indictment when motion t h £ allowance of the demurrer, 
to set aside granted, I 8882. *«>#« v. Hill, 8 U. 834; 8 P. 75. 
Decisions on once in Jeopardy, etc, note to This section, nor f 8903, does not permit tb# | 8905. filing of a new information on the dismissal 
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of an action and the discharge of the accused part of the motion, that accused had not, prior 
after plea. to the filing of the information, had a right 
Barnes v. Second Dis t Court, 86 17. S96; 104 of a preliminary examination for the offense 
P. 282 charged in the information, and prayed that 
While an appeal may be taken from a judg- the information be set aside and quashed, 
merit sustaining a demurrer, the supreme court held it was not a demurrer to tne informa-
ls without authority to reinstate the case and tion, but a motion under § 8878, and, if sus-
remand for further pleading tained, is not a bar to another prosecution 
Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 U. 696, 184 P. for the same offense, and the question whether 
558 or not it is a bar is for the court and not 
Where accused filed written objections to the Jury, to determine, 
the information which recited that it appeared State v. Springer, 40 U. 471, 121 P. 976. 
by the justice's record, which was made a 
8894. (4784.) Id. When defendant discharged. If the court does not 
permit the information to be amended, nor direct that a new information be 
filed, nor direct that the case be resubmitted, the defendant, if in custody, 
must be discharged, or if admitted to bail, his bail shall be exonerated, or if 
he shall have deposited money instead of bail, the money must be refunded 
to him. 
Cal Pen C , f 1009*. Amendment of information, I 8781. 
8895. (4785.) Id. If case resubmitted. If the court directs that the 
case be resubmitted, the same proceedings must be had thereon as are pre-
scribed in § 8882. 
Cal Pen C, I 1010. 
8896. (4787.) What objections must be taken by demurrer. What at 
any time. When the objections mentioned in § 8889 appear upon the face of 
the information or indictment, they shall be taken only by demurrer, except 
that the objection to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject of the in-
formation or indictment, or that the facts stated do not constitute a public of-
fense, may be taken at the trial, under the plea of not guilty, or after the trial, 
in arrest of judgment. 
. Cal Pen. C, f 1012 A question of want of jurisdiction in the (The title and enacting clause of chap. 118, trial court in a criminal case may be raised 
Laws '15, recite that this section is amended for the first time in the supreme court 
but the act contains no amendment) State v. Morrey, 23 U. 273, 64 P. 764. 
Objections, except the two specified, not 
taken by demurrer are waived 
U 8 v. West, 7 U. 487; 27 P. 84. 
CHAPTER 26. 
PLEA. 
8898. (4788.) Pleas of four kinds. There are four kinds of pleas to an 
information or indictment. A plea of: 
1. Guilty; 
2. Not guilty; 
3. A former judgment of conviction or acquittal of the offense charged, 
which may be pleaded either with or without the plea of not guilty; 
4. Once in jeopardy, which may be pleaded with or without the plea of 
not guilty. 
Cal Pen C, I 1016*. defendant may waive the arraignment and 
When put in, I 8888. plea. The case of People v. Heller, 2 U. 188 is 
"Not guilty" entered when defendant refuses overruled, 
to plead, $ 8306. State v. Bates, 52 TJ. —; 175 P. —<. 
Decisions on former conviction, acquittal, or
 p | - #^.mA. ~Am,i«»«iAft «*• ~>.*i» u 
once in jeopardy, note to 8 8205. w-ivirf former conviction not made Is 
Former conviction, or acquittal, or once in tl tS'*r«»«*-~ * rr i««r. #n T> moo 
Jeopardy a bar, Con. art 1, sec 12, ft 8904, S I ! ^ ^ ° i W ' j f p ^ i r 
8905, 8555, 8652, 8658. m *• Barton, 6 U. 254, 21 F. 8-8. 
Where an arraignment is had and a plea en- Where an Issue of former acquittal Is raised, 
tered on a holiday, no objection being entered, It must be passed upon by the Jury, 
the error, if any, is Waived Inasmuch as the State v. Creechley, 27 U. 142; 75 P. 884. 
8899. (4789.) Plea must be oral. Form of entry. Every plea must be 
oral, and entered upon the minutes of the court substantially in the following 
form: 
1. If the defendant pleads guilty: "The defendant pleads that he is 
guilty of the offense charged;" 
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After two trials of a criminal case, a new to have boarded, and defendant's affidavit tin 
trial for newly discovered evidence to estab- the power was off while he was on the ar 
Ush an alibi was properly denied for lack of was not ground for a new trial, the defendSt 
diligence. having omitted to testify as to the stepou* ti State v. Moore, 41 XJ. *47; 116 P. 122. the car at the trial «*«*« 
ID order to authorize a new trial on the State v. Sirmay, 40 U. 525; 122 P. 7o 
ground of newly discovered evidence, it must Where the evidence barely sustained s eon* 
be so conclusive In its character as to raise viction for larceny of horses, the trial coon 
a reasonable presumption that the result of abused its discretion in denying a new trial 
the second trial would be different from the motion, largely based on cumulative affidavita 
first, in granting or refusing a new trial, dls- showing there was nothing suspicious in ac-
cretion is vested in the trial court cused's connection with the horBes, and that State v. Montgomery, 87 U 515; 109 P. 815. the man from whom he had Innocently secured 
Where a crime was committed in broad day- them really existed, which the sheriff had tst-
ligbt and testified to by eight or nine witnesses, tilled was not a fact 
the granting of a motion for new trial is not State v Williams, 49 U. 886, 144 P. 8SS justified, on affidavits showing evidence which Evidence held to establish that accused via 
merely corroborates the defendant's version reasonably diligent in preparing for trial al-
and to some extent contradicts or modifies the ter his release on ball after seven months' cos* 
statements of some of the state's witnesses. Unement where he was without funds, and im* State v. tfolitz, 40 U. 443, 122 P. $76. portant witnesses lived several hundred mita 
Where the time in which defendant boarded distant, and subpoenas were given the sheriff 
a street car was material, evidence alleged to serve them* out they did not appear. 
to be newly discovered that the power was off Id. 
during the trip of the car defendant claimed 
9200. (4953.) Application for new trial, how and when mack Form. 
The application for a new trial must be made upon written notice of motion 
designating" the grounds upon which it is made, and must be served and filed 
within five days after the rendition of the verdict. If based upon any of the 
grounds mentioned in subs. 2, 3, 4, and 7, § 9199, the affidavits in support 
thereof must be served and filed within thirty days after filing the notice of 
motion. Am'd '03, p. 47; '15, p. 204. 
Mont Pen C, f 2198*; Cal. Pen. C, I 1182*. tion was filed and served within the pre-
After a judgment in a criminal case has been scribed time after discovery, it is not error to 
affirmed on appeal and the case remanded, a deny the motion. 
were not passed upon by the appellate court or In a prosecution for homicide it is not error 
discovered before the appeal was taken could for the court to refuse to permit defendant to 
be entertained by the trial court, within thirty introduce oral evidence in support of his motion 
days after discovery for new trial. 
8tate v. Morgan, 13 TJ. 112; «4 P. 156. State •. Mortensen, 26 U. 812, 73 P. 662, 631 
Where alleged prejudicial statements of a Where a motion for new trial, supported by juror are discovered before an appeal from the affidavits, is overruled, and an appeal is taken, 
conviction is taken, the motion for new trial, the transcript filed, and a second motion for 
based on subs 8 or 4 of § 9199, should be made new trial, supported by affidavits is filed, the 
within thirty days, and the appeal delayed un- lower court is without jurisdiction to pats on 
til after the denial of the motion such motion. 
State v. Mickle, 25 U. 179, 70 P. 856. State v. Carter, 62 U. —; 173 P. 459. 
Where the record does not show that the mo-
9201. (4954.) Motion for new trial for certain causes to be based upon 
affidavits. Time of hearing. A motion for a new trial, if made for any of 
the causes mentioned in subs, 2, 3, 4, and 7, § 9199, must be based upon affi-
davits which must be served and filed as provided in the next preceding sec-
tion. The motion must be heard as soon as practicable, and the hearing 
thereof shall not be delayed longer than may be imperative. Am'd '15, p. 204. 
Mont Pen. C, I 2194*. 
CHAPTER 41. 
APPEALS. 
9205. (4955.) Either party may appeal. Method prescribed. Either 
party in a criminal action may, except in cases appealed from a justice's court, 
appeal to the supreme court, as prescribed in this chapter. 
Cal. Pen. C.. I 11S5*. 
Appeals from district court, Con. art 8, see. 9, mad note. 
9206. (4956.) Title of action not changed on tppeaL The party ap-
pealing shall be known as the appellant, and the adverse party as the respond-
ent, but the title oi the action shall not be changed in consequence of the ap-
peal. 
Cal Pen. C, I 1235. Title not chanced, civil procedure, I IWS. 
9207. (4957.) From what defendant may appeal. An appeal may be 
taken by the defendant: 
1. From a final judgment .of conviction; 
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2. From *an order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights 
of the party. 
Cal Pen. C., 1 1237*. 
Defendant shall have the right to appeal in 
all cases, Con. art 1, t e c 12 
Appeal lies from final judgments, Con. art. 
I, tec 8, and note. 
Power of supreme court on appeal, |§ €995, 
9233, and note 
Orders resubmitting a case to grand Jury 
after demurrer to indictment sustained, and re-
fusing to discharge defendant pending such re-
submission, are not appealable. 
People v Hill, Z U. 334, 3 P. 75. 
A fugitive from justice has no right to be 
Mard upon appeal. 
People v Tremayne, 3 TJ. 331; 3 P. 85. 
Orders forfeiting a defendant's bail, refusing 
to set aside such forfeiture, and directing that 
money deposited in lieu of bail be paid into 
the territorial treasury, are not appealable. 
Id. 
Rulings on challenge! for actual bias are con-
wple v. fiopt, 4 
130 
elusive, and not reviewable on appeal. 
Peo H , U. 347; 9 P. 407; 130 U. fi. 
Where a juror is challenged for actual bias, 
in issue of fact is raised, and if no exception 
la taken to the admission or rejection of evi-
dence upon the voir dire examination, the ac-
tion of the trial court is final and conclusive, 
and cannot be reviewed on appeal. 
People v. Thiede, 11 U. 341, 39 P . 337; af-
firmed 159 U. 6. 510. 
See note to i 3958. 
Under Con. art 34, eec 3, I 5186, C. I* of 
1888 (this section), is still in force and effect, 
and not being inconsistent with art 1, sec. 
12, or art 8, s e e 9, gave defendant the right 
to move for new trial upon facts discovered af-
ter judgment and to appeal from an order 
refusing to set aside the judgment and grant 
a new trial. 
State v. Morgan, 28 U. 212; 34 P. 256. 
Order discharging one accused of crime for 
want of jurisdiction is a final judgment 
State v. Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553. 
State v. McKenna, 24 U. 317; 67 P. 815. 
A judgment of dismissal discharging a pris-
oner is final, after plea to the jurisdiction, 
and, under Oon. art 8, s e c 9, an appeal lies 
on behalf of the state to the supreme court 
State v. Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P. 553. 
9208. (4958.) From what the state may appeal* An appeal may be tak-
en by the state: 
1. From a judgment for the defendant on a demurrer to the information 
or indictment; 
2. From an order arresting judgment; 
3. From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights 
of the state; 
4. From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the defendant. 
N. Dak. (1895) $ 8329*, Cal. Pen. C, 8 1238*. men to try defendant for a crime committed 
before statehood, and as the state had no right 
of appeal, mandamus is a proper remedy. 
State ex rel. v. Hart 19 U. 438, 57 P. 415. 
Where accused, after plea and entering on 
the trial, was discharged on the ground that 
no proper preliminary examination had been 
entered on appeal by the state, the court can 
only reverse the order and judgment and can-
not determine its legal effect or direct the dis-
trict court to reinstate the case and proceed 
to try accused. 
State v. Gustaldi, 41 U. 63, 123 P. 897. 
Appeal by the state does not stay judgment | 9212 
A judgment of dismissal, discharging a pris-
oner, in a criminal case, and releasing his 
bail, entered after hearing arguments on a plea 
to the jurisdiction of the court is a final judg-
ment, and under provisions of Con art 8, sec 
I, an appeal lies, on behalf of the state, to the 
wpreme court 
State v Booth, 21 U. 88, 59 P . 653. 
Where the district court erred In holding that 
it had no authority to impanel a jury of twelve 
9209. (4959.) Time for taking appeal All appeals in criminal cases 
must be taken within two months after the entry of the judgment appealed 
from. Am'd '15, p. 204. 
Cal Pen. C, f 1289*. peal, and decided within thirty days from sub-
Appeal be heard within ninety days from ap- mission, | 9225. 
9210. (4960.) Id. Taken by filing and serving notice. An appeal shall 
be taken by filing, with the clerk of the court in which the judgment or order 
appealed from shall have been entered or filed, a notice stating the appeal 
from the same, and serving a copy thereof upon the attorney of the adverse 
party. Dismissal for failure to serve notice of ap* 
peal. 
People y. Gough, 2 TJ. €9. 
People T. Fennel, 4 U. 112, 7 P. 525, €48. 
Dismissal for failure to serve notice of ap-
peal, civil procedure, note, | 6996. 
After an appeal is perfected, the case ceases 
to be pending in the lower court and thereafter 
is deemed pending in the appellate court* un-
til finally disposed of there. 
State v. Carter, 52 U. —; 171 P . 459. 
Cal Pen. C, I 1240. 
An appeal in a criminal case is taken by fil-
ing the notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
Kurt, and serving a copy thereof on the ad-
rerse party or his attorney. 
People v. Gough, 2 U. 69. 
Where the record shows the filing of a notice )f appeal, but is silent as to its service, affi-
davits will not be received in the supreme 
sourt to show that the notice of appeal was 
in fact served upon the adverse party. 
People v. Gough, 2 TJ. 69. 
People v. Fennel, 4 TJ. 112; 7 P . 525, t48. 
9211. (4961.) Id. Service of notice by publication. If personal service 
Df the notice cannot be made, the judge of the court in which the action was 
tried, upon proof thereof, may make an order for the publication of the notice 
in some newspaper for a period not exceeding thirty days. Such publication 
shall be equivalent to personal service. 
Cat Pen. C , I 1241. 
***• / j M * \ A ~ ^ I kv atate. Effect An appeal taken by the state 
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2. Complaint. 
Under this section and 77-11-1, com-
plaint which states name of crime charged, 
the time and place of its commission, the 
name of the accused, if known, and sets 
out in general terms the acts or omissions 
constituting public offense or crime 
charged, is sufficient as basis of prelimin-
77-10-2. "Indictment" defined.—An indictment is an accusation in 
writing presented by a grand jury to the district court, charging a person 
with a public offense. 
History: R. 8.1898 * 0. L. 1907, { 4605; 
0. L. 1917, § 8675; B. 8. 1933 * 0. 1943, 
105-10-2. 
ary examination, even though it is lacking 
in other averments which would be neces-
sary in indictment or information. State 
T. Anderson, 85 U. 496, 101 P. 385. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law$»209. 
22 CJ.B. Criminal Law § 803. 
Oross-Beference. 
Indictments generally, 77-20-1 et seq. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, (917; Iowa 
Code 1950, § 773.1 (includes substantially 
same provisions); Hont. Bev. Codes 1947, 
§94-4902 (substantially identical). 
Collateral Bef erences. 
Indictment and Informational 7. 
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations 
§7. 
77-10-3. "Information" defined.—An information is an accusation in 
writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, 
charging a person with a public offense, presented and signed by the 
district attorney, or by the attorney pro tempore for the state, and* filed 
in the office of the clerk of the district court. 
History: B. 8.1898 It 0. L. 1907, § 4606; 
C. L. 1917, § 8676; B. 8. 1933 * C. 1943, 
105-10-3. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Bev. Codes 1947, {94-4903 
(identical). 
Oross-Beference. 
Information generally, 77-17-1 et seq. 
1. Prosecution by Information. 
Prosecution by information for non-
capital felony, committed after statehood, 
was not, as to defendant, in violation of 
federal Constitution. Maxwell v. Dow, 
176 U. S. 581, 44 L. Ed. 597, 20 B. Ct. 448 
(Harlan, J., dissenting), aff'g 19 U. 495, 
57 P. 412. 
Collateral Beferences. 
Indictment and Information §35. 
42 CJ.B. Indictments and Informations 
§11. 
77-10-4. "Magistrate" defined.-—A magistrate is an officer having power 
to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public offense. 
History: B. 8.1898 ft C. L. 1907, § 4807; 
C. L. 1917, § 8877; B. S. 1983 ft 0. 1943, 
105-10-4. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §807; Idaho 
Code 1947, §19-502; Mont. Bev. Codes 
1947, § 94-4904 (identical). 
1. In general 
Formerly the term "magistrate" included 
justices of the peace. People v. Spiers, 4 
TJ. 885, 391, 10 P. 609, 11 P. 509. 
District judge held magistrate entitled 
to hold preliminary •examinations in case 
of misdemeanor. - Btate v. Mclntyre, 92 
TJ, 177, 66 P. 2d 879. 
Collateral Beferences. 
JudgesG=>l. 
48 CJ.S. Judges §8. 
77-10-5. Magistrates enumerated.—The following persons are magis-
trates : 
(1) Justices of the Supreme Court. 
(2) Judges of the district courts. 
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(3) Judges of city courts. 
(4) Justices of the peace. 
History: R. & 1898 * C. L. 1907, § 4608; 
0. L. 1917, §8678; B. 8. 1933 ft 0. 1943, 
105-1041. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section differs materially, but was 
derived from 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4836. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 808 (similar 
provisions); Idaho Code 1947, §19-503; 
Iowa Code 1950, § 748.1; Mont. Bev. Codes 
1947, § 94-4905 (similar). 
1. Who are magistrates. 
When Utah was a territory, justices 
of the peace were magistrates. Marks v. 
Sullivan, 9 U. 12, 15, 83 P. 224, applying 
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4836. 
A city judge may act merely as a com-
mitting magistrate. State v. Hale, 71 TJ. 
134, 263 P. 86. 
District judge held magistrate entitled 
to hold preliminary examinations in case 
of misdemeanor. State v. Mclntyre, 92 
U. 177, 66 P. 2d 879. 
Under this section, a justice of the peace 
is a magistrate. State v. Spencer, 101 U. 
287, 121 P. 2d 912, denying rehearing 101 
U. 274, 117 P. 2d 455. 
2. Justices of the peace. 
A justice of the peace has power to 
issue search warrants. Allen v. Holbrook, 
103 U. 319, 135 P. 2d 242, 247, modified 
on rehearing and petition denied 103 U. 
599, 139 P. 2d 233. 
Collateral References. 
Judges$»l. 
48 C.J.8. Judges § 3. 
7740-6. Peace officers enumerated.—A peace officer is a sheriff of a 
county or his deputy, or a constable, or a marshal or policeman of any 
incorporated city or town. 
History: B. S. 1898 * C. L. 1907, § 4609; 
C. L. 1917, §8679; E. 8. 1933 * C. 1943, 
105-10-6. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Idaho Code 1947, § 19-510 (substantially 
identical); Iowa Code 1950, § 748.3; Mont. 
Bev. Codes 1947, §94-4906 (similar). 
1. Peace officers. 
Formerly a United States marshal was 
regarded as a peace officer when acting 
under orders of a United States commis-
sioner, functioning as a committing mag-
istrate. Matter of Nelson, 9 U. 365, 36 
P. 634. 
Collateral References. 
Sheriffs and Constables^l. 
57 C.J. Sheriffs and Constables § 1. 
Section 77-114. 
77-11-2. 
77-11-3. 
77-11-4. 
CHAPTER 11 
COMPLAINTS BEFORE MAGISTRATES 
Contents. 
Person having knowledge must make. 
Complainant to be examined. 
Arrest without warrant—Procedure. 
77-11-5. Complainant to name witnesses—Subpoenas. 
77-11-1. Contents.—The complaint must state: 
(1) The name of the person accnsed, if known; or if not known and 
it is so stated, he may be designated by any other name. 
(2) The county in which the offense was committed. 
(3) The general name of the crime or public offense. 
(4) The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the crime 
or public offense named. 
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History: R. 8.1898 It C. L. 1907, § 461S; Collateral References. 
0. L. 1917, § 8683; R. 8. 19S3 it 0. 1943, Criminal Law€»209. 
106-U-4. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §306. 
/w»«-,.«M* x>~>rr**^ Arrest without warrant, 4 Am. Jur. 15, 
Comparable Provision. Arrest 8 22. 
Montana Rev. Codes 1947, §04-5804 * 
(similar). 
7741-5. Complainant to name witnesses—Subpoenas.—Every person 
making complaint charging the commission of a crime or public offense 
must inform the magistrate of all persons whom he believes to have any 
knowledge of its commission, and the magistrate at the time of issuing 
the warrant may issue subpoenas for such persons, requiring them to 
attend at a specified time and place as witnesses. 
History: R. 8.1898 * 0. L. 1907, § 4614; Orosa-Beference. 
C. L. 1917, § 8684; B. 8. 1933 * 0. 194% 
105-11-5. 
Comparable Provision. 
Montana Bev. Codes 1947, (94-5805 
(similar). 
Holding witnesses or requiring bonds, 
77-15-25 et seq. 
Collateral Bef erences. 
Criminal Law<S=>206. 
22 OJ.fi. Criminal Law § 301. 
CHAPTER 12 
WARRANT OP ARREST 
Section 77-12-1. Issuance of warrant. 
77-12-2. Form of warrant. 
77-12-3. Warrant to name defendant. 
77-12-4. Directed to and executed by peace officer. 
77-12-5. When warrant issued by supreme or district judge. 
77-12-6. When warrant issued by other magistrates. 
77-12-7. Pursuing officer may call for aid in any county. 
77-12-8. Return of prisoner—When offense charged is felony. 
77-12-9. When offense charged is a misdemeanor not triable by magistrate— 
Bail. 
77-12-10. Procedure when ball taken. 
77-12-11. When offense charged is triable by magistrate—Bail. 
77-12-12. Procedure when bail taken. 
77-12-13. Disposition of defendant when bail not given. 
77-12-14. Defendant to be taken before magistrate without delay. 
77-12-15. Taken before another magistrate—Procedure. 
77-12-16. Proceedings for offenses triable in another county. 
77-12-17. Duty of officer. 
77-12-18. Preliminary examinations. 
77-12-19. Conveyance through other counties not an escape. 
77-12-20. Arresting officer not liable to civil arrest—May call for aid. 
77-12-21. Misdemeanors other than those indictable—Summons may issue. 
77-12-22. Summons—Service. 
77-12-23. Failure to appear—Contempt—Warrant of arrest. 
77-12-1. Issuance of warrant.—When a verified complaint is made 
before a magistrate charging the commission of a crime or public offense, 
he must, if satisfied therefrom that the offense complained of has been 
committed and that there is reasonable, ground to believe that the accused 
committed it, issue a warrant for his arrest; but when the magistrate 
before whom the complaint is made is a justice of the peace, before issuing 
the warrant, the complaint, if made by any person other than the county 
attorney of the county, and the evidence taken by such magistrate relating 
18—UTAH CODE—VOL 8 
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to the offense charged, must be submitted to such county attorney, and he 
must examine into the charge and enter either his approval or disap-
proval of the issuance of a warrant upon such complaint. If the county 
attorney disapproves, no warrant shall be issued, but if he approves 
the issuance of a warrant, such magistrate shall proceed accordingly; 
provided, that when it appears from the complaint or evidence submitted 
to the magistrate that the accused is likely to escape from the county 
before such approval of the county attorney can be had, a warrant may 
issue without the approval of the county attorney. No justice of the 
peace shall receive any fees or allowances whatever for any act done or 
services rendered in a criminal action or proceeding commenced or prose-
cuted in disregard of the provisions of this section. 
v. Eldredge, 5 XL 161, 166, 13 P. 673, 
applying Laws 1878, § 59, p. 72. 
2. Issuance of warrant. 
The magistrate would not be justified 
in refusing to do so unless the charge is 
too indefinitely stated to warrant the be-
lief in the magistrate that an offense had 
been committed, or that defendant was 
the guilty party. The officer has a limited 
discretion as to how far he relies on the 
statement of the party. United States v. 
Eldredge, 5 U. 161, 167, 13 P. 673, follow-
ing New York cases. 
Objection that county attorney did not 
approve the issuance of warrant of arrest 
of defendant comes too late when not 
urged until after trial in court below; the 
irregularity is thereby waived. State v. 
Green, 78 U. 580, 604, 6 P. 2d 177. 
8. Bemedies. 
Failure to comply with this section will 
not justify the issuance of a writ of pro-
hibition. State v. Morse, 27 U. 336, 75 P. 
739, 1 Ann, Caa. 711. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law<S=>216. 
22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 316. 
Arrest with warrant, 4 Am. Jur. 8, Ar-
rest S 5 et seq. 
Affidavit, who may take, as basis for 
warrant of arrest, 16 A. L. B. 923. 
History: E. S. 1898 ft 0. L. 1907, §4615; 
C. L. 1917, § S688; E. 8. 1938 It C. 1943, 
105-12-1. 
Compiler's Note. 
This chapter was E. S. 1898, Title 76, 
ch. 13; Comp. Laws 1907, Title 91, ch. 13; 
Comp. Laws 1917, Title 120, ch. 13. 
Comparable Provision-
Idaho Code 1947, § 19-506 (includes sub-
stantially same provision). 
Cross-Eeferences. 
Arrest by police officers, 10-6-67: 
in game law violations, 23-1-17. 
in liquor violations, 82-8-17. 
without warrant, 77-13-3. 
Civil arrest, Eules of Civil Procedure, 
Eule 64A. 
Form of complaint, 77-11-1. 
"Magistrate" defined, 77-10-4. 
Magistrates enumerated, 77-10-5. 
Summons instead of warrant in cases of 
nonindictable misdemeanors, 77*12-21 to 
77-12-23. 
Weights and measures, violations, 5-6-14. 
1. Affidavits, 
In affidavits generally for the arrest of 
alleged criminals it is not necessary that 
they should show a prima facie case, but 
need only set forth facts tending to es-
tablish the commission of the offense and 
the guilt of the defendant. United States 
77-12-2. Form of warrant.-—A warrant of arrest is an order in writing 
in the name of the state, signed by a magistrate, commanding the arrest 
of the defendant, and may be substantially in the following form: 
State of Utah, County of 
The State of Utah to any peace officer of said state (or of the county 
of ) : 
Complaint on oath haying been this day made before me by A B, 
that the crime of (designating it) has been committed, and accusing 
C D thereof, you are therefore commanded forthwith to arrest the above 
538 
77-15-15 CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
trial depend upon its having been filed. 
State v. Morgan, 27 XL 103, 74 P. 526. 
The admitting in evidence of transcript 
of testimony of witness who testified for 
state on preliminary hearing, and was 
cross-examined by counsel for defendant 
at hearing, did not violate constitutional 
right of defendant to be confronted by 
witnesses where such witness was absent 
from state. State v. Vance, 38 U. 1, 110 
P. 434. 
Under this section, the evidence before 
the magistrate is not required to be and 
is not reported and preserved, or certified 
up, except in homicide cases or when 
ordered on the request of the prosecuting 
attorney. In all other cases, proof of what 
the evidence before the magistrate was 
would have to be made independently of 
any record and by the testimony of wit-
nesses who were present at the hearing 
and heard the evidence. That defendant 
at his own expense and for his own benefit 
had proceedings before magistrate steno-
graphically reported and transcribed, does 
not help the matter. State v. Sheffield, 
45 U. 426, 439, 146 P. 306. 
77-15-15. Custody and disposition of exhibits and depositions.—The 
magistrate or his clerk must keep the depositions taken and exhibits 
admitted as evidence on the examination until they shall be returned to 
the proper court; and must not permit them to be examined or copied 
by any person, except a judge of a court having jurisdiction of the offense, 
or authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus, the attorney general, county 
attorney or other prosecuting attorney, and the defendant and his counsel. 
History: B. 8.1898 k 0. L. 1907, § 4671; Comparable Provisions. 
0. L. 1917, § 8751; B. 8. 1933 & 0. 1943, 
105-15-15. 
Under this section and 77-15-31, trans-
cript of testimony of witness on prelim-
inary examination may be nsed at trial 
for first-degree murder, where he eonld 
not, after exercise of due diligence, be 
found in the state. State v. fiillstrom, 
46 U. 341, 150 P. 935. 
6. Effect of waiver of preliminary ex-
amination. 
Under this section, where accused, with 
consent of the state, waived the prelim-
inary examination, lie must be held to 
have waived the necessity of the magis-
trate's hearing any testimony as to the 
charge against him, so that there was no 
testimony in such case to be heard or 
"reduced to writing." State v. Mewhin-
ney, 43 U. 135, 134 P. 632, L. B. A. 1916D, 
590, Ann. Cas. 1916C, 537. 
Collateral Beferencas. 
Criminal Law$»236. 
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §341. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is practically identical with 
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4884. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §870 (in-
cludes substantially same provision); 
Idaho Code 1947, §19-813; Mont. Bev. 
Codes 1947, §94-6112 (substantially iden-
tical). 
Collateral Beferencas. 
Criminal Law^»236. 
22 OJ.8. Criminal Law §341. 
7745-16. Violation a misdemeanor.—Every violation of the next pre-
ceding section is a misdemeanor. 
History: B. 8.1898 * C. L. 1907, § 4672; Collateral Beferencas. 
C. L. 1917, §8752; B. 8. 1933 * 0. 1943, Criminal Law<£»236. 
105-1M6. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §341. 
77-15-17. Defendant when and how discharged.—If after hearing the 
proofs it appears that either no public offense has been committed, or that 
there is not sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty of a public 
offense, the magistrate must order the defendant to be discharged, by an 
indorsement on the warrant or the complaint, signed by him, to the 
following effect: "Tb*re being no sufficient cause to believe the within 
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named A B guilty of the offense 
charged." 
History: B. 8. 1898 k 0. L. 1907, § 4673; 
C. L. 1917, §8753; E. 8. 1933 & C. 1943, 
105-15-17. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is practically identical with 
2 Conip.'Laws 1888, §4885. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §871 (iden-
tical); Idaho Code 1947, §19-814; Iowa 
Code 1950, § 761.17 (similar); Mont. Bev. 
Codes 1947, §94-6113 (substantially iden-
tical). 
1. Discharge of accused. 
If upon the hearing it develops that 
within mentioned, I order him dis-
the crime charged has not been committed, 
but that some other crime probably has 
been committed, the magistrate need not 
discharge the accused unconditionally, but 
he may prepare, or direct the public 
prosecutor to prepare a complaint in which 
the offense which the magistrate finds was 
committed is stated, and rearrest accused 
upon that charge and give him an oppor-
tunity to either waive or insist upon an 
examination, and give him time to procure 
counsel if he desires to do so. State v. 
Pay, 45 U. 411, 424, 146 P. 300. 
Collateral References, 
Criminal Law®»239. 
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §347. 
77-15-18. When costs taxed against complainant—If the defendant on 
a preliminary examination for a public offense is discharged as provided 
in the next preceding section, and if the magistrate finds that the prosecu-
tion was malicious or without probable cause, he shall enter such judgment 
on his docket and tax the costs against the complaining witness, and 
execution may issue therefor. 
History: E. 8.1898 & C. L. 1907, § 4674; Collateral References. 
C. L. 1917, § 8754; E. 8. 1933 & C. 1943, Criminal Law<&=>239. 
105-15-18. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 347. 
77-16-19. Defendant held to answer—Order.—If it appears from the 
examination that a public offense has been committed and that there is 
sufficient cause to believe the defendant guilty thereof, the magistrate 
must indorse on the complaint an order, signed by him, to the following 
effect: "It appearing to me that the offense in the within complaint 
mentioned (or any offense, according to the fact, stating generally the 
nature thereof) has been committed, and that there is sufQcient cause to 
believe the within named A B guilty thereof, I order that he be held to 
answer to the same." 
History: E. 8. 1898 * O. L. 1907, § 4675; 
C. L. 1917, § 8755; B. 8. 1933 fc C. 1943, 
105-15-19. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is practically identical with 
2 Comp. Laws 1888, §4886. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §872; Idaho 
Code 1947, §19-815; Iowa Code 1950, 
§ 761.18 (similar); Mont. Bev. Codes 1947, 
§ 94-6114 (substantially identical). 
Cross-Beference*. 
Form of commitment, 77-15*24. 
Magistrate to furnish list of witnesses, 
77-15-32. 
Magistrate to return papers to district 
court, 77-15-32. 
Names of witnesses to be indorsed on 
information, 77-17-4, and on indictment, 
77-20-3. 
1. Bight to hold accused. 
This section, which was taken from 
California Penal Code, does not warrant 
holding accused upon any charge except 
upon the one contained in the complaint, 
or for one that is embraced or included 
therein. State v. Pay, 45 U. 411, 146 P. 
300; State v. Sheffield, 45 U. 426, 146 P. 
806. 
Magistrate need not hold defendant 
for charge specified in complaint but 
may hold him for any offense embraced 
therein. State v. Freeman, 93 U. 125. 
71 P. 2d 196. 
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Constitutional or statutory changes af- investigation to find indictment as affect-
fecting grand jury or substituting infor- ing right to file information, 120 A. L. E. 
mation for indictment as an ex post facto 713. 
law, 53 A. L. E. 716. Leave of court to file information, 120 
Failure or refusal of grand jury upon A. L. E. 358. 
77-16-2. Defects prior to filing information or indictment—Waived 
unless objection made before plea.—No defect or irregularity in or want 
or absence of any proceeding or statutory requirement, prior to the filing 
of an information or indictment, including the preliminary hearing, shall 
constitute prejudicial error and the defendant shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have waived any such defect, irregularity, want or absence of 
proceeding or statutory requirement, unless he shall before pieading to 
the information or indictment specifically and expressly object to the 
information or indictment on such ground. Whenever the consent of the 
state to any waiver by the defendant is required, such consent shall be 
conclusively presumed, unless the state before or at the time the defendant 
pleads to the information or indictment expressly objects to such waiver. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 123, § 1; 0. 1943, of, or irregularities in, a preliminary hear-
105-16-2. ing must be taken before pleading to 
the information." This applies to lack of 
Title of Act. counsel at the preliminary hearing to 
An act relating to waiver of any defect represent defendant charged with homi-
or irregularity in or want or absence of cide. State v. Crank, 105 U. 332, 338, 142 
any proceeding or statutory requirement P. 2d 178, 181. 
prior to the filing of any information or 
indictment, including the preliminary 2« Presumption of regularity, 
hearing, unless objection thereto is made In criminal proceedings charging de-
before plea. fendant with offense of carnal knowledge 
and unlawful knowing female over 13 
Cross-Beferences.
 a n a un^eT ig y e a r 8 o f a g e > h e l d t h a t 
Failure to move to quash indictment or amendments in complaint which changed 
information as constituting waiver of date of alleged offense were presumed to 
objections, 77-23-10. have been regularly made, where record 
Objection to defects in or lack of ar- was silent as to any objection by defend-
raignment required before making plea to ant before appeal, and that date of al-
save error, 77-22-18. leged offense was not material State v. 
Objection to information on ground of Gates, — U. —, 220 P. 2d 115. 
lack of subscription or verification, 77- „ . _ . 
21.5. Collateral References. 
_
 A M ^ , Indictment and Information@=>5. 
1. Accused not represented by counsel. 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations 
"Any objections based upon the want §3. 
CHAPTER 17 
THE INFORMATION 
Section 77-17-1. Filing after examination and commitment. 
77-17-2. When information is not filed—Nolle prosequi. 
77-17-3. Amendments—New information ordered filed, when. 
77-17-4. Contents. 
77-17-1. Piling after examination and commitment.—When a defendant 
has been examined and committed as provided in this Code it shall be 
the duty of the district attorney, within thirty days thereafter, to file in 
the district court of the county in which the offense is triable an inf orma-
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ment or within ten days thereafter, but not less than four days before the 
trial of such cause, file and serve upon the prosecuting attorney in such 
cause, notice in writing of his intention to claim such defense, and in 
case of a claimed alibi, such notice shall include specific information as 
to the place at which the accused claims to have been at the time of the 
alleged offense. 
If the defendant fails to file such notice he shall not be entitled to 
introduce evidence tending to establish an alibi. The court may, however, 
permit such evidence to be introduced where good cause for the failure 
to file the notice has been made to appear. 
he should be acquitted. State v. Whitely, 
100 U. 14, 110 P. 2d 337. 
Where court In trying criminal ease 
without jury expressed in his findings the 
belief that burden was on defendant to 
establish defense of alibi, conviction 
would be rerersed. State T. Whitely, 100 
U. 14, 110 P. 2d 337. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law£=>286. 
22 (U.S. Criminal Law § 436. 
Instructions disparaging defense of 
alibi, 146 A. L. B. 1377. 
77-22-18. Arraignment—Failure to or irregularity in does not invali-
date proceedings.—Neither a failure to arraign nor an irregularity in the 
arraignment shall affect the validity of any proceedings in the cause if 
the defendant pleads to the indictment or information and/or proceeds to 
trial without specifically and expressly objecting to such failure or 
irregularity. 
History: L. 1035, en. 121, § 1; O. 1043, Collateral References, 
105-22-18. Criminal LawS=>262. 
Title of Act 2 2 C#*r,8# C r i m i n a l I * w 8 *°8-
An act providing for waiver of irregu-
larity in arraignment or failure to arraign 
unless objection is made. 
CHAPTER 23 
MOTION TO QUASH 
Section 77-23-1. Time to move to quash or plead. 
77-23-2. Demurrers abolished—Motion to quash substituted. 
77-23-8. Motion to quash—Grounds. 
77-23-4. Form, contents, omissions. 
77-23-5. When motion shall be heard. 
77-23-6. Hearing on motion to quash. 
77-23-7. Order on motion to quash—Entry thereof—Failure to enter. 
77-23-8. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. 
77-23-9. Order sustaining not a bar to another prosecution. 
77-23-10. Effect of failure to move to quash. 
77-33-1. Time to move to quash or plead.—Upon being arraigned the 
defendant shall immediately, unless the court grants him farther time, 
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History: L. 1985, dL 120, §1; O. 1943, 
105-22-17. 
Title of Act 
An act requiring defendants in criminal 
eases to give notice of a proposed defense 
of alibi. 
1. Burden of proof. 
The section does not operate to shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant; 
and the state, in all eases where the pres-
ence of the accused is necessary to render 
him responsible, must prove that he was 
there, and if from all the evidence there 
exists a reasonable doubt of his presence, 
MOTION TO QUASH 77-23-3 
either move to quash the information or indictment, or plead thereto, or 
do both. If he moves to quash, without also pleading, and the motion is 
withdrawn or overruled he shall immediately plead. 
History* I* 1035, cb. 118, § 1; 0. 1948, tion, mnst be presented before plea and 
105-2M. trial. State v. Sheffield, 45 V. 426, 433, 
146 P. 806. 
Compiler's Kote. Motion to qnash information or Indict-
LSWB 1935, eh. 118, § 1, repealed chapter ment for misjoinder of offenses must be 
23, Title 105, Bevised Statutes of 1933, the timely made, otherwise defendant waives 
sections of which were numbered 105-23-1 right to object on that ground, in view of 
to 105-23-6, and enacted a new chapter 23. this section and 77-23-10. Bogerson v. 
_ ^ Harris, 111 U. 330, 178 P. 2d 397. 
1. Time to move to quash. 
Under our Code, motions to quash must Collateral Beferences. 
eome before plea and trial. State v. Shef- Indictment and Information®»139. 
field, 45 U. 426, 439, 146 P. 806. 42 C.J.8. Indictments and Informations 
Generally speaking, matters presenting §199. 
questions relating to the examination, or Objections to indictments and informa-
that the information charged an offense tions, 27 Am. Jur. 694, Indictments and 
other than and different from that de- Informations {137 et seq. 
scribed in the complaint, or that defend-
ant was not given an examination of the Bight of accused to attack indictment 
offense charged, or to defects, other than or information after reversal or setting 
substance and sufficiency, in the informa- aside of conviction, 145 JL L. B. 493. 
77-23-2. Demurrers abolished—Motion to quash substituted.—Demur-
rers to the information or indictment are hereby abolished. All defenses 
heretofore available to the defendant by demurrer, or by a motion to set 
aside or quash the information or indictment, and which are available 
under this Code, shall hereafter be taken by a motion to quash the 
information or indictment or a count thereof. 
History: L. 1935, chu 118, §1; O. 1943, Collateral Beferences. 
105-23-2. Indictment and Informational36. 
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations 
§195. 
77-23-3. Motion to quash—Grounds.—-A motion to quash the informa-
tion or indictment shall be available only on one or more of the following 
grounds. In the case of: 
(1) Either an information or indictment: 
(a) That it does not charge the defendant with the commission of an 
offense. 
(b) That the court has ordered a bill of particulars under the pro-
visions of section 77-21-9 and the prosecuting attorney fails to furnish a 
sufficient bill. 
(c) That the defendant is misnamed in the information or indictment. 
In such case if his true name is inserted, or if he refuses to give his true 
name, the motion shall be overruled. 
(d) That the information or indictment contains a statement of matter 
which constitutes a legal justification of the offense charged, or other legal 
bar to the prosecution. 
(e) That it appears from a bill of particulars furnished under the 
provisions of section 77-21-9 that the particulars stated do not constitute 
the offense charged in the information or indictment, or that the defendant 
did not commit that offense, or that a prosecution for that offense is 
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barred by the statute of limitations. If the prosecuting attorney shall 
furnish another bill of particulars which so states the particulars as to 
make it appear that they constitute the offense charged and that the offense 
was committed by the defendant, and that it is not barred by the statute 
of limitations, the motion shall be overruled. 
(f) That the court trying the cause has no jurisdiction TDf offense 
charged or of the person of the defendant. 
<g) That there is more than one offense charged except as provided 
in section 77-21-31 of this Code. 
(2) An information: 
(a) That an information was filed without the defendant first having 
had or waived a preliminary examination. 
(b) That the provisions of section 77-17-4 or of section 77-21-5 were 
not complied with. If, on the hearing of the motion, the prosecuting 
attorney complies with the provisions of such section or sections the 
motion shall be overruled. 
(c) That the prosecuting attorney had no authority to file the infor-
mation. 
(3) An indictment: 
(a) That there was irregularity in the drawing, summoning, exam-
ining, or impaneling of the grand jury which returned the indictment, 
provided it is made to appear that actual and substantial injustice and 
prejudice has resulted or will result to the accused in consequence of 
such irregularity. 
(b) That a person, other than a grand juror, was present while the 
grand jurors were deliberating or voting and there is reasonable cause 
to believe that the defendant was in fact prejudiced thereby. 
(c) That the requisite number of grand jurors did not concur in 
finding the indictment. 
(d) That the grand jury had no authority to inquire into the offense 
charged. 
If a motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the information 
or indictment which can be cured by amendment the court shall order 
the amendment to be made and shall overrule the motion. 
History: L. 1935, clt 118, § 1 ; 0. 1943, 
105-23-3; L. 1947, ch. 14, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1947 amendment rewrote subdivi-
sion 3 (a) pertaining to irregularity of 
grand jnry. 
The references in this section to sec-
tions 77-21-9, 77-21-31, 77-17-4 and 77-21-
5 appeared in Code 1943 as sections 105-
21-9, 105-21-31, 105-17-4 and 105-21-5. 
Oross-Eeferences, 
Amendments, 77-17-3, 77-21-45. 
Harmless or prejudicial nature of errors, 
defects or omissions in indictment or in-
formation, 77-21-43, 77-21-44, 77-53-2. 
Name of defendant, 77-21-1L 
Penal statutes not strictly construed. 
76-1-2. 
Procedure upon misjoinder of counts, 
77-21-44. 
Quashal for variance between bill of 
particulars and indictment or information, 
77-21-10. 
Bequiring giving of true name upon ar-
raignment, 77-22-14. 
Requisites of indictment or information, 
77-21-1 et seq. 
1. Grounds for quashal. 
The language of this section is exclu-
sive, and there is no authority for allow-
ing other grounds for quashing an in-
dictment than such as are specified there-
in. United States v. Cutler. 5 U. 608, 19 
P. 145. 
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It shall specify distinctly the ground of objection relied on and the court 
shall hear no objection other than that stated in the motion. It shall be 
entered of record but a failure to so enter it shall not affect the validity 
of any proceeding in the cause. 
History: L. 1935, eh, 118, f l ; 0. 1943, trial, to object to jurisdiction, assumed 
105-23-4. by court, does not constitute waiver of 
that right nor prevent him from raising 
Compiler's Koto. question of jurisdiction in 8upreme Court 
This section is similar to B. 8. 1933, on appeal. State v. Morrey, 23 U. 273, 
105-23-3. It was derived from the Call- 64 P. 764, applying section since repealed, 
fornia Penal Code and is much the same But see State v. Durfee, 77 U. 1, 290 P. 
in its provisions. Deering's Cal. Penal 962. 
e>
 ' Collateral References. 
1. Objections to jurisdiction. Indictment and Inf ormation*»138. 
Defendant has constitutional right to 42 CJ.8. Indictments and Informations 
have his case tried by court having ju« §200. 
risdiction, and his mere failure! during 
77-23-5. When motion shall be heard.—The motion to quash shall be 
heard immediately on its being made unless, for good cause, the court 
postpones the hearing. The court shall not postpone the hearing for any 
longer time than may be necessary. 
History: 7* 1935, eh. 118, § 1; O. 194% guage thereof. Deering's Cal. Penal Code, 
105-23-5. § 998. 
Compiler's Note. Collateral Bef erences. 
This section is similar to B. 8. 1933, Indictment and InformationS»140(l). 
105-23-4. It was derived %om California 42 C.J.8. Indictments and Informations 
Penal Code and closely follows the Ian- {214. 
77-23-6. Hearing on motion to quash.—All issues which arise upon a 
motion to quash shall be tried by the court. 
History: L. 1985, oh. 118, 11; 0. 194S, Collateral References, 
105-234. Indictment and Information«»140(l). 
42 CJ.B. Indictments and Informations {214. 
77-23-7. Order on motion to quash—Entry thereof—Failure to enter.— 
The order of the court quashing an information or indictment or over-
ruling the motion to quash the information or indictment shall be entered 
of record, but a failure to make said entry shall not affect the validity 
of any proceeding in the cause. 
History: X* 1935, eh. 118, §1; O. 1943, Collateral Bef erences. 
105-23-7. Indictment and Inf ormation£»141. 
42 CJ.8. Indictments and Informations {215. 
77-23-8. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash.—If the motion to 
quash is sustained the court may order that a preliminary hearing be 
had or that another information be filed or that the matter be again 
submitted to a grand jury. If one of the aforementioned orders is made, 
the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he is admitted to 
bail If none of such orders is made or if another information is not 
filed within such time as is specified in the order or within such other or 
further time as the court may allow for good cause shown or if the mat-
ter has been ordered to be submitted to a grand jury and a new indictment 
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is not found by the aame or the next succeeding grand jury having au-
thority to inquire into the offense, the defendant, if in custody, shall be 
discharged therefrom unless he is in custody on some t>ther charge; or if 
he has been released on bail, he and his sureties shall be exonerated, or 
if he has deposited money instead of bail the same shall be refunded to him. 
History: L. 1935, ch. 118, § 1; C. 194% 
105-23-8. 
Gross-Reference. 
Dismissal of prosecutions, 77-51-1 et 
•eq. 
1, Effect of sustaining motion. 
If motion to quash information is sus-
tained and defects are not amendable, 
defendant must be discharged. State v. 
Potello, 42 V. 396, 401, 132 P. 14, fol-
lowing State T. Topham, 41 U. 89, 123 
P. 888. 
Information charging defendant with 
unlawful cohabitation on a certain day, 
which failed to name the cohabitees of 
the opposite sex, should have been 
quashed, and where the preliminary 
hearing was waived by defending, the 
court should have directed the filing of a 
new information. State v. Jeasup, 98 IT. 
482, 100 P. 2d 969. 
Collateral References. 
Indictment and Information$s>141. 
42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations 
1215. 
77-23-9. Order sustaining not a bar to another prosecution.—An order 
sustaining the motion to quash, is not a bar to another prosecution for 
the same offense. 
History: L. 1935, dL 118, § 1 ; 0. 1948, 
105-23-9. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is similar to B. 8. 
105-23-6. 
1933, 
2. Effect of sustaining demurrer. 
Under former statute, sustaining of 
demurrer to information, charging acts 
allegedly intended to procure miscar-
riage of pregnant woman, and discharging 
of defendant, ^ without direction that an-
other inf ormanon be filed or that ease be 
submitted to grand jury, held bar to de-
fendant's prosecution on subsequent in-
formation for identical alleged offense on 
same woman. State v. Crook, 16 U. 212, 
51 P. 1091, followed in Tooele City • . 
Hoffman, 42 U. 596, 602, 134 P. 558, Ap-
plying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 4976. 
This section also takes the place of 
former 105-24-8, now repealed, under 
which it was held that a judgment sus-
taining a demurrer to a complaint under 
the former practice was final and a bar 
to another prosecution for the same of-
fense. Tooele City v. Hoffman, 42 XT. 696, 
602, 134 P. 558, following State T. Crook, 
16 U. 212, 219, 51 P. 1091, which latter 
ease applied California law. 
Collateral References. 
Indictment and Inf ormation$=>142. 
42 C.J.8. Indictments and Informations 
{215. 
77-23-10. Effect of failure to move to quash.—If the defendant does 
not move to quash the information or indictment before or at the time 
he pleads thereto he shall be taken to have waived all objections which 
are grounds for a motion to quash except those which are also grounds 
for a motion in arrest of judgment. 
History: L. 1935, clu 118, $1 ; C. 1043, Oross-Eefereacefl. 
105-23-10. Defects prior to indictment or infor-
mation waived unless objection made be-
fore plea, 77-16-2. • 
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Oross-Reference. 
Dismissal without judgment as not bar-
ring further prosecution, 77-24-11. 
1. Effect of sustaining motion. 
In prosecution for adultery under 
former statutes, where defendant bad 
filed certain objections in writing to in-
formation reciting that it appeared by 
record in justice's court that defendant 
was not, prior to filing of information, 
given statutory right of preliminary 
examination for offense charged in in* 
formation, and prayed that information 
be set aside and quashed, held that such 
motion could not be treated as demurrer 
to information, but as motion tinder 
former statute, and if sustained, would 
not bar another prosecution for same of-
fense. State v. Springer, 40 IT. 471, 121 
P. 976. 
APPEALS 77-39-1 
tions. State v. Rosenberg, 84 U. 402, 35 
P. 2d 1004. 
Collateral Bef erences. 
Criminal Law<S=>949(l). 
23 CJ.8 . Criminal Law §1468. 
Acceptance of probation, parole, or sus-
pension of sentence as waiver of error or 
right to appeal or to move for new trial, 
117 A. L. B. 929. 
8ection 77-39-1. 
77-39-2. 
77-39-3. 
77-39-4. 
77-39-5. 
77-39-6. 
77-39-7. 
77-39-8. 
77-39-9. 
77-39-10. 
77-39-11. 
77-39-12. 
77-39-13. 
CHAPTER 39 
APPEALS 
Who may appeal. 
Parties, how designated. 
By defendant, in what eases. 
Appeal by state, in what eases. 
Time for taking. 
Taken by filing and serving notice. 
Service by publication. 
Effect of appeal by state. 
Effect of appeal by defendant. 
Stay of execution. 
Restoring custody to original officer on stay. 
Clerk to transmit record on appeal—Filing. 
Appeal by one or more defendants tried jointly—Effect. 
77-39-1. Who may appeal.—-Either party in a criminal action may, 
except in cases appealed from a justices' court, appeal to the Supreme 
Court as prescribed in this chapter 
History: B. 8.1898 6 0. L. 1907, § 4955 
0. L. 1917, §9205; B. 8. 1933 * C. 1943, 
105-40-L 
Compiler's Note. 
This section was derived from 2 Comp. 
Laws 1888, S 5134, and is practically iden-
tical therewith. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 1235; Idaho 
Code 1947, §19-2801; Mont. Bev. Codes 
1947, §94-8101 (similar). 
Orose-Bef erences. 
Appeal from city court criminal eases, 
77-35-18, 78-4-14. 
Appeal from eity justice's conrt, 78-5-14. 
Appeals by state in eases arising under 
Liquor Control Act, 32-8-50. 
Appeals from district court, Const. Art. 
vnf, §9. 
Appeals from justice's court, 77-57-38 
to 77-57-52, 78-5-14. 
Appeals from order of sterilization, 64-
10-10. 
Appeals to district court from inferior 
courts, 10-7-75, 78-3-5. 
Appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court, 
78-2-2. 
1. Appealable judgments, orders and de-
crees. 
Under this section, no appeal lies to 
Supreme Court from an order of district 
court discharging a person from arrest 
upon a writ of habeas corpus. Mead v. 
Metcalf, 7 U. 103, 25 P. 729. 
This section and 77-39-3 do not author-
ize an appeal from a judgment of convic-
tion in a contempt proceeding. Ex parte 
Whitmore, 9 U. 441, 448, 35 P. 524, apply-
ing 2 Comp. Laws 1888, §§ 5134, 5136, both 
of which are similar to present section. 
2. Appeals of cases originating in city 
and justices' courts. 
In criminal case originating in justice's 
court and appealed to district court, Su-
preme Court, under provisions of Constitu-
tion, could not review errors except those 
which related to or assailed validity or 
fact under which defendant was convicted. 
State v. Holtgreve, 58 U. 563, 200 P. 
894, 26 A. L. B 696. 
This section does not authorize an ap-
peal by a city or town from a judgment 
of district court, on appeal from city 
court, discharging defendant from cus-
tody, even though constitutionality of 
ordinance under which defendant was 
prosecuted was in issue. Town of Scipio 
v. Olsen, 71 U. 328, 265 P. 1117. following 
Castle Dale City v. Woolley, 61 U. 291, 
212 P. 1111. 
Collateral Beferencee, 
Criminal LawG=>1023%. 
24 C J . 8 . Criminal Law § 1658. 
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Criminal prosecutions, 2 Am. Jur. 984, Acceptance of probation, parole, or tus-
Appeal and Error § 226 et seq. pension of sentence as waiver of error or 
right to appeal or to move for new trial, 
117 A. L. R. 929. 
77-39-2. Parties, how designated.—The party appealing shall be known 
as the appellant, and the adverse party as the respondent, but the title 
of the action shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal 
History: R. 8.1898 s O . L 1907, §4956; Comparable Provisions. 
C. L. 1917, § 9206; 
105-40-2. 
R. 8. 1933 ft C. 1943, 
Compiler's Note. 
This section is practically identical with 
2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 5135. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 1236; Idaho 
Code 1947, §19-2802; Mont. Bev. Codes 
1947, §94-8102 (substantially identical). 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law§»1004. 
24 C.J.6. Criminal Law § 1623. 
77-39-3. By defendant, in what cases.—An appeal may be taken by 
the defendant: 
(1) From a final judgment of conviction. 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial 
rights of the party. 
History: B. 8. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 4957; 
C. L. 1917, § 9207; B. 8. 1933 It C. 1943, 
105-40-3. 
Compiler's Note. 
This section was 2 Comp. Laws 1888, 
§ 5136. 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, § 1237; Idaho 
Code 1947, §19-2803 (includes substan-
tially same provisions); Mont. Bev. Codes 
1947, § 94-8103 (similar). 
Cross-References. 
See 77-39-1. 
Appeal lies from final judgments, Const. 
Art. VIII, § 9. 
Defendant shall have the right to ap-
peal in all criminal cases, Const. Art. I, 
§12. 
Power of Supreme Court on appeal, 77-
42-3. 
1. Validity. 
Subdivision (2) is not inconsistent with 
Const. Art. I, § 12. State v. Morgan, 23 
U. 212, 230, 64 P. 356. 
2. Appealable Judgments, orders and de-
crees. 
This subdivision applies only to orders 
made after final judgment, which, of 
course, could not be reviewed on an ap-
peal from the judgment. People v. Hill, 
3 U. 334, 359, 3 P. 75. 
Neither an order of resubmission after 
demurrer to indictment sustained, nor an 
order refusing to discharge a defendant 
pending investigation by the grand jury 
to which charge is thus resubmitted, is 
appealable. People v. Hill, 3 IT. 334. 359. 
3 P. 75. 
An appeal does not lie to Supreme Court 
from the judgment and conviction for con-
tempt. Elliot v. Whitmore, 10 U. 246, 253, 
37 P. 461, following People v. Owens. 8 
U. 20, 28 P. 871. 
Order refusing to grant new trial is 
appealable. State v. Morgan, 23 U. 212, 
64 P. 356. 
Orders made in capital eases under 
chapter 36 of this title are not appealable. 
State v. Gardner, 62 U. 156, 217 P. 1111. 
This section gives defendant no right 
of appeal from order of trial court re-
fusing to order a sanity inquisition under 
the provisions of 77-48-2 to 77-48-6, unless 
such orders or rulings of the court denied 
or affected some substantial right of de-
fendant. State v. Green, 88 U. 491, 499, 
55 P. 2d 1324, following State v. Gard-
ner, 62 U. 156, 217 P. 1111. 
Collateral References, 
Criminal Law$=>1023(l). 
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §1656. 
Buling against defendant's attack upon 
indictment or information as subject to 
review by higher court, before triaL 133 
A. L. B. 934. 
77-39-1 Appeal b~ state, in what oases.—-An appeal may be taken 
by the state: 
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant upon 
a motion to quash the information or indictment. 
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(2) From an order arresting judgment. 
(3) From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial 
rights of the state. 
(4) From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the 
defendant. 
History: B. 8. 1898 * C. L. 1907, $ 4958; 
0. I*. 1917, §9208; B. 8. 1933, 105-40-4; 
L. 1935, clL 132, §1 ; 0. 1943, 105-40-4. 
Compiler's Note. 
The 1935 amendment rewrote subdivi-
sion (1). 
Comparable Provisions. 
Deering's Cal. Penal Code, §1238; Idaho 
Code 1947, § 19-2804 (includes substan-
tially same provisions); Mont. Bev. Codes 
1947, §94*8104 (similar). 
Cross-Beferences. 
Appeal by state in eases arising under 
Liquor Control Act, 32-8-50. 
Appeal by the state does not stay judg-
ment, 77-39-8. 
1. Judgments and orders appealable by 
the state. 
This section does not give defendant 
named in writ of habeas corpus, nor 
people, right of appeal from order dis-
charging a person upon hearing of writ. 
In re Clasby, 3 U. 183, 1 P. 852, ap-
plying Comp. Laws 1876, § 1553. 
State held to have had no right of 
appeal from ruling of district court that 
it had no jurisdiction or authority to 
impanel twelve-person jury to try de-
fendant, indicted for noncapital felony 
prior to, but not brought to trial until 
after, statehood. State v. Hart, 19 U. 438, 
57 P. 415. 
District court's judgment, discharging 
defendant in criminal prosecution and 
releasing his bail, entered on plea to 
court's jurisdiction, held final judgment 
from which state might appeal to Su-
preme Court. State v. Booth, 21 TJ. 88, 
59 P. 553. 
State has right of appeal from judg-
ment discharging defendant, in prosecu-
tion for felony, on ground that infor-
mation does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute public offense. State v. Mc-
Kenna, 24 TJ. 317, 67 P. 815. 
In prosecution for unlawful possession 
of intoxicating liquors, state could ap-
peal from dismissal of defendant on 
ground information was insufficient to 
charge an offense, where appeal was 
taken in time. 8tate v. Bickenberg, 58 
TJ. 270, 198 P. 767. 
Under former statute held, this sec-
tion did not allow appeal by city from 
judgment of city justice's court direct-
ing verdict for defendant in action for 
violation of ordinance. Castle Dale City 
v. WooUey, 61 TJ. 291, 212 P. 1111. 
State may not appeal under Const. Art. 
V m , §9, and this section, from order 
quashing and setting aside information 
because no preliminary examination nor 
order of commitment had been made by 
magistrate, since only final judgments are 
appealable. State v. Thompson. 69 17. 282, 
254 P. 147. 
2. Judgment on appeal. 
Under this section, on appeal from 
judgment and order discharging accused 
from custody after he has pleaded and 
trial begun, on ground that no proper 
preliminary examination was had, Su-
preme Court can only reverse, and can-
not make order requiring district court 
to reinstate case, and proceed to try 
defendant upon information filed against 
him. State v. Gustaldi, 41 U. 63, 72, 123 
P. 897, applying Comp. Laws 1907, § 4958, 
which is much like present section. See 
77-42-1. 
Collateral Beferencee. 
Criminal LawG=»1023(l). 
24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1656. 
Constitutionality of statute permitting 
appeal by state in criminal case, 113 A. L. 
B. 636, 157 A. L. B. 1065. 
Decision quashing or dismissing indict-
ment or sustaining demurrer thereto, right 
of prosecution to review, 92 A. L. B. 1137. 
Bight of state to writ of certiorari in 
criminal case, 109 A. L. B. 793. 
77-39-5. Time for taking.—All appeals in criminal cases must be taken 
within two months after the entry of the judgment appealed from, or, 
if a motion for a new trial is made, within two months after notice of 
the denial of the motion. 
History: B. 8.1898 ft C. L. 1907, § 4959; Compiler's Note. 
J" ^ i 6 ' ^ J ^ J H ^ i ^ J ^ Z ' J S S ? T h i s 8 * c t i o n w*s 2 Comp. Laws 1888, 
L. 1925, ch. 113, § 1; B. 8. 1933 * 0.1948, * sigg. r ' * 
105-40-5. 
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77-1-1 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 1 
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS 
Section 
77-M. Short title. 
77-1-2. Criminal procedure prescribed. 
77-1-3. Definitions—Peace officer classifications. 
77-1-4. Conviction to precede punishment. 
77-1-5. Prosecuting party. 
77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
77-1-1. Short title.—This act shall be known and may be cited as the 
"Utah Code of Criminal Procedure." 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-1, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, i 2. 
Title of Act 
An act relating to criminal procedure; enact-
ing the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure with 
chapters relating to: preliminary provisions; 
prosecution, screening and diversion; security 
to keep the peace; suppression of resistance to 
service of process; impeachment; removal by 
judicial proceedings; arrest; lineups; fresh pur-
suit; grand juries; indictments; pleas; 
affirmative defenses; mental examinations; 
trials; judgment; execution; bail; attendance of 
witnesses outside the state; subpoena power 
and immunity; search and administrative war-
rants; interception of communications; disposal 
of property received by peace officer; justice's 
courts; criminal identification; pardons and 
77-1-2. Criminal procedure prescribed.—The procedure in criminal 
cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the rules of criminal procedure, and 
such further rules as may be adopted by the supreme court of Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-2, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15,12. 
77-1-3. Definitions—Peace officer classifications.—For the purpose of 
this act: 
(1) "(Mminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is charged, 
accused and brought to trial for a public offense; 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation, in writing, presented by a grand 
jury to the district court, charging a person with a public offense; 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person with a 
paroles; Western Interstate Corrections Com-
pact; disposition of detainers against prisoners; 
extradition; reciprocal enforcement of support; 
counsel for indigent defendants; defense costs; 
rendition of prisoners as witnesses; and inter-
state furlough; and providing an effective date. 
This act repeals Title 77, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, and enacts chapters 1 through 34 of 
Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953.—Laws 
1980, ch. 15. 
Repealing Clause. 
Section 1 of Laws 1980, ch. 15 provided: 
Title 77, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is re-
pealed." 
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public offense which is presented and signed by a prosecuting attorney and 
filed in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is commenced or sub-
scribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a magistrate if the 
offense is a class B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not requiring approval of 
the prosecuting attorney; 
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice of the supreme court, a judge of the dis-
trict courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts and a 
justice of the peace or a judge of any court created by law; and 
(5) All peace officers shall be classified as peace officers—category I, peace 
officers—category II, or federal officers. 
(a) Category I: 
Any sheriff or deputy sheriff, police officer or marshal of any county, city 
or town, investigators of the motor vehicle business administration, the 
commissioner of public safety and any sworn member of the department of 
public safety, all persons specified in section 23-20-1.5, or any police officer 
employed by any college or university; provided, howeVter, any police force 
established by a private college or university shall, prior to exercising its 
police power, make application to the commissioner of public safety and be 
certified by the commissioner as meeting rules and regulations promulgated 
by the department of public safety. 
(i) Category I peace officers shall have statewide peace officer authority; 
provided, however, such authority shall extend to other counties, cities, or 
towns only when the officer acts in accordance with chapter 9 of title 77; 
provided, however, such limitation shall not apply to any peace officer em-
ployed by the state. 
(ii) Category I peace officers shall satisfactorily complete the peace officer 
training academy and such annual certified training as the director of the 
division of peace officer standards and training, with the advice and consent 
of the council on peace officer standards and training, shall direct; provided, 
however, in no event shall such training consist of less than 40 hours per 
year. Any category I peace officer not previously satisfactorily completing 
such academy or having failed to satisfactorily complete such academy within 
18 months from the date of his appointment, or who fails to satisfactorily 
complete the annual training shall automatically be prohibited from exercising 
any peace officer powers. 
(b) Category II: 
State capitol security officers, reserve or auxiliary police of the state and 
any county, city, or town, correctional employees of the division of correc-
tions, constables and deputy constables, school district security officers, spe-
cial agents or investigators for the attorney general and county attorneys, 
jailors, railroad special agents deputized by a county sheriff pursuant to sec-
tion 17-22-2, and all other persons designated by statute as having peace 
officer status. 
(i) Category II peace officers shall have total peace officer authority when 
on duty and when acting in relation to the responsibilities of the peace 
officer's agency; provided, however, category II peace officers shall have the 
powers of a category I peace officer over felonies or misdemeanors committed 
within their presence. 
(ii) Category II peace officers shall successfully complete a training pro-
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not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on appli-
cation of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except 
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he pro-
poses to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel. 
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural 
person. 
History: C. 1953, 774*4, enmcted by L. 
1980, eh. 14,11. 
77*35-5. Rule 5—Information and indictment—(a) Unless otherwise 
provided, all criminal prosecutions whether for felony, misdemeanor or in-
fraction shall be commenced by the filing of an information or the return of an 
indictment. Prosecution by information shall be commenced before a magis-
trate having jurisdiction of the offense alleged to have been committed unless 
otherwise provided by law. 
(b) Unless otherwise provided, no information shall be filed before a magis-
trate charging the commission of a felony or class A misdemeanor unless the 
prosecuting attorney shall first authorize the filing of such information. This 
restriction shall not apply in cases where the magistrate has reasonable cause 
to believe that the person to be charged may avoid apprehension or escape 
before approval can be obtained. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-5, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14,11. 
77-35*6. Rule 6—Warrant of arrest or summons.—(a) Upon the return 
of an indictment the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the 
arrest or a summons for the appearance of the accused. 
Upon the filing of an information, if it appears from the information, or 
from any affidavit filed with the information, that there is probable cause to 
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused has commit-
ted it, the magistrate shall cause to issue either a warrant for the arrest or a 
summons for the appearance of the accused. 
(b) If it appears to the magistrate that the accused will appear on a sum-
mons and there is no substantial danger of a breach of the peace, or injury to 
persons or property, or danger to the community, a summons may issue in 
lieu of a warrant of arrest to require the appearance of the accused. If the 
defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue. A warrant of arrest may 
issue in cases where the defendant has failed to appear in response to a sum-
mons or citation or thereafter when required by the court. When a warrant of 
arrest is issued, the amount of bail shall be fixed by the magistrate and stated 
on the warrant. 
(c) (I) The warrant shall be executed by a peace officer. The summons may 
be served by a peace officer or any person authorized to serve a summons in a 
civil action. 
(2) The warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at any 
place within the state. 
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(3) The warrant shall be executed by the arrest of the defendants. The 
officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest, 
but upon request shall show the warrant to the defendant as soon as practi-
cable. If the officer does not have the warrant in his possession at the time of 
the arrest, he shall then inform the defendant of the ofifense charged and of 
the fact that the warrant has been issued. The summons shall be served as in 
civil actions, or by mailing it to the defendant's last known address. 
(4) The person executing a warrant or serving a summons shall make re-
turn thereof to the magistrate as soon as practicable. At the request of the 
prosecuting attorney, any unexecuted warrant shall be returned to the 
magistrate for cancellation. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-6, enacted by L. 
1980, eh. 14, S 1. 
77-35-7. Rule 7—Proceedings before magistrate.—(a) (1) When a 
summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant shall appear 
before the court as directed in the summons. 
(2) When any peace officer or other person shall make an arrest with or 
without a warrant the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate pur-
suant^  to section 77-7-19. If a magistrate is not available in such circuit or 
precinct, the person arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magis-
trate for setting of bail. If an information has not been filed one shall be filed 
without delay before the magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(3) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed he shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county 
wherein the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper magis-
trate as provided in these rules. If, for any reason, the person arrested can-
not be promptly returned to such county, he shall, without unnecessary 
delay, be taken before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the de-
termination of bail and released thereon or other appropriate disposition. 
Bail, if taken, shall be returned forthwith to the proper magistrate having 
jurisdiction over the offense together with the record made of the proceed-
ings before such magistrate. 
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant: 
(i) Of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy 
thereof to him; 
(ii) Of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the informa-
tion and how he may obtain the same; 
(iii) Of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel; 
(iv) Of his rights concerning bail or other circumstances under which he 
may obtain pre-trial release; and 
(v) That he is not required to make any statement and that the statements 
he does make may be used against him in a court of law. 
The magistrate shall thereupon allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel before proceeding further and shall allow him 
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to contact any attorney by any reasonable means without delay and without 
fee. 
(b) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to plead. If the defendant enters a plea of guilty, 
he shall be sentenced by the magistrate as provided by law. If the defendant 
enters a plea of not guilty, a trial date shall be set and it may not be extended 
except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held in accordance with these 
rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on to plead 
before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance before the 
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a preliminary exam-
ination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination, and 
the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate shall forthwith order the 
defendant bound over to answer in the district court. If the defendant does 
not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the pre-
liminary examination. Such examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but in any event not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody 
for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if he is not in custody; 
provided, however, that these time periods may be extended by the magis-
trate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination shall not be held if the 
defendant is indicted. 
(d) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held in accordance with the 
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state 
shall have the burden of proof and be required to proceed first with its case. 
At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, 
call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine 
the witnesses against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, in writing, 
that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings 
of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to 
evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not prop-
erly raised at the preliminary examination. If the magistrate does not find 
probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that 
the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and 
discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge shall not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense. 
(2) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party the magistrate may order all spec-
tators to be excluded from the courtroom. 
(3) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district court, 
the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall forthwith 
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records made of 
the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, recordings and the 
typewritten transcript, if made, in the magistrate's court. 
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(e) Whenever a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the 
sheriff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(f) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material witness 
in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless bond is re-
quired, he may fix a bond, with or without sureties and in such sum as he may 
deem proper, for the appearance of the witness. If the witness fails or refuses 
to post the bond with the clerk of the court, the magistrate may commit him 
to jail until he complies or is otherwise legally discharged. If the witness does 
provide bond when so required, he may be examined and cross-examined be-
fore the magistrate in the presence of the defendant and his testimony shall 
be recorded, whereupon he shall be discharged. If the witness thereafter is 
unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent hearing or trial when ordered 
to do so, the recorded testimony may thereafter be used at the hearing or 
trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the witness. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-7, enacted by L. 
1980, eh. 14,11. 
77-35-8. Rule 8—Appointment of counsel.—A defendant charged with a 
public offense, other than an infraction, who is indigent and unable to obtain 
counsel shall have the right to have counsel appointed for him or to represent 
himself. 
History: C. 1953, 77-85-8, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, S 1. 
77-35-9. Rule 9—Joinder of offenses and of defendants.—(a) Two or 
more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a 
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged arise out of a criminal 
episode as defined in section 76-1-401. A felony offense and a misdemeanor 
offense may be charged in the same indictment or information if: 
(1) They arise out of a criminal episode; and 
(2) The defendant is afforded a preliminary hearing with respect to the 
misdemeanor along with the felony offense. 
(b) Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or 
information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or conduct 
or in the same criminal episode. 
Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or sepa-
rately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count. 
When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they 
shall be tried jointly unless the court in its discretion, on motion or otherwise, 
orders separate trials consistent with the interests of justice. 
(c) The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to 
be tried together if the offenses, and the defendants, if there is more than 
one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The proce-
dure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indict-
ment or information. 
(d) If it appears that a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information, or by a 
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the interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be dis-
charged and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to 
any other prosecution for the offense charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may 
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. 
The iiyured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or 
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in 
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same 
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted 
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the 
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony. 
History: C. 1953, 77*35-25, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, S 1. 
77-35-26. Rule 26—Appeals.—(a) An appeal is taken by filing with the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the 
order or judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the 
adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof of service of such copy shall be 
filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant: 
(1) From the final judgment of conviction; 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the su-
preme court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a men-
tal disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecu-
tion. 
(c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution: 
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal; 
(2) From an order arresting judgment; 
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of dou-
ble jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof 
invalid; or 
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the supreme court decides that such 
an appeal would be in the interest of justice. 
(d) (1) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or arrest 
of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the motion is 
given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving such notice shall be filed 
with the court. 
(2) No appeal shall be dismissed except for a material defect in the taking 
thereof, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appellant. 
The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another appeal can 
be, and is, timely taken. 
174 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-35-27 
(e) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(f) Appeals may be submitted on briefs and if an appellant's brief is filed 
the appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon due notice of the hear-
ing, shall fail to appear for oral argument. 
(g) The rules of civil procedure relating to appeals shall govern criminal 
appeals to the supreme court except as otherwise provided. 
(h) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed, the case 
shall be automatically reviewed by the supreme court within 60 days after 
certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless the time is 
extended by the supreme court for good cause. A case involving the sentence 
of death shall have priority over all other cases in setting for hearing and in 
disposition by the supreme court. 
(i) The rules of practice for district and circuit courts promulgated by the 
judicial council and approved by the supreme court relating to appeals from 
circuit courts shall govern criminal as well as civil appeals. 
(j) An appeal may be taken to the supreme court from all final orders and 
judgments rendered in a district court or juvenile court in accordance with 
the provisions of this rule. 
(k) An appeal may be taken to the district court from a judgment rendered 
in the justice court in accordance with the provision of this rule, except as 
follows: 
(1) The case shall be tried anew in the district court and the decision of the 
district court shall be final except in cases where the validity or constitution-
ality of a statute or ordinance is raised in the justice court; 
(2) Within 20 days after receipt of the notice of appeal, the justice court 
shall transmit to the district court a certified copy of the docket, the original 
pleadings, all notices, motions and other papers filed in the case and the 
notice and undertaking on appeal; 
(3) Stay of execution and relief pending appeal shall be in accordance with 
Rule 30; and 
(4) All further proceedings shall be in the district court, including any pro-
cess required to enforce judgment. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-26, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14,11. 
77-35-27. Rule 27—Stays pending appeal.—(a) (1) A sentence of death 
shall be stayed if an appeal or a petition for other relief is pending. 
(2) A sentence of fine, imprisonment, or probation shall be stayed if an 
appeal is taken and a certificate of probable cause is issued. 
(3) When an appeal is taken by the state, a stay of any order or judgment 
in favor of the defendant may be granted by the court upon good cause pend-
ing disposition of the appeal. 
(b) A certificate of probable cause shall be issued if the court hearing the 
application determines that there are meritorious issues that should be de-
cided by the appellate court. A certificate of probable cause may be issued by 
the trial court or, if denied by the trial court, by the court to whom an appeal 
is taken. The application for a certificate of probable cause shall be in writing, 
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78-5-102. Offices of justice court judges. 
(1) Justice court judges holding office in: 
(a) county precincts are county justice court judges; and 
(b) cities or towns are municipal justice court judges. 
(2) With the concurrence of the governing bodies of both the county and 
municipality, a justice court judge may hold both the offices of county and 
municipal justice court judge. 
History: C. 1953, 76-M02, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Lews 1989, ch. 157, 
1889, ch. 157, t 11. i 51 makes the act effective on July 1,1989. 
78-5-103. Territorial jurisdiction. 
(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice courts extends to the limits 
of the precinct for which the justice court is created and includes all cities or 
towns within the precinct, except cities where a municipal justice court or 
municipal department or primary location of the circuit court exists. 
(2) The territorial jurisdiction of municipal justice courts extends to the 
corporate limits of the municipality in which the justice court is created. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-103, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157, 
1989, ch. 157, § 12. i 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
78-5-104. Criminal jurisdiction — Concurrent and exclu-
sive jurisdiction — Preliminary examinations — 
Small claims. 
(1) Justice courts have criminal jurisdiction over class B and C misde-
meanors and infractions and have civil jurisdiction over small claims cases 
and related proceedings. 
(2) (a) Municipal justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the 
following offenses committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
court: 
(i) all city or town ordinances; and 
(ii) offenses charged under Title 41 except driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% 
or higher, and reckless driving. 
(b) Municipal justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the cir-
cuit court over the following offenses committed within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court: 
(i) class B and C misdemeanors; 
(ii) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a 
blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, and reckless driving; and 
(iii) infractions. 
(c) Municipal justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the cir-
cuit court of small claims cases under Chapter 6, Title 78, if the defendant 
resides in or the debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice 
court. 
(3) (a) County justice courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over of-
fenses charged under Title 41 when committed within the territorial ju-
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risdiction of the court, except driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs, driving with a blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, and reckless 
driving. 
(b) County justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit 
court over the following public offenses committed within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court: 
(i) class B and C misdemeanors; 
(ii) driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, driving with a 
blood alcohol content of .08% or higher, and reckless driving; 
(iii) city or town ordinances of municipalities within the precinct, 
except those in which a municipal justice court, or a primary location 
or municipal department of the circuit court exists; and 
(iv) infractions. 
(c) County justice courts in counties which do not have a primary loca-
tion of the circuit court have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary examina-
tions to determine probable cause of felony informations, except those 
charging capital offenses or first degree felonies, if the justice court pro-
ceedings are made a matter of record. 
(d) County justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit 
court of small claims cases under Chapter 6, Title 78, if the defendant 
resides in or the debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice 
court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-104, enacted by L. Informations and indictments, Rule 5, Rules 
1989, ch. 157, i 13. of Criminal Procedure 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch 157, Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
t 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Cross-References. — Criminal jurisdiction 
of justice courts, Chapter 25 of Title 77. 
78-5-105. Jurisdiction of justice court and juvenile court 
(1) Justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court over 
traffic misdemeanors and infractions committed by persons 16 or 17 years of 
age and that occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, except those 
offenses exclusive to the juvenile court under Subsection 78-3a-16(l)(a). The 
justice courts do not have jurisdiction of offenses committed by persons 16 or 
17 years of age that are alcohol or drug related traffic offenses, reckless driv-
ing, fleeing an officer, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving on a 
suspended license. 
(2) If the traffic offense involves the conviction of a person 16 years of age or 
older but younger than 18 years of age for an offense under Section 
78-3a-39.5, the justice of the peace shall notify the juvenile court of the convic-
tion. 
(3) The justice court has authority to take the juvenile's driver license and 
return it to the Driver License Division, Department of Public Safety, for 
suspension under Section 41-2-128. 
(4) Justice court judges may transfer matters within the court's jurisdiction 
under this section to the juvenile court for postjudgment proceedings accord-
ing to rules of the Judicial Council. 
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Art. I, § 13 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by 
Grand jury.] information or indictment — 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prose-* 
cuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, 
unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the 
State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. 
The formation of the grand jury and the powers and duties thereof shall be as 
prescribed by the Legislature. 
History: Const 1896; L. 1947, S.J.R. 5. 
Cross-References. — Formation, powers, 
and duties of grand jury, § 77-10a-l et seq. 
"Grand jury" defined, § 78-46-4. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Examination. 
Grand jury. 
Information. 
Juveniles. 
Cited. 
Examination. 
Under territorial laws, preliminary exami-
nation was not indispensable to finding of in-
dictment or trial thereon, and thus neither 
would indispensability attach to any steps con-
nected with conduct of such examination. 
Thiede v. People, 159 U.S. 510,16 S. Ct. 62,40 
L. Ed. 237 (1895). 
When defendant is called on to plead and 
interposes no objection that he has been unlaw-
fully committed or has not waived examination 
before magistrate, and goes to trial without ob-
jection, examination will be presumed to have 
been waived. State v. Norman, 16 Utah 457,52 
P. 986 (1898). 
Where defendant was charged by informa-
tion with fornication and bound over by com-
mitting magistrate, but information was 
quashed on ground that offense was barred by 
limitations, court could not authorize district 
attorney to file new information and place de-
fendant on trial for offense separate and dis-
tinct from one charged in first information 
without again taking defendant before commit-
ting magistrate for preliminary examination. 
State v. Jensen, 34 Utah 166, 96 P. 1085 
(1908). 
The examination may be waived by the ac-
cused in every case. If the entire proceeding 
may be waived, any part thereof may likewise 
be waived, and such a waiver may be deemed 
to have taken place, unless accused at the 
proper time and in a proper manner indicates 
that he does not waive anything. State v. 
Gustaldi, 41 Utah 63, 123 P. 897 (1912). 
If accused waives a preliminary examina-
tion, he waives the necessity of the magis-
trate's hearing testimony, and, therefore, there 
is no testimony to be reduced to writing. State 
v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135,134 P. 632,1916D 
L.R.A. 590, 1916C Ann. Cas. 537 (1913). 
The right of a preliminary examination is a 
substantial one. State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411,146 
P. 300, 1917E Ann. Cas. 173 (1915). 
If accused waives examination before magis-
trate, and state consents thereto, all that mag-
istrate has authority to do is to require accused 
to appear before district court to answer charge 
contained in complaint and no other. State v. 
Pay, 45 Utah 411,146 P. 300,1917E Ann. Cas. 
173 (1915). 
The provisions of this section were not com-
plied with in prosecution for having carnal 
knowledge of a female, where defendant was 
subjected to preliminary examination for act 
committed on one date specifically stated in 
information and tried for another act alleged to 
have been committed on a later date. State v. 
Nelson, 52 Utah 617, 176 P. 860 (1918). 
Right to preliminary examination hereunder 
may be waived by failure to move to quash 
information. Where information charged both 
rape and adultry but preliminary examination 
related only to rape, defendant's failure to 
move to quash or to demur specially to the in-
formation as duplicitous, or to object thereto 
until after plea of not guilty, waived those de-
fenses. State v. Anderton, 69 Utah 53, 252 P. 
280 (1926). 
Preliminary hearing conducted by district 
judge in prosecution for indictable misde-
meanor of conspiracy to extort money satisfied 
requirements of this section. State v. Mclntyre, 
92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879 (1937). 
Right of district court to try person for felony 
rests upon filing of proper indictment by grand 
jury, or filing of proper information by district 
attorney or other proper counsel for state, and 
such information can be filed properly only af-
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77-1-2. Criminal procedure prescribed. 
The procedure in criminal cases shall be as prescribed in this title, the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and such further rules as may be adopted by the 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-2, enacted by L. Effect of creation of new county on pending 
1980, ch. 15, i 2. prosecutions and prior offenses, §§ 17-3-7, 
Cross-References. — Annexation of county 17-3-8. 
as affecting prosecutions and prisoners, 
§§ 17-2-5, 17-2-12. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Common law. 
As the state is bound by the Code of Crimi-
nal Procedure, it is unnecessary to inquire 
what was the rule at common law when the 
statute speaks. United States v. Cannon, 4 
Utah 122, 7 P. 369, affd, 116 U.S. 55, 6 S. Ct. 
278, 29 L. Ed. 561 (1885). 
This section excludes all common-law prac-
77-1-3. Definitions. 
History: C. 1953, 77-1-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 68, § 1; 1983, ch. 
212, § 1; 1985, ch.174, § 2; 1985, ch. 212, 
§ 16. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1985 amend-
ment by ch. 174 deleted Subsection (5), which 
related to classification of peace officers. 
The 1985 amendment by ch. 212 would have 
deleted "and regulations'* after "rules" in two 
places in Subsection (5); and substituted "De-
partment" for "division" in three places in Sub-
tice. United States v. Cutler, 5 Utah 608,19 P. 
145 (1888). 
The rules for testing an indictment in this 
state are those prescribed by Code of Criminal 
Procedure, and not the rules of the common 
law. People v. Kerm, 8 Utah 268, 30 P. 988 
(1892). 
section (5); however, pursuant to the directive 
of the Office of Legislative Research and Gen-
eral Counsel, the repeal of Subsection (5) by 
Laws 1985, ch. 174 has been given effect. 
Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
same catchline following § 77-1-1. 
Cross-References. — Indictments gener-
ally, § 77-12-1 et seq. 
Prosecutions of public offenses, Rule 4, 
U.R.Cr.P. 
For the purpose of this act: 
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is 
charged, accused and brought to trial for a public offense; 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation, in writing, presented by a grand 
jury to the district court, charging a person with a public offense; 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person 
with a public offense which is presented and signed by a prosecuting 
attorney and filed in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is com-
menced or subscribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a 
magistrate if the offense is a class B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not 
requiring approval of the prosecuting attorney; 
(4) "Magistrate" means a justice of the Supreme Court, a judge of the 
district courts, a judge of the juvenile courts, a judge of the circuit courts 
and a justice of the peace or a judge of any court created by law. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Effect of pardon and expungement reference to the sealed record cannot be al-
—Professional licensing hearing. l o w e d to "recreate" the record in proceedings 
Those persons who have access to the sealed *&** &e record has been expunged. Ambus v. 
record, who testified at the previous criminal State Bd. of Educ, 800 P.2d 811 (Utah 1990). 
hearings, or whose testimony is bolstered by 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Expunction of federal arrest § 241(a)(4), (11) of Immigration and National-
records in absence of conviction, 97 A.L.R. Fed. ity Act of 1952 (8 USCS § 1251(a)(4), (11)), 
652. making aliens deportable for crimes involving 
Effect of expungement of conviction on moral turpitude or drugs, 98 A.L.R. Fed. 750. 
CHAPTER 18a 
THE APPEAL 
Section 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
77-18a-2. Capital cases. 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18a-l, enacted by L. Rules of Criminal Procedure. For notes to cases 
1990, ch. 7, i 10. construing that rule, see the Court Rules vol-
Compiler's Notes. —- This chapter ume. 
recodifies Subsections (2), (3), and (9) of former Effective Dates. — Laws 1990, ch. 7, § 12 
Section 77-35-26, which is Rule 26 of the Utah makes the act effective on July 1, 1990. 
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78-5-104. Jurisdiction. 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, viola-
tion of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdic-
tion, except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdic-
tion. 
(2) County justice courts may not conduct preliminary examinations to de-
termine probable cause of felony informations, except under rules of the Judi-
cial Council. 
(3) Justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court of 
small claims cases under Title 78, Chapter 6, if the defendant resides in or the 
debt arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the justice court. Prior to ac-
cepting small claims affidavits, a justice court shall be certified as competent 
to determine small claims pursuant to Section 78-5-139. 
History: C. 1953, 78-5-104, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 157, § 13; 1991, ch. 268, S 39. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective January 1,1992, deleted former 
Subsections (2), (3)(a), and (3)(b); redesignated 
former Subsections (3)(c) and (3)(d) as present 
Subsections (2) and (3); rewrote Subsection (1), 
which read "Justice courts have criminal juris-
diction over class B and C misdemeanors and 
infractions and have civil jurisdiction over 
small claims cases and related proceedings," 
and Subsection (2) which read "County justice 
courts in counties which do not have a primary 
location of the circuit court have jurisdiction to 
conduct preliminary examinations to deter-
mine probable cause of felony informations, ex-
cept those charging capital offenses or first de-
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
Amount in controversy. 
—Interest. 
—Waiver of excess. 
Failure to pay fine. 
Personal jurisdiction. 
—Waiver of objections. 
Preliminary hearing. 
—Felony. 
Representation of state. 
Violation of game laws. 
Violation of Sunday laws. 
Venue. 
Presumptions. 
Constitutionality. 
Laws 1925, ch. 62, amending former 
§ 20-5-4 (Code 1943) and limiting jurisdiction 
of justices' courts to offenses committed in their 
respective precincts, was valid against claim 
that it might produce confusion and derange-
ment in criminal practice and procedure in jus-
gree felonies, if the justice court proceedings 
are made a matter of record"; and substituted 
"Justice" for "County justice" in the first sen-
tence and added the second sentence in Subsec-
tion (3). 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1989, ch. 157, 
§ 51 makes the act effective on July 1, 1989. 
Cross-References. — Criminal jurisdiction 
of justice courts, Chapter 25 of Title 77. 
Informations and indictments, Rule 5, Rules 
of Criminal Procedure. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
Transfer to district court of counter, cross or 
third-party claims in excess of jurisdiction, 
Rule 13(k), U.R.C.P. 
tices' courts and was inconsistent with other 
statutory provisions. Dillard v. District Court, 
69 Utah 10, 251 P. 1070 (1926). 
Amount in controversy. 
—Interest 
In action on promissory notes, brought in 
justices' court, held that, notwithstanding 
judgment prayed for was within justices' juris-
diction, justice could not properly award plain-
tiff judgment in excess of $300 (the former ju-
risdiction limit), although excess over that 
amount consisted of interest that had 
accumulated on notes after action was begun. 
McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. 
Marchant, 11 Utah 68, 39 P. 483 (1895). 
In determining amount in controversy, inter-
est was to be deemed part of "sum claimed" 
whether claimed in complaint or not, at least 
where it was legal consequence of an obligation 
or demand without stipulation. Wheatley v. 
Oregon Short Line R.R., 49 Utah 105,162 P. 86 
(1916). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES 78-7-17.5 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 21 C.J.S. — 48A C.J.S. Judges § 53 et seq. 
gt geq Key Numbers. — Judges •=> 23. 
78-7-17. Powers of every judicial officer. 
Every judicial officer has power: 
(1) to preserve and enforce order in his immediate presence, and in 
proceedings before him, when he is engaged in the performance of official 
duty. 
(2) to compel obedience to his lawful orders as provided by law. 
(3) to compel the attendance of persons to testify in a proceeding before 
him in the cases and manner provided by law. 
(4) to administer oaths to persons in a proceeding pending before him, 
and in all other cases where it may be necessary in the exercise of his 
powers and duties. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Oaths and affirma-
Supp., 104-7-17. tions, power to administer, § 78-24-16. 
Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments court's order precluding publicity or comment 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Criminal about pending civil case by counsel, parties, or 
Procedure, 1989 Utah L. Rev. 223. witnesses, 56 A.L.R.4th 1214. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 21 Propriety of trial court order limiting time 
et
 *&l- for opening or closing argument in civil case — 
C.J.S. — 48A C.J.S. Judges § 53 et seq.
 g t a t e u^^ 7 1 A.L.R.4th 130. 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of state 
78-7-17.5. Authority of magistrate. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, a magistrate as defined in Section 
77-1-3 shall have the authority to: 
(a) commit a person to incarceration prior to trial; 
(b) set bail and release upon the payment of bail and satisfaction of any 
other conditions of release; 
(c) issue warrants of search and arrest; 
(d) conduct an initial appearance in a felony; 
(e) conduct arraignments; 
(f) conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause; 
and 
(g) issue temporary orders as provided by rule of the Judicial Council. 
(2) In a first degree or capital felony, only a judge of a court of record may 
set or deny bail or commit a person to imprisonment prior to trial. Except as 
provided in Subsection 78-5-104(2), in felony cases only a judge or commis-
sioner of a court of record may conduct an initial appearance, preliminary 
examination, or arraignment. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. —5 Am. Jur. 2d Arrest §§ 4,7 Bail it 23, 54; 22 CJJS. Criminal Law § 334 
to 17; 8 Am. Jur. 2d Bail and Recognizance et seq. 
§ 23. Key Number*. —Arrest«» 65 to 68; Bail«» 
C.J.S. — 6A CJJS. Arrest $1 4 to 9; 8 CJ.S. 42, 49; Criminal Law *» 215 to 220. 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(1) When a summons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the defendant 
shall appear before the court as directed in the summons. 
(2) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest with or without 
a warrant, the person arrested shall be taken to a magistrate under Section 
77-7-19. If a magistrate is not available in the circuit or precinct, the person 
arrested shall be taken to the nearest available magistrate for setting of bail. 
If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed without delay before the 
magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense. 
(3) (a) If a person is arrested in a county other than where the offense was 
committed he shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county 
where the crime was committed and shall be taken before the proper 
magistrate under these rules. 
(b) If for any reason the person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
the county and the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor for 
which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a conviction under 
Subsection 77-7-21(1), he may state in writing that he desires to forfeit 
bail, waive trial in the district in which the information is pending, and 
consent to disposition of the case in the county in which he was arrested, 
held, or present. 
(c) Upon receipt of the defendant's statement, the clerk of the court in 
which the information is pending shall transmit the papers in the pro-
ceeding or copies of them to the clerk of the court for the county in which 
the defendant is arrested, held, or present. The prosecution shall continue 
in that county. 
(d) Forfeited bail shall be returned to the jurisdiction that issued the 
warrant. 
(e) If the defendant is charged with an offense other than a misde-
meanor for which a voluntary forfeiture of bail may be entered as a 
conviction under Subsection 77-7-21(1), he shall be taken without unnec-
essary delay before a magistrate within the county of arrest for the deter-
mination of bail under Section 77-20-1 and released on bail or held with-
out bail under Section 77-20-1. 
(f) Bail shall be returned to the magistrate having jurisdiction over the 
offense, with the record made of the proceedings before the magistrate. 
(4) The magistrate having jurisdiction over the offense charged shall, upon 
the defendant's first appearance before him, inform the defendant: 
(a) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish a copy to 
him; 
(b) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the infor-
mation and how to obtain them; 
(c) of his right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court 
without expense to him if he is unable to obtain his own counsel; 
(d) of his rights concerning pretrial release, including bail; and 
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(e) that he is not required to make any statement, and that the state-
ments he does make may be used against him in a court of law. 
(5) The magistrate shall, after providing the information under Subsection 
(4) and before proceeding further, allow the defendant reasonable time and 
opportunity to consult counsel and shall allow him to contact any attorney by 
any reasonable means, without delay and without fee. 
(6) If the charge against the defendant is a misdemeanor, the magistrate 
shall call upon the defendant to enter a plea. 
(a) If the plea is guilty, the defendant shall be sentenced by the magis-
trate as provided by law. 
(b) If the plea is not guilty, a trial date shall be set. The date may not 
be extended except for good cause shown. Trial shall be held under these 
rules and law applicable to criminal cases. 
(7) (a) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he may not be called on to 
enter a plea before the committing magistrate. During the initial appear-
ance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a 
preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a prelimi-
nary examination, and the prosecuting attorney consents, the magistrate 
shall order the defendant bound over to answer in the district court. 
(b) If the defendant does not waive a preliminary examination, the 
magistrate shall schedule the preliminary examination. The examination 
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days if the 
defendant is in custody for the offense charged and not later than 30 days 
if he is not in custody. These time periods may be extended by the magis-
trate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination may not be held if 
the defendant is indicted. 
(8) (a) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws 
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden 
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and 
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses 
against him. 
(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe 
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause 
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on 
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly 
raised at the preliminary examination. 
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, 
the magistrate shall dismiss the information and discharge the defen-
dant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
(9) At a preliminary examination, the magistrate, upon request of either 
party, may exclude witnesses from the courtroom and may require witnesses 
not to converse with each other until the preliminary examination is con-
cluded. On the request of either party, the magistrate may order all spectators 
to be excluded from the courtroom. 
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(10) (a) If the magistrate orders the defendant bound over to the district 
court, the magistrate shall execute in writing a bind-over order and shall 
transmit to the clerk of the district court all pleadings in and records 
made of the proceedings before the magistrate, including exhibits, record-
ings, and any typewritten transcript. 
(b) When a magistrate commits a defendant to the custody of the sher-
iff, the magistrate shall execute the appropriate commitment order. 
(11) (a) When a magistrate has good cause to believe that any material 
witness in a case pending before him will not appear and testify unless 
bond is required, he may fix a bond with or without sureties, and in a sum 
he considers adequate, for the appearance of the witness. 
(b) If the witness fails or refuses to post the bond with the clerk of the 
court, the magistrate may commit him to jail until he complies or is 
otherwise legally discharged. 
(c) If the witness does provide bond when required, he may be exam-
ined and cross-examined before the magistrate in the presence of the 
defendant and his testimony shall be recorded. He shall then be dis-
charged. 
(d) If the witness is unavailable or fails to appear at any subsequent 
hearing or trial when ordered to do so, the recorded testimony may be 
used at the hearing or trial in lieu of the personal testimony of the wit-
ness. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, deleted the sub-
section designation (a) at the beginning of the 
section; rewrote present Subsection (3), which 
read I f a person is arrested in a county other 
than where the offense was committed he shall 
without necessary delay be returned to the 
county wherein the crime was committed and 
shall be taken before the proper magistrate as 
provided in these rules. If, for any reason, the 
person arrested cannot be promptly returned to 
such county, he shall, without unnecessary de-
lay, be taken before a magistrate within the 
county of arrest for the determination of bail 
and released thereon or other appropriate dis-
position. Bail, if taken, shall be returned forth-
with to the proper magistrate having jurisdic-
tion over the offense together with the record 
made of the proceedings before such magis-
trate"; redesignated former Subsections 
(a)(4)(i) to (a)(4)(v) as present Subsections 
(4)(a) to (4)(e); substituted "pretrial release, in-
cluding bail" for "bail or other circumstances 
under which he may obtain pretrial release" in 
Subsection (4)(d); inserted subsection designa-
tion (5) and substituted "after providing the 
information under Subsection (4)" for "there-
upon"; redesignated former Subsection (b) as 
present Subsection (6) and inserted the desig-
nations (a) and (b) therein; redesignated for-
mer Subsection (c) as present Subsection (7); 
redesignated former Subsections (dXD to (d)(3) 
as present Subsections (8) to (10); deleted "if 
made, in the magistrate's court" at the end of 
the introductory paragraph of present Subsec-
tion (10); redesignated former Subsections (e) 
and (f) as present Subsections (10)(a> and 
(10)(b); and made minor stylistic changes 
throughout. 
The 1988 (2nd S.S.) amendment divided for-
mer Subsection (3)(e) into present Subsections 
(3)(e) and (3)(f); substituted '"under Section 
77-20-1 and released on bail or held without 
bail under Section 77-20-1" for "and released 
on bail or by other appropriate disposition" and 
made a punctuation change in present Subsec-
tion (3)(e); made a phraseology change in Sub-
section (5); substituted "enter a plea" for 
"plead" in Subsection (6); divided Subsection 
(7) into Subsections (7)(a) and (7)(b); substi-
tuted "enter a plea" for "plead" in the first sen-
tence of Subsection (7)(a); added the (a) desig-
nation to the beginning of Subsection (10); re-
designated former Subsection (10)(a) as Sub-
section (10)(b) and former Subsection (10)(b) as 
present Subsections (ll)(a) to (ll)(d); and 
made minor stylistic changes. 
Laws 1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, i 5 provides: 
"This act takes effect on January 1,1989, if the 
BAIL CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT is 
approved by the voters during the next general 
election." The bail constitutional amendment, 
amending Utah Const., Art. I, i 8, was pro-
posed by Laws 1988 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 1, and approved in November 
1988. 
Cross-References. — Court reporters, 
§ 78-56-1.1 et seq. 
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ground for reversal, new trial, or mistrial, 60 in federal criminal case during its progress as 
A.L.R.4th 1063. ground for mistrial, new trial, or reversal, 85 
Prosecutor's appeal in criminal case to ra- A.L.R Fed 13. 
rial, national, or religious prejudice as ground 'Recantation 'of testimony of witness as 
for mistrial, new trial, reversal, or vacation of _ . M _ i a *» _ „_ ^ a l fi^^«i «^«„„«i ««« 
sentence-modern cais, 70 A.L.R.4th 664. «">**& for new tnal-federal criminal cases, 
Standard for granting or denying new trial 
_ 94 A.L.R. Fed. 60. 
in state criminal case on basis of recanted tes- K e y Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 911 to 
timony—modern cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031. 965. 
Juror's reading of newspaper account of trial 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the 
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, 
order an information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defen-
dant to trial; 
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any 
bill of particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the of-
fense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the 
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and 
entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable 
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly 
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impanel-
ing or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the 
offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect 
to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged 
and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to 
any other prosecution for the offense charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may 
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. 
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or 
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in 
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same 
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted 
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the 
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony. 
Cross-References. — Detainers against Dismissal where evidence not sufficient to 
prisoners, dismissal of action for failure to establish offense charged, Rule 17. 
bring to trial, § 77-29-1. Right to speedy trial, Utah Const., Art. I, 
Dismissal not a bar to further proceedings, Sec 12' § 77-1-6 
§ 77-1-7. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal prosecution because of failure of jury to agree 
Law §§ 512 to 519; 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal after successive trials, 4 A.L.R.4th 1274. 
Law §§ 859 to 875. What constitutes "manifest necessity" for 
C.J.S. — 22A C J.S. Criminal Law § 610 et state prosecutor's dismissal of action, allowing 
seq. subsequent trial despite jeopardy's having at-
A.L.R. — Construction and effect of statute tached, 14 A.L.R.4th 1014. 
authorizing dismissal of criminal action upon When does delay in imposing sentence vio-
settlement of civil liability growing out of act late speedy trial provision, 86 A.L.R.4th 340. 
charged, 42 A.L.R.3d 315. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 574, 
Propriety of court's dismissing indictment or 576. 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of the court from which the 
appeal is taken a notice of appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed 
from, and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party or his attorney of record. 
Proof of service of the copy shall be filed with the court. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the appellate 
court decides that the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the appellate court decides that 
the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
(4) (a) All appeals in criminal cases shall be taken within 30 days after the 
entry of the judgment appealed from, or, if a motion for a new trial or 
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial of the 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving notice 
shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material defect in 
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeal, or upon motion of the appel-
lant. The dismissal of the appeal affirms the judgment unless another 
appeal may be, and is, timely taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond shall be 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on briefs. If an appellant's brief is filed, the 
appeal shall be decided even though a party, upon notice of the hearing, fails 
to appear for oral argument. 
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(4) Upon receipt of the Offense Tracking Number from booking personnel, 
the prosecutor shall forward the number immediately to the court. 
(5) If the defendant appears at court and does not have the summons form 
with the date and time of booking and the Offense Tracking Number, court 
personnel shall instruct the defendant to go immediately to the jail or other 
designated place for booking and release. If possible, court personnel shall 
postpone the arraignment in order to allow sufficient time for the booking to 
be accomplished prior to arraignment. 
(Added effective March 31, 1992.) 
Rule 4-610. Appointment of justice court judges to preside 
at preliminary hearings. 
Intent* 
To establish the criteria for the appointment of justice court judges to pre-
side at preliminary hearings. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district courts, the circuit courts and the justice 
courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) The presiding district court judge may, on a case by case basis, appoint a 
justice court judge to preside at a preliminary hearing if: 
(A) the justice court judge consents to the appointment; 
(B) the justice court judge has either completed a course in the conduct-
ing of preliminary hearings or has presided over at least five preliminary 
hearings prior to the effective date of this rule; and 
(C) either: 
(i) no judge or commissioner of a trial court of record within the 
district is reasonably able to conduct the preliminary hearing within 
the time period specified by law and the parties are unwilling to 
stipulate to an extension of the time period; or 
(ii) the parties, on the record or in writing, stipulate to the ap-
pointment. 
(2) The Justice Court Administrator shall maintain a list of those justice 
court judges who meet the qualifications set forth in paragraph (1)(B) above. 
(3) The administrative office shall offer courses in the conducting of prelim-
inary hearings, and shall pay the expenses of justice court judges attending 
such courses not offered in conjunction with the annual justice court judges 
conference. 
(4) Preliminary hearings conducted pursuant to this rule shall be con-
ducted on the record. 
(Added effective January 1, 1992.) 
Rule 4-611. Probable cause determinations for purposes of 
detention. 
Intent: 
To establish a uniform procedure for conducting probable cause determina-
tions for the purpose of determining whether a person arrested without a 
warrant is to be detained. 
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